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Joint UNDP-DPA Programme  
on Building National Capacities  
for Conflict Prevention

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Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National  
Capacities for Conflict Prevention

# MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT

2015-2017

SUBMITTED BY:

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## List of Abbreviations and acronyms

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|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>ASEAN</b>   | <b>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</b>            |
| <b>AWP</b>     | <b>Annual Work Plan</b>                                  |
| <b>BCPR</b>    | <b>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</b>         |
| <b>BPPS</b>    | <b>Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (of UNDP)</b> |
| <b>CARICOM</b> | <b>Caribbean Community</b>                               |
| <b>CCA</b>     | <b>Common Country Analysis</b>                           |
| <b>CCJP</b>    | <b>Commission for Justice and Peace</b>                  |
| <b>CDA</b>     | <b>Conflict and Development Analysis</b>                 |
| <b>CPD</b>     | <b>Country Programme Document</b>                        |
| <b>DOCO</b>    | <b>Development Operations Coordination Office</b>        |
| <b>DPA</b>     | <b>Department of Political Affairs</b>                   |
| <b>DPs</b>     | <b>Development Partners</b>                              |
| <b>EU</b>      | <b>European Union</b>                                    |
| <b>FBA</b>     | <b>Folke Bernadotte Academy</b>                          |
| <b>HRuF</b>    | <b>Human Rights up Front</b>                             |
| <b>I4Ps</b>    | <b>Infrastructures for Peace</b>                         |
| <b>IPCR</b>    | <b>Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution</b>       |
| <b>JMC</b>     | <b>Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee</b>              |
| <b>KII</b>     | <b>Key Informant Interview</b>                           |
| <b>M&amp;E</b> | <b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>                         |
| <b>OCHA</b>    | <b>Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs</b>          |
| <b>OHCHR</b>   | <b>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</b>  |
| <b>PBF</b>     | <b>Peacebuilding Fund</b>                                |
| <b>PBSO</b>    | <b>Peacebuilding Support Office</b>                      |
| <b>PDA</b>     | <b>Peace and Development Advisor</b>                     |
| <b>PDS</b>     | <b>Peace and Development Specialist</b>                  |

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| <b>PMD</b>    | <b>Policy and Mediation Division (of DPA)</b>                     |
| <b>PPP</b>    | <b>Peacebuilding Priority Plan</b>                                |
| <b>PVE</b>    | <b>Preventing Violent Extremism</b>                               |
| <b>RC</b>     | <b>Resident Coordinator</b>                                       |
| <b>RPA</b>    | <b>Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment</b>                      |
| <b>RRF</b>    | <b>Results and Resources Framework</b>                            |
| <b>SCORE</b>  | <b>Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index</b>                   |
| <b>SMART</b>  | <b>Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound</b> |
| <b>ToC</b>    | <b>Theory of Change</b>   |
| <b>ToRs</b>   | <b>Terms of Reference</b>   |
| <b>UN</b>     | <b>United Nations</b>   |
| <b>UNCT</b>   | <b>United Nations Country Team</b>                                |
| <b>UNDAF</b>  | <b>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</b>            |
| <b>UNDP</b>   | <b>United Nations Development Programme</b>                       |
| <b>UNEG</b>   | <b>United Nations Evaluation Group</b>                            |
| <b>UNICEF</b> | <b>United Nations Children's Fund</b>                             |
| <b>UNV</b>    | <b>United Nations Volunteers</b>                                  |

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A special thank you goes to all the donors, Headquarters staff, programme partners and short-term advisors who met with us and availed themselves for follow-up interviews. Thank you also to the Resident Coordinators we met with during our mission to New York as well as those we interviewed telephonically. We thank you all for sharing your insights and perspectives as these enabled us to better understand the intricacies of the Programme.

We extend our appreciation to all the Resident Coordinators, Peace and Development Advisors and Peace and Development Specialists whom we met with during the country visits. Thank you for accepting our request to have more in-depth understanding of Programme achievements through your country work. Especially to the PDAs, thank you for arranging meetings with your partners and the background materials you shared with us.

Our greatest thanks go to all the national partners we met with during the country visits, with some meetings arranged at very short notice yet you graciously agreed to meet with us. Thank you.

Finally, to all the current and past PDAs who participated in the E-Survey, thank you very much.

This being an independent evaluation, the views expressed herein are entirely our own. However, we trust that this report is a true reflection of the insights, observations and lesson you shared with us during this evaluation.

# Executive Summary

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## INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and more recently the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), have been collaborating on the *Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention*. First launched in 2004, the programme has grown significantly in recent years. During the period under review for the evaluation (January 2015 to June 2017), the Joint Programme has approved the provision of conflict prevention support to 50 countries globally, mostly through the deployment of Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs). The deployment of PDAs represents the most visible element of the partnership, though the Programme provides broader support. The Joint Programme is structured according to five Outputs all implemented with the overarching aim of **strengthening national capacities for conflict prevention**. Currently, the programme is being implemented in five regions (Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Arab States and the Americas), with the Africa region having the most number of PDAs (42% of approved PDA posts during the period under review).

This is a unique programme both in terms of its managements and leadership, as well as its very nature. The partnership between UNDP and DPA in this project is an example of how different arms of the UN can work successfully together in pursuit of preventing violent conflict and building capacities for peace. It has enabled better coordination between UNDP and DPA through the interactions and work of PDAs.

It is important to highlight that peacebuilding programmes by their very nature present some challenges in terms of evaluation in that, often, results are implicit and nebulous to quantify and attribute directly to a particular intervention. The evaluators were mindful of this challenge and ask users of this evaluation to factor in this reality as they read this report. Be that as it may, the evaluation has made every effort to showcase the successes raised and to highlight the contributions made by the Joint Programme both at the global as well as country levels.

## EVALUATION PURPOSE

Three core purposes were proposed for conducting the evaluation, namely:

- **Supporting programme accountability** to management, partners and beneficiaries by providing independent and objective information regarding programme performance and progress to date;
- **Enhancing policy and programmatic effectiveness** by providing evidence-based findings and recommendations that Joint Programme management and stakeholders could use to make mid-course corrections and/or improvements to ongoing programme design and implementation;
- **Providing insights into the next programme design** through findings, conclusions and key recommendations that emerged from this evaluation.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

As outlined in the Terms of Reference, the evaluators assessed the Programme's: strategic positioning and relevance; results-based programme design, management and M&E; effectiveness; efficiency; management systems and capacities; sustainability; partnerships; and national leadership and ownership of country-level interventions.

## EVALUATION APPROACH, METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS

The mixed method approach was used for this evaluation and both programme progress against set targets to date and programme performance were assessed. Purposive sampling was used at all levels of data collection to ensure that the most suitable partners and beneficiaries were interviewed as well to allow for a strategic spread of contexts, types of interventions and programmatic support and the contributions that the Programme has made towards building national capacities despite its very nuanced and flexible nature. The evaluators endeavoured to ensure gender and ethnic/cultural diversity was considered in sampling to allow for as representative a sample as was feasible.

### DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The following methods were utilised for data collection during this evaluation: **Desk Review** – Of programme documents, reports and related literature, as well as a review of a select sample PDA reports among others; **PDA E-Survey** – Targeting all current and former PDAs in the period under review. The consultants developed a set of questions that were administered through Survey Monkey; **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)** – Ranging from Resident Coordinators, Headquarters staff, donors, select PDAs and national partners at country level; and **Country Field Visits** – The evaluators visited 8 countries that have a serving PDA or where one recently exited for in-depth interviews and understanding of the results of the Programme at country level. Each evaluator visited four countries. These countries were used as examples to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of Joint Programme support through PDA deployments among other programme activities.

### DATA ANALYSIS

Data entry, cleaning, and analysis were a continuous process from the development of the inception report, desk review, E-Survey, KIIs and country visits. Field and interview notes, secondary data sources and qualitative information were synthesised. Triangulation of the data was done to support a coherent view of issues under study. Information gathered from the stakeholders through KIIs was triangulated through analysis with the information provided by Joint Programme management and PDAs in the countries visited.

## EVALUATION FINDINGS

### STRATEGIC POSITIONING AND RELEVANCE

The Joint Programme was consistently recognised by stakeholders as extremely relevant and well situated to support new institutional priorities, particularly as the Programme contributes to bridging the peace and development parts of the UN system at both Headquarters and at the country-level. The Joint Programme was recognised by most stakeholders for being ahead of recent UN system thinking in terms of conflict prevention and was able to positively influence how conflicts are handled and responded to at the country level.

### RESULTS-BASED PROGRAMME DESIGN, MANAGEMENT AND M&E

The joint design and management of a programme, resourced from multiple funding sources and implemented flexibly across 50 different country contexts, naturally presents challenges for employing results-based management methods. Moreover, defining and measuring impact results remain central challenges to the entire conflict prevention and peacebuilding sector. Given these constraints, it is not surprising that some key elements of results-based programme design, management and M&E need strengthening in the Joint Programme. While the Programme has

achieved successes in most contexts, it has been problematic for the Programme to systematically and coherently define and demonstrate its impact. Management has been stretched and predominantly focused on the achievement and measurement of 'outputs', with less time and resources available to systematically monitor for outcomes or impact. At the country-level, fully articulated agreed results and milestones of achievement were usually not in-place at the outset of PDA deployments. At a deeper level, there were often different expectations among stakeholders about the Programme's purpose and impact. In practical terms, there were instances when unreconciled expectations about the goals, roles and functions of a PDA undermined their effectiveness and some of the impact of the Joint Programme. Helpfully, Joint Programme management is conscious of the need to progressively advance results-based practices into the Programme.

## **EFFECTIVENESS**

This was assessed based on the stated project Outputs. The evaluation found that performance varied with some Outputs having made significant progress towards attainment of programme Outcomes whereas performance of others could have been improved. Management pointed out that one challenge the Programme faced was demands on the limited funding it had during the period under review. This necessitated some outputs being put on hold as higher priority was given to deploying PDAs to meet increasing needs and requests from Resident Coordinators (RCs). Despite this, the programme has proved effective particularly in its contribution towards addressing country-level challenges and needs regarding the strengthening of national capacities for peace.

## **EFFICIENCY**

The evaluators faced challenges in assessing efficiency of the Joint Programme, which had few systems for collecting data and measuring efficiency. Therefore, the evaluators looked at what various aspects of programme efficiency that could be examined. Initial findings indicate that programme resource uptake is satisfactory. Very recent improvements appear to have been made in catalytic fund approval turnaround times and PDA deployment times.

## **SUSTAINABILITY**

Given the achievements of the Joint Programme and the experiences that RCs shared on the value of having PDAs, coupled with increasing fragility and internal conflict in some regions, there are increasing demands and requests for PDAs and other Joint Programme support. The Joint Programme has responded well in seeking to broaden its donor base and increase funding from current partners thus taking positive steps to ensure programme sustainability. The evaluators noted with concern, however, that the generally short nature of Joint Programme commitments to fund PDA deployments for one to two years (though in practice this has sometimes eventually been extended longer) in relation to how long it takes to build relationships and sufficient trust among key stakeholders at national level may have a negative impact on sustainability of results. Though recognised as crucial, sustainability and exit strategies for PDA deployments were largely afterthoughts that generally arose only once funding started to run out at the county level. Overall, the Joint Programme needs to better ensure the integration of sustainability plans at the design stage of country engagements and PDA deployments. Funding timeframes and sustainability strategies for PDAs need to be discussed and agreed among the Joint Programme, DPA, UNDP, RCs and UNCTs in advance of PDA deployments.

## **MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CAPACITIES**

The Joint Programme Secretariat was nearly universally appreciated and valued for its positive approach, responsiveness and professional conduct. Many PDAs and RCs shared that they could often



draw upon strong support from the Secretariat for access to best practice, resources, contacts, programme design support, strategizing and problem-solving in times of need. Good effort has been made at information management given existing staffing and the evaluators found the Secretariat to be responsive in providing documentation and clarification on programme management queries. Many stakeholders noted a number of key improvements to management systems and capacities during the period under review. Suggestions have been made that certain management systems could be further enhanced and improved upon, such as the Criticality Assessment and Roster system, and that management authority could be restructured to achieve more optimal project management coherence and effectiveness.

## **PARTNERSHIPS**

The Programme has forged partnerships within the UN as well as externally. One such partnership that has made significant contribution to the efficacy of the Joint Programme with the Folke Bernadotte Academy which has been leading the PDA Inductions and has now seen the deployment of 8 FBA secondees as Peace and Development Specialists (PDSs). Within the UN, the partnership with the United Nations Volunteers programme has resulted in the deployment of UN Volunteers to provide the support to PDAs. Through the partnership with the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre in Norway, PDAs (particularly those about to complete their tour of duty) are given a two-week fellowship to reflect and write. The Joint Programme is commended for this innovative way of capturing this wealth of information. The partnership with the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has proved invaluable in providing funding for PDAs, who have in-turn facilitated the initiation of PBF programmes in-country; at the country level, this has enabled closer inter-agency collaboration and joint programming in some instances.

## **NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP**

Evaluators found good evidence in all visited countries of good national ownership and leadership of PDA supported initiatives, including establishment of different 'infrastructures for peace' (I4Ps), national strategies and national and local dialogue processes. What is not demonstrated is regularised Member State (whether as countries hosting PDAs or as funders of the Programme) involvement in the Joint Programme at the global level. If the Programme is about building national capacities, then some form of consultation and partnership with Member States must be reflected in the Joint Programme's management processes.

## **SUMMARISED CONCLUSIONS**

In its totality, the evaluators assess the Joint Programme as meeting standards and expectations, even exceeding standards and expectations in some areas. The evaluation has also identified some challenges and suggests where adjustments and improvements should be made. Overall, most involved stakeholders see the Joint Programme as valuable and needed; there is strong demand for such work to not only continue but to consider how it can be further scaled-up and enhanced. Further elaboration is contained in the main report. While not wishing to downplay the Programme's positives, the following summarised principal conclusions and recommendations have largely been formulated to provide constructive suggestions for how management might further improve upon the successes of the Joint Programme:

**Conclusion 1:** The PDA-modality is the flagship of the Joint Programme and has largely been a success across a broad spectrum of different country contexts. Through PDAs, the Joint Programme has made an impact at the country level among national partners and demand for PDA deployments is increasing. PDAs are so valuable that the modality is at risk of becoming a victim of its own success if

the Joint Programme becomes seen as a PDA ‘rostering service’. As the Joint Programme matures and potentially scales-up in its next programme phase, management has the opportunity to enhance its approaches and more comprehensively respond to the requirements of different country contexts with a wider spectrum of results-based support than simply deploying PDA-types. Such a future route was often argued by many stakeholders, who described the next programme phase as an opportunity to strive for a “Joint Programme 2.0” or an enhanced “Status Quo-Plus” that would more fully elaborate and enhance current Joint Programme approaches.

**Conclusion 2:** The Joint Programme faces unique challenges for employing results-based programme design and management methods. Programme management has progressed in recent years, but is still striving to meet key standards and requirements from the perspective of results-based programming. A central challenge has been effectively defining results, consistently capturing these through the Programme’s M&E systems and then translating these into a coherent narrative about the Programme’s impact. More attention and resources need to be devoted to results-based design and M&E to ensure the Programme can demonstrate its impact, both for accountability and to maintain confidence of its funding base. At a deeper level, though, the Joint Programme has neither been designed nor operated on the premise of an explicit and coherent ‘theory of change’ (ToC) from which the rest of the strategy flows, reflecting the fact that different stakeholders have different expectations of the Programme. The process to design the next phase of the Joint Programme presents an excellent opportunity to further strengthen the Programme’s: theory of change; results strategies at the country-level; and results-based M&E systems.

**Conclusion 3:** The Joint Programme has been ahead of UN thinking and practice in terms of conflict prevention, with ground breaking interventions (such as eminent persons panels), at the country level. The Programme possess great potential for translating its lessons, good practice examples and evidence-base into vital inputs for conflict prevention and sustaining peace policy development at the global, regional and national levels (as well as for replication in other countries under the Joint Programme). While more work is needed to realise the Programme’s largely internally focused learning and knowledge management results under Output 5, the Joint Programme also possess great potential to strategically input into the conflict prevention and sustaining peace community of practice across the wider UN.

**Conclusion 4:** Given the global nature of the Programme, number of outputs, requisite levels of interactions and engagements across so many countries and stakeholders and need for much stronger results-based programme and the enhancement of other management capacities, the current Programme management team is overstretched. While the existing team proved largely effective in responding to requests for information and clarifications, keeping the programme on-track and advancing some new management innovations, additional staff and other solutions are required to reinforce programme management capacity. This will especially be the case as many stakeholders see great potential and significant opportunities to scale-up the Joint Programme.

**Conclusion 5:** The results achieved through PDAs are attracting increased global interest and attention, inside and outside of the UN. The visibility and strategic positioning of the Programme is good across DPA, UNDP and PBSO. Most stakeholders involved with or benefitting from the Joint Programme see it as a valuable and much needed innovation and PDAs as strategic assets for the UN, national actors and the wider international community. At the same time, many wider stakeholders at the country and global levels, particularly UN entities outside of the Programme management team, do not understand or take advantage of the full value of PDAs or the Joint Programme.

**Conclusion 6:** There is sufficient evidence that at the country level, national ownership and leadership of PDA-supported initiatives is strong and that by working with institutions, strategically positioned

individuals and community-level initiatives (mainly through civil society partners), the chances of sustainability of results beyond PDA deployment is high. The challenge however is that commitment and coordination is largely dependent on the personal relations and understanding of leadership of the PDA and RC. This presents a risk of reversal of gains once these individuals leave. Apart from this, there is no regularised Member State involvement or consultation in the management processes of the Programme, an element that evaluators deemed essential.

**Conclusion 7:** The Joint Programme has been strategic in its partnerships to enhance programme delivery through PDAs. The FBA, UN Volunteer programme and the Inside Mediator project have made significant contributions. However, there is need for continued effort in forging partnerships with other sectors that could augment the current set and contribute to attainment of results.

### SUMMARISED RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** In potentially enhancing and scaling-up the Joint Programme, it is suggested that management prioritise improving the *quality* and *breadth* of Joint Programme support to each country engagement rather than the *quantity* of country engagements. This would require regularising more rigorous and collaborative needs assessments of country situations that involve all key stakeholders (such as UNDP, DPA, RCs, UNCT and national actors) to converge expectations into basic multi-year ‘engagement frameworks’. Such frameworks would identify a spectrum of needs-based support tailored to each country context, rather than necessarily defaulting to a PDA deployment approach. Working from an agreed framework, the Programme could also build-in sustainability outcomes and exit strategies from the outset. Such an approach would likely result in country engagements on average becoming more resource intensive and, as a consequence, management might effectively have to adopt a ‘narrower but deeper’ approach that would plateau the number of country engagements (though this depends on overall growth of Programme resource mobilisation).

**Recommendation 2:** It is recommended that Joint Programme management increases the use of results-based management practices as it designs its next programme phase, including taking steps to: undertake an inclusive and collaborative design process with stakeholders and partners; facilitate a process to review and develop a coherent and viable Theory of Change (ToC) followed then by design of a new Results Framework with realistic and clear Outcomes and expected Outputs; design workable indicators and establish baselines so that country-level results can be aggregated into global impact statements (aided by instituting ‘engagement frameworks’ with in-country results linked to the Joint Programme’s Outcomes and ToC); establish indicators and baselines for global results the Programme might seek to achieve, elements of programme management performance and criteria for future evaluations; and re-develop M&E systems with practical reporting mechanisms that document results (not just outputs). Management should consider the addition of an M&E Specialist to the Secretariat so that it can effectively carry the additional workload of designing the next programme phase, but also the enhanced M&E approaches required for the next programme phase. Alternatively, project design and M&E specialists could be procured over the short-term to support the Secretariat during a new programme design process. Advice and support could also be sought from UNEG and/or the PBSO, as well as through collaborative partnerships with peace research and other institutions that could enhance the Programme through enhanced monitoring methodologies and innovative data management technologies.

**Recommendation 3:** The Joint Programme is recommended to take steps to increasingly position itself in closer support to the centres of conflict prevention and sustaining peace policy development and practice within the UN. More immediately, this could include convening a roundtable with key players supporting the SG’s Prevention Agenda where national partners of the Programme and PDAs would

have an opportunity to share their experiences. More long-term, the Joint Programme should explore during the design of its next programme phase how it might prioritise policy advocacy as an outcome area. Similarly, the Joint Programme should explore during the design of its next programme phase how it might expand its current learning Outcome and strategies for the benefit of the wider UN conflict prevention and sustaining peace community of practice.

**Recommendation 4:** The evaluators recommend that the Joint Programme both restructures the Secretariat and seeks additional partnerships to reinforce its programme management capacities. Firstly, the Secretariat should be expanded. A minimum team to enable the Programme to moderately scale-up and implement many of the enhancements recommended in the evaluation would include: a project manager with delegated decision-making authority supported by a project coordinator to adequately handle the responsibilities of a programme of this nature; a full-time specialist to establish and run the results-based M&E and reporting systems; a full-time specialist to expand and run a professional development and learning strategy directed not just at PDAs, but a wider spectrum of key stakeholders; and a finance/admin assistant. Secondly, the Joint Programme should identify and deepen strategic partnerships with think-tanks, specialised institutions and even private sector actors that may be willing to contribute resources, systems and skill-sets for enhancing programme management capacity and performance.

**Recommendation 5:** The evaluation recommends the Joint Programme invests more to strategically position itself through partnerships across the wider UN system, particularly the development and human rights pillars. In the near-term, Joint Programme management could develop a communications and strategic engagement strategy to enhance awareness of its work and explore how it might enhance its strategic partnerships across the UN system. Including DPA regional divisions as direct members of the Technical Committee would also deepen understanding of the Joint Programme across DPA. More long-term, the Joint Programme should explore during the design of its next programme phase how it might prioritise enhanced inter-agency involvement and joint initiatives both at the global level and through joint-programming at the country level (potentially in closer partnership with the PBSO). As part of this, management needs to instigate more dialogue with senior UN management about how the Joint Programme will converge with the structural changes taking place both with the UN's peace and security architecture and its development system. Suggestions were even made by some stakeholders that an opportunity exists to utilise the successes, approaches and lessons of the Joint Programme as a foundation for establishing a strategic UN conflict prevention platform that comprehensively integrates the peace and development pillars of the UN system in support of the Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace Agendas.

**Recommendation 6:** It is recommended that PDAs and RCs identify strong institutions (either state or non-state) that can be supported to coordinate national actors in conflict prevention work such that, even when the PDA leaves, national institutions can sustain the work. Regarding the involvement of Member States in the programme leadership, it is proposed in the next programme cycle that an ad hoc structure of programme advisors be created involving 7 Member States where PDAs are deployed. These could meet with Joint Programme management annually, with one or two virtual meetings in between. Membership can be rotated every two or three years. This group could serve as Member State advocates for the Joint Programme.

**Recommendation 7:** It is recommended that the Joint Programme conduct a partnership review and develop a Partnerships Strategy that more thoroughly considers foundations, research institutes, peace practice organisations, private philanthropies and the private sector as potential partners. This would enable the Programme to expand its resource base and lead to enhanced programme quality, reach and impact.

# Chapter one

## Introduction and Background

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### 1.1 PROGRAMME BACKGROUND

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and more recently the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), have been collaborating on the **Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention**. First launched in 2004, the Programme has grown significantly in recent years.

During the period under review for the evaluation (January 2015 to June 2017), the Joint Programme has approved the provision of conflict prevention support to 50 countries globally, mostly through the deployment of Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs). The deployment of PDAs represents the most visible element of the partnership, though the Programme provides broader support.

The Joint Programme is structured according to the following five Outputs:

- Peace and Development Advisers deployed to help build long-term capacity of national partners and UN Country Teams to undertake conflict/political analysis, and design and implement conflict-sensitive programming;
- Enhanced mechanisms and capacities for collaboration and dialogue;
- Mechanism for deployment of short-term expertise to respond and engage in crisis settings more responsive;
- Coordinated and complementary UNDP and DPA support, analysis, and engagement in target countries;
- Enhanced capacity of UN Country Teams, DPA, and UNDP to share good practices, lessons learned, and engage in community of practice.

Current funding partners of the Joint Programme include the European Union, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Programme has also cost shared some PDA deployments with the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). In the last two years, the Joint Programme has enhanced partnerships with Sweden's Folke Bernadotte Academy on training and capacity support, as well as with the UN Volunteer (UNV) programme, both in an effort to strengthen the technical capacities of and support to PDAs.

The current programme cycle covers the period of 2015-2018 and engages in multiple conflict prevention initiatives at the country level and regularly receives positive feedback from the Country Teams on the ground. Currently the programme is being implemented in five regions (Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Arab States and the Americas), the Africa region having the most number of PDAs (42% of approved PDA posts during the period under review).

### 1.2 EVALUATION PURPOSE

Three core purposes were proposed for conducting the evaluation namely:

- **Supporting programme accountability** to management, partners and beneficiaries by providing independent and objective information regarding programme performance and progress to date;

- **Enhancing policy and programmatic effectiveness** by providing evidence-based findings and recommendations that Joint Programme management and stakeholders could use to make mid-course corrections and/or improvements to ongoing programme design and implementation;
- **Providing insights into the next programme design** through findings, conclusions and key recommendations that emerged from this evaluation.

### 1.3 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

#### Evaluation objectives

The evaluation assessed Programme performance in achieving its intended results specifically focusing on the following components as outlined in the Terms of Reference:

##### At the country level:

- Evaluate the Programme vis-à-vis its intended objective of building national capacities for conflict prevention;
- Assess to what extent the Programme leverages UNCT's role in building prevention capacities at the country level;
- Review whether PDAs strike a balance in building national capacities, serving the Resident Coordinator and the UNCT, and the colleagues at the Headquarters;
- Review to what degree PDAs are successful in mainstreaming their political and conflict analysis into UNCT programming and monitoring;
- Assess the gender sensitivity of the work of the PDAs at the country level, and whether they are engaged in promoting women, peace and security related work at the country level;
- Gauge the degree to which the PDAs and the Programme engages other UN agencies and funds, including leveraging PBF/PBSO resources and EU-UN Insider Mediation Programme;
- Assess whether the functions of the PDAs are consistently understood and applied; and how context specific the functions become at the country level (noting some PDAs are deployed in mission settings, some have sub-regional roles);
- Explore whether the deployment of FBA seconded capacity, UNVs and other seconded staff have made an impact on the programme;
- Assess whether Country Teams in selected fragile countries that do not have a PDA would benefit from having such a function;
- Propose options for a framework for monitoring and evaluating the work for PDAs going forward; and for assessing the impact of the programme.

##### At the global level:

- Evaluate the degree to which the programme achieves the cross-fertilization of expertise and lessons learned between the cadre of PDAs;
- Evaluate to what degree the PDAs are able to leverage on the opportunities to connect to the larger community of practice of governance, conflict prevention, political and mediation expertise in UNDP and DPA;
- Evaluate the extent to which the Programme contributes to enhancing Joint UN action on prevention;

- Review the contribution of the Programme in enhancing UN collaboration between UNDP, DPA and PBSO/PBF.
- Assess the possible contribution of the Programme to the sustaining peace agenda and the SG's agenda on enhancing UN prevention capacity.

**At the Programme management level:**

- Review the management, operational, financial and administrative structures, including business processes (standard operating procedures) of the Programme and whether they are fit for purpose;
- options for the sustainability of the PDA cadre including options for cost-sharing of the function;
- Assess whether the Programme has the required resources (human and financial) to achieve its intended objectives;
- Explore options for further enhancing the gender balance within the PDA cadre;
- Assess the relevance of and the capacity of the Programme to respond to the bi-annual Montreux retreat recommendations.

#### **1.4 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

Being a mid-term evaluation, it covered the period from the start of this programme cycle in January 2015 to June 2017 and was conducted at three levels as per the ToRs, that is, the country, global and programme management levels. The ToRs is attached as **Annex 1**.

#### **1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA**

As outlined in the Terms of Reference, the evaluators assessed the Programme's: strategic positioning and relevance; results-based programme design, management and M&E; effectiveness; efficiency; management systems and capacities; sustainability; partnerships; and national leadership and ownership of country-level interventions.

#### **1.6 EVALUATION APPROACH, METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS**

The mixed method approach was used for this evaluation and both programme progress against set targets to date and programme performance were assessed. Purposive sampling was used at all levels of data collection to ensure that the most suitable partners and beneficiaries were interviewed as well to allow for a strategic spread of contexts, types of interventions and programmatic support; and the contributions that the Programme has made towards building national capacities despite its very nuanced and flexible nature. The evaluators endeavoured to ensure gender and ethnic/cultural diversity was considered in sampling to allow for as representative a sample as was feasible. The list of persons interviewed is attached as **Annex 2**.

#### **1.7 DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

The following methods were utilised for data collection during this evaluation:

**Desk Review** – Of programme documents, reports and related literature, as well as a review of a select sample PDA reports among others. This provided secondary data and enabled the team to have clarity on the issues to explore during the primary data collection phase.

**PDA E-survey** – Targeting all current and former PDAs in the period under review. The consultants developed a set of questions that were administered through Survey Monkey. The survey was open for a period of three weeks with an extension of 1 week and the team monitored responses to ensure a 60% response rate was achieved (27 responded out of 45 past/current PDAs invited to participate). This was an anonymous survey unless respondents voluntarily identified themselves.

**Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)** – This was done in four parts, first with a sample of 12 former/current Resident Coordinators (RCs) and a Special Envoy who have supervised PDAs during the period under review (excluding the 8 serving in the countries visited), ensuring representation of all regions. The second group was a sample of 16 former/current PDA-types drawn from the five regions serviced by the Programme (excluding the 8 serving in the countries visited). The third was interviews with individuals that have been deployed as short-term support either as interim PDAs, technical specialists or Headquarters staff, and finally key Joint Programme staff, regional service centre practice team leaders, United Nations Country Team (UNCT) members and staff, national interlocutors, beneficiaries and other UN projects and entities that interface with the Joint Programme. Development partners funding or providing technical support to the Joint Programme who attended the partners Event in June were also interviewed.

**Country Field Visits** – The evaluators visited 8 countries that have a serving PDA or where one recently exited for in-depth interviews and assessment of programme results at country level. Each evaluator visited four countries. Typically, the duration of each country-level mission was between two to four days. The table outlining the criteria for selection of countries and the identified countries per criterion is attached as **Annex 3**. The field visits also provided another layer of evaluative evidence gathering through national interlocutor interviews (government and civil society) the ultimate programme beneficiaries and UNCT heads and staff. Further, it allowed the evaluators to assess how FBA Secondees, UN Volunteers and short-term deployment support is adding value to the work of the PDAs and; finally, to identify suggestions for how such support can be replicated and or sharpened in countries with similar contextual dynamics.

## **1.8 DATA ANALYSIS**

Data entry, cleaning, and analysis were a continuous process from the development of the inception report, desk review, E-Survey, KIIs and country visits and interviews. Field and interview notes, secondary data sources and qualitative information were synthesised. Triangulation of the data sources was done to support a coherent view of issues under study. Information gathered from the stakeholders through KIIs was triangulated through analysis with the information provided by Joint Programme management and PDAs in the countries visited.

## **1.9 REPORTING**

A draft report was compiled, internally reviewed by Joint Programme management and leadership. After receiving feedback from Joint Programme management, the evaluators compiled a final report.

## **1.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

This study was conducted with the highest standards of integrity and respect. Free consent was obtained verbally at the start of the interviews from the institutions and individuals who provided information. Interactions with individuals were done observing mutual respect and taking into consideration gender, disability and age.

## **1.11 TEAM COMPOSITION**



The team comprised of two independent consultants with expertise and experience in peacebuilding programming in the Caucuses, Europe, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.

### **1.12 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

This evaluation was impacted by a number of factors namely, lack of a clear Theory of Change (ToC) against which to assess programme effectiveness using the results chain and logic. Another is the lack of outcome-level indicators. Given the very flexible and context specific nature of the programme approach in interventions, the team had difficulty in measuring progress towards Outcome-level results across the globe using the RRF (the RRF does not contain any Outcome-level result indicators, only Output-level indicators).

The evaluation commenced in June at the onset of when most key informants were already scheduled to go on holiday. This also affected the scheduling of country visits thus necessitating an extension of the duration of the study. Additionally, owing to the full schedules of most of the RCs and some Headquarters-level respondents, KIIs took longer than originally expected and the evaluators were not able to interview all the respondents they intended to. However, this did not have material impact on the results as the final sample interviewed had representation of all the key institutions and levels that interact with the Joint Programme and the information was triangulated with Joint Programme staff and evidence gathered during the country field visits.

# CHAPTER TWO

## Evaluation Findings

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### 2.1 STRATEGIC POSITIONING AND RELEVANCE

The UN Secretary General has identified conflict prevention as a priority during his tenure and has made repeated calls for the UN system to focus on strengthening the preventive aspects of its work. At the same time, the Sustaining Peace Agenda is gaining traction with calls to accelerate plans for making this a reality among Member States. The Joint Programme was consistently recognised by stakeholders as extremely relevant and well situated to support both of these new institutional priorities, particularly as the Programme works in bridging the peace and development elements of the UN system at Headquarters and at the country-level.

**The Joint Programme was recognised by most respondents as being ahead of new UN system thinking in terms of conflict prevention and was able to positively influence how conflicts are handled and responded to at the country level.** Nigeria is a good example of where PDA advice and accompaniment of national interlocutors has contributed to averting violent conflict in certain parts of the country. Some of the national-level mechanism that have been established through the PDA deployment such as the National Infrastructures for Peace in Ghana and Malawi, as well as the eminent person's panels in Lesotho, Uganda and Kenya, are already playing very strategic roles in sustaining peace in these countries as well as anticipating and mitigating conflicts that may arise. These mechanisms could be adopted and replicated as UN mechanisms for conflict prevention and peace consolidation globally, with context sensitivity being applied in how they are constituted and established in accordance with different national contextual realities and needs.

**The partnership between DPA and UNDP through the Joint Programme was assessed as being an example of the type of collaboration and strategic positioning of which the UN system needs to demonstrate more, especially in undertaking peace and development work.** The entirely joint UNDP-DPA Steering Committee, Technical Committees and Secretariat structures has ensured continuous dialogue between DPA and UNDP and a consensus-based approach for the management of the programme. Involving staff from UNDP-BPPS and DPA-PMD as co-chairs of the Technical Committee, as well as involving wider DPA representation, UNDP regional bureaux and the PBSO on the Senior Level Advisory Committee to the Steering Committee and on the Technical Committee, has strategically positioned the Joint Programme across DPA, UNDP and PBSO, preventing it from becoming "just another project". There were suggestions that the DPA regional divisions would gain greater first-hand understanding of the wider goals of the Programme if they directly participated in the Technical Committee. A question frequently raised by UN entities outside of Joint Programme management was that "if the Joint Programme is meant to serve the whole UN system then why is it only managed by UNDP and DPA?" Many UN actors and UNCT's commented that they are still effectively "on the outside" of a joint programme that is meant to support the wider UN system. The Joint Programme should explore how it can leverage its unique experience at the nexus between peace and development to attract meaningful buy-in, partnerships and resources from other UN entities to support the work of PDAs and UN conflict prevention goals in-country.

**The Joint Programme's experiences and lessons have great potential for informing system-wide conflict prevention and sustaining peace policy.** Conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy leadership currently rests with different parts of the UN's architecture. Although not an outcome area

of the Joint Programme, there were frequent suggestions from stakeholders that the Programme could position itself closer to and increasingly input its cumulative expertise into such UN strategic policy discussions and development. The Joint Programme was seen by many as having considerable potential to strategically position itself as a vital conflict prevention and peacebuilding “thought leader” within the UN and supporting existing UN focal points/leads for conflict prevention and sustaining peace policy development.

**Regional PDAs have the potential to influence and strengthen the implementation of RECs’ peace and security architecture.** The evaluation found the Caribbean Regional PDA, based in Trinidad and Tobago, has closely supported the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in the review of its Regional Crime and Security Strategy and development of a Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Importantly, the PDA was instrumental in articulating the need for early intervention and social responsibility elements in the Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which now also includes a pillar on preventing violent extremism rather than relying solely on law enforcement approaches. The Caribbean PDA has also usefully linked CARICOM Secretariat staff with those in the African Union and ASEAN secretariats to exchange lessons and experiences regarding peace and security. The Pacific Islands Forum has also been provided similar advisory and other support from the Fiji/Pacific PDA. The evaluation found these to be excellent examples of how strategically positioning Regional PDAs in partnership with RECs can make a deeper contribution. Such an approach could be further replicated in certain regions, as appropriate, to strengthen regional peace and security approaches.

In-country, the evaluation found that **PDAs were nearly universally seen as relevant and having strategic value, both for the breadth of their thematic expertise and for the breadth of their skills for analysis, policy advice, strategic thinking, partnership building, facilitating collaborative processes and catalysing new programmes.** As one UN staff noted, “There is simply no other position in a standard UNCT of development ‘technocrats’ like a PDA.” PDAs are often the *only* UN staff members with a “bird’s eye view”, understanding and interested in the underlying dynamics “behind the veil” and “not in the headlines” that are contributing to conflict. As one RC described, “The PDA has given me a new capacity to have a place at the table and to better engage with international actors [...] The PDA has enabled me to have a longer-term and strategic curve to my understanding of the context and to put development issues properly into the political context.”

Positioned at the juncture between the RC, UNCT, UNDP and DPA—as well as the juncture between the field and Headquarters—PDAs are often the only voice educating the UN about the context and prevention, as well as generating strategic thinking about how the UN can make itself relevant and useful. Reflecting on what change had been achieved in having a PDA in Ukraine, a national stakeholder said, “The orientation of the UN regarding conflict prevention in Ukraine is complete night and day compared to before the PDA. Before the deployment of the PDA, the UN was completely unprepared and not capable of dealing with conflict.” However, the extent of value a UNCT held of the PDA was often a function of the extent to which a PDA was empowered to engage with and serve the needs of the UNCT, but also fundamentally how well risks inherent in the nature and set-up of the UN development system were managed. The RC’s co-authority over UNDP often created perceptions that they are biased in favour of UNDP. As an extension of RCs, PDAs continuously faced the risks of being perceived as biased in favour of UNDP and having their credibility as a UN asset undermined. This represents a structural challenge that can only be resolved as part of ongoing institutional changes taking place with the UN development system.

## 2.2 RESULTS-BASED PROGRAMME DESIGN, MANAGEMENT AND M&E

The joint design and management of a programme, resourced from multiple funding sources and implemented flexibly across 50 different country contexts, naturally presents challenges for employing results-based management methods. Moreover, defining and measuring impact results remain central challenges to the entire conflict prevention and peacebuilding sector. Therefore, after reviewing available programme documentation and interviewing stakeholders, it is not surprising that some key elements of results-based programme design, management and M&E need strengthening in the Joint Programme. The Mid-Term Evaluation was a challenging process as the Joint Programme had not established many necessary conditions of ‘evaluability’<sup>1</sup>. Three key elements highlighted during the mid-term evaluation as needing further strengthening were the Programme’s: theory of change; results strategies at the country-level; and results-based M&E systems. Members of management felt that there had been increasing prioritisation of results-based management efforts in recent years, such as conducting this mid-term evaluation, undertaking the 2017 Audit and enhancing the Criticality Assessment (as an evidence-based and needs based resource allocation method was an important step to ensuring a results-oriented use of PDAs). Helpfully, Joint Programme management is conscious of these challenges, but pointed to the prioritisation of other strategic management measures (increasing requests for PDAs, setting-up the PDA Roster, re-invigorating the catalytic funds system, etc.) as having reduced the time and resources available to advance new results-based management measures. Management expressed a desire to explore how results-based practices could be better designed and resourced into the next programme cycle.

### 2.2.1 Theory of Change

Current Joint Programme project documentation represents some progression towards improved results-based management design. A key challenge, though, is that **project documentation does not present a specific and agreed to theory of change from which the rest of the project strategy flows**. When asked, interviewed stakeholders often held diverging viewpoints about the primary intended purpose of the Joint Programme and PDAs, which varied from:

- Directly catalysing, supporting, deepening and promoting national stakeholders and capacities for peacebuilding and preventing conflict;
- Strengthening UN systems in situations of conflict or tension, particularly enabling the Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team to better understand the context so as to (at the very least) promote more conflict-sensitive behaviour and (at its best) integrate conflict prevention as a core priority for UN strategies in-country;
- Providing vital information about in-country dynamics so as to increase the awareness of UN headquarters elements and senior UN management to issues of conflict prevention in-country;
- Providing additional UN (predominantly UNDP) capacity to develop and manage in-country programming that either: (i.) supports direct national conflict prevention efforts; or, (ii.) indirectly supports ‘structural’ conflict prevention through development interventions; and
- Enabling the PBSO to more effectively design and manage in-country PBF programming.

When current/past PDAs were surveyed as to “What their ToC as a PDA has been?”, there were mixed responses. Just over a third of responses focused principally on supporting national capacity and effectiveness for conflict prevention, while a third of responses focused principally on supporting UN capacities and effectiveness for conflict prevention. A little less than a third prioritised both equally or

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<sup>1</sup> “Evaluability can be defined by clarity in the intent of the subject to be evaluated, sufficient measurable indicators, accessible reliable information sources, and no major factor hindering an impartial evaluation process.” UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results (2002), p. 83.

linked their support to the UN *as a pathway to* ultimately strengthening national capacities and effectiveness for conflict prevention.

Not including an explicit ToC may have contributed to inconsistencies in programme design and management, including:

- The Project Document and RRF define one overall Outcome under which are three secondary Outcomes and five Outputs, but does not describe logical linkages between them;
- The Strategic Results Framework for 2015-2018 operates with a related but different set of five Outputs from those in the Project Document, and with no mention of the higher-level Outcomes to which they contribute and;
- Annual Reporting on outcome/output performance for 2015 and 2016 was largely not consistent with each other or organised in alignment with outcomes/outputs defined in the Project RRF.

Developing and presenting a ToC is not a theoretical exercise, it provides the basis for sound results-based programme design and management. A clear ToC articulates how and why a set of outcomes and activities will bring about sought changes by providing a logical flow from a problem or needs analysis to a change goal. Founding the Joint Programme on sound logic and agreed assumptions is crucial for programme effectiveness. A ToC is also a vital communications tool for the Joint Programme to “tell its story” and build a case for how it contributes to preventing the outbreak of violent conflict. Having an explicit ToC would also mean greater convergence of stakeholder expectations about what they jointly wish to achieve and how they will accomplish this through the Joint Programme, significantly mitigating the “constructive ambiguity” that always accompanies joint programmes. **It seems unlikely that the Joint Programme can successfully grow and scale-up until it can confidently articulate a coherent and viable ToC that reconciles the goals and aims of its different stakeholders.**

### 2.2.2 Results Strategies at the Country-Level

**At the country-level, common expectations, agreed results and milestones of achievement are the necessary starting point for the results-based design and management of PDA deployments; however, these usually did not exist at the onset of PDA deployments.** As a former UNDP regional bureau staff member said, “If you deploy a PDA, you should have a strategy *and* indicators for success.” But nearly all PDAs arrive in-post with their “generic” and “overloaded” ToRs as their only written strategic guidance. Their participation in the PDA Induction is useful, but it is only a generic briefing and training on the role of PDAs and the Joint Programme. What is missing is a consistent and joint-process for designing a PDA’s strategy and work plan. As one PDA explained, “the Joint Programme knew what functions I needed to perform, but didn’t provide any vision for the results I was expected to achieve.” The Induction is supposed to be accompanied by bilateral briefings with DPA, UNDP, PBSO and other Headquarters counterparts and then also a trilateral PDA, DPA and UNDP meeting to aid in developing and/or validating a PDA’s work strategy in-country. From interviews with PDAs and others, the trilateral meetings have often not occurred and PDAs have lost out on a crucial opportunity for developing a commonly agreed work strategy.

**Interviewees proposed that the Joint Programme takes leadership in ensuring results-based country engagements and in facilitating greater convergence of expectations.** Existing efforts to sensitise RCs and UNCTs about the purpose, roles and functions of PDAs and the higher-level results of the Joint Programme should continue and expand (these efforts would be bolstered by having a ToC). The Joint Programme could institutionalise more collaborative and rigorous assessment processes so that all stakeholders (Joint Programme, DPA, UNDP, RCs, UNCTs, national partners, etc.) jointly identify context-specific needs and jointly agree on what results are to be delivered with what resources.

Numerous stakeholders suggested **Joint Programme management should be responsible for facilitating agreement on some form of basic ‘engagement framework’ for its work in each country.** Tailored to context-specific needs, such engagement frameworks would: agree management and funding responsibilities; preliminarily outline core results for the Joint Programme’s engagement over an agreed multi-year timeframe; delineate basic roles, responsibilities and functions of the PDA or other deployed assets; and build-in sustainability and exit strategies from the start. Thereafter, recruitment of PDAs and/or deployment of other assets and resources would begin. Concise engagement frameworks would enable more targeted definitions of performance at the country-level from the outset, provide a foundation for more effective M&E of performance and ensure country engagements are based on needs rather than organisational and political factors. It would also be a requirement to help develop, validate or revisit these frameworks at the trilateral PDA, DPA and UNDP briefings that take place during PDA inductions. The use of such engagement frameworks would mitigate against the risk of the Joint Programme simply becoming a PDA-type ‘rostering service’; they would shift the Joint Programme towards an approach that offers a “wider menu” of results-based and more integrated support than simply deploying PDA-types. Of course, PDAs and partners in-country should be given scope to determine precisely what approaches would deliver core expected results.

**Engagement frameworks in each country could also serve as the basis for developing and monitoring PDA work plans.** Many stakeholders questioned the utility and value of the current PDA Annual Work Plan (AWP). Evaluators found that compliance with submission of AWP was mixed; newer PDAs more regularly complied, while many more established PDAs did not. When probed as to why, a number of PDAs cited non-responsiveness from HQ as a demotivating factor. Some shared however that they see the AWP as a useful annual “reminder” of where PDA work stands and what needs to be done over the following year. Only a very few PDAs actively used the AWP as a management or accountability tool they regularly reviewed to monitor progress. For the most part, AWP are activity and output-based rather than orienting PDAs towards outcomes and results. The design and use of AWP within the Joint Programme need to be revisited so that they are more results-oriented and used as practical planning and performance monitoring tools. AWP should not be stand-alone annual documents, but explicitly linked to the expected results of a PDA’s engagement framework and the wider Joint Programme RRF and M&E systems.

PDAs also identified a number of tools and methods they found were useful for informing their strategic vision and planning, that included: specialised analysis tools and processes<sup>2</sup> such as Conflict and Development Analyses (CDAs), the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index and joint conflict analysis workshops; Common Country Assessments (CCAs); UNDAFs; and handover notes (if they are comprehensive) and Skype discussions with outgoing PDAs. Numerous PDAs highlighted the value of using Joint Programme catalytic funds or other funding to produce or facilitate new research, analysis and evidence-base, which in turn then enhanced the PDA’s credibility, partnerships, networks, “thought leadership” and ability to then develop a framework of strategic goals to guide their work. Regular conversations, briefings and joint tele-conferenced discussions amongst stakeholders (involving both PDAs *and* RCs) were also seen as invaluable means to develop and maintain common expectations of results, discuss challenges, monitor performance and ensure accountability.

While there would be advantages to moving towards results-based engagement strategies in each country, some respondents **cautioned against attempts to over “bureaucratise” and “programatise”**

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<sup>2</sup>Over 41% of surveyed PDAs claimed to have undertaken or contributed significantly to some form of national or sub-national level conflict analysis of some sort, with another 33% claiming they were in progress of doing so (PDA E-Survey).

**the work of PDAs and the Joint Programme itself, emphasising the need to remain flexible and responsive to dynamic contexts.** Such significant enhancements in management practices will also require a significant enhancement in the Joint Programme’s management capacities; while the current limited Secretariat might pilot some practices (e.g. putting in place engagement frameworks in a select number of new PDA postings), additional staff would be required to do this at full-scale with 40 (or more) country engagements ongoing in any given year. There was also consistent feedback for the **need to place more emphasis on monitoring achievement for qualitative, process and “intangible” results;** that the best conflict prevention results are often when new relationships or collaborative processes are established, new perspectives and transformed attitudes are demonstrated, or new and even tentative collaborative behaviours have emerged.

### 2.2.3 Results-Based M&E Systems

**The Joint Programme needs to strengthen and systematise its results-based M&E approaches so it can demonstrate the Programme’s effectiveness, identify its contribution to impact and ensure accountability with stakeholders.** No available project documentation presented baselines, indicators and/or criteria for assessing the Outcomes or performance at the impacts / results level. The only indicators and baselines presented were Activity and Output measures, many of which are not SMART<sup>3</sup> or feasibly measurable. Most Activity and Output indicators were not being actively tracked or reported through Programme M&E systems.

PDA Bi-Monthly Reports have been the principal programme monitoring tool of the Joint Programme, though these reports also have the dual purpose of providing RCs, DPA and UNDP with valuable information about contextual developments in-country. For programme monitoring purposes, Bi-Monthly Reports include a narrative snapshot of PDA activities and programming. However, they do not systematically report on progress against results at the country level or provide information that otherwise feeds into the Joint Programme RRF at the global level. Many PDAs find the bi-monthly reporting burdensome, do not understand how the reports are utilised and get nearly zero feedback from DPA or UNDP after submitting. As a result, many PDAs have not seen great utility in the reports and some have not regularly submitted these. As reported in the PDA E-Survey, PDAs on average only believed that current methods for monitoring and reporting their activities and results were ‘moderately effective’.<sup>4</sup>

Content for Annual Reports has been compiled and drafted by the Secretariat. A standard template reporting form (which continues to evolve and improve) has been sent to all PDAs to collect basic information regarding the past year (e.g. county context, role of the PDA, key achievements) as well as looking forward to prospects for the Programme’s and PDA’s country engagement in the coming year. The draft template reporting form for 2018 has evolved to collect some information relating to the RRF and have greater emphasis on elaborating PDA results/impact and relevance. Information collected from the se templates has often been supplemented by extracting examples and anecdotes on key successes from the narrative Bi-Monthly Reports and other communications with PDAs about their activities throughout the year. The Annual Reports are then refined through consultation with PDAs and UNDP and DPA Desk Officers. Annual Reports have not reported progress against the Project Document RRF Activity and Output indicators or against the Joint Programme’s Outcomes. Instead, the Reports provided snapshots of key PDA activities and achievements grouped around key common thematic areas that are similar to but are not quite the Programme’s Outcomes and Outputs. Many

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<sup>3</sup> Meaning: specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound.

<sup>4</sup>The weighted average response for this question was 3.4 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was ‘completely ineffective’ and 5 was ‘extremely effective’.

stakeholders welcomed this “anecdotal” approach as providing convincing and approachable “stories” of what the Joint Programme concretely does and achieves. Nevertheless, many stakeholders highlighted the need for the Programme to go beyond anecdotes and find the means to both gauge performance against expected results and measure its impact. Ultimately, most interviewed stakeholders *felt* that the Joint Programme makes a useful and sometimes essential contribution to preventing conflict and enhancing peace; however, this is not a sustainable basis for accountability and funding the Programme. Particularly as the Programme seeks to secure sustainable funds for scaling-up, it needs to begin to both *demonstrate performance* and *prove its impact*.

The evaluators observed that Joint Programme management has been stretched in recent years managing implementation and the prioritisation of new important initiatives (such as the PDA Roster, Criticality Assessment, an enhanced Induction process, re-invigorating the PDA catalytic funds process, etc.). The Secretariat has had less time and resources available to systematically monitor for outcomes/impact or otherwise systematise results-based M&E methods. Consequently, M&E efforts have predominantly focused on the achievement and measurement of activities/outputs. The evaluation found that these challenges are mostly recognised by Programme management, with one member conveying that the team “inherited a ‘non-results’ framework” and another identifying the need to overhaul the Programme in order to put in place adequate results-based management and monitoring systems.

One final key finding regarding monitoring worth noting is that many PDAs find that regularly scheduled PDA and RC teleconferences with Headquarters (including Joint Programme management, DPA, UNDP, PBSO, etc.) are a very useful and practical mechanism for communicating issues, discussing challenges, reporting on activities and achievements, updating on future work and planning collaboration/support from headquarters. Regular teleconferences between in-country and headquarters partners should be institutionalised for all country engagements within the Joint Programme. It has also been suggested that annual PDA visits to Headquarters or Joint Programme visits to countries would improve communications and monitoring, as well as be important steps for developing coherent engagement frameworks for PDA engagements.

## 2.3 EFFECTIVENESS

This was assessed based on the stated project Outputs. The evaluation found that performance varied with some Outputs having made significant progress towards attainment of programme Outcomes whereas performance of others could have been improved. Management pointed out that one challenge the Programme faced was demands on the limited funding it had during the period under review. This necessitated some outputs being put on hold as higher priority was given to deploying PDAs to meet increasing needs and requests from Resident Coordinators (RCs). Despite this, the programme has proved effective particularly in addressing country-level challenges and needs regarding the strengthening national capacities for peace. The following sections provide the best typologies of effectiveness as evidenced through documentation, interviews and country visits:

**Output 1: Peace and Development Advisors deployed to help build long-term capacity of national partners and UN Country Teams to undertake conflict/political analysis, and design and implement conflict-sensitive programming**

**PDAs are perceived to be particularly adept at nurturing strategic relationships with key national partners, resulting in the UN having greater and increasing influence on matters pertaining to dialogue, peace and reconciliation and being recognized as a trusted partner by most national partners interviewed.** In Sri Lanka for instance, the UNCT through its PDA supported the Government in 2015 to develop a Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP); which is the framework for all peacebuilding



and reconciliation work in the country with substantial funding from PBF. The PPP has been costed at \$80 million and the PDA and UNDP approached donors, explained it to them and solicited not just funding but their buy-in and active involvement in implementation. A high-level government official who met with the evaluator spoke of how the PDA has been able to coordinate all the different actors, government, civil society, the UN as well as development partners in the implementation and funding of the plan. Bilateral development partners use the PPP to inform their funding priorities. Another example of an area of support that the Sri Lankan government has appreciated is the commissioning of annual peacebuilding surveys and violence perception surveys. Findings are then shared with strategic government actors who can influence policy making and decisions. The RC highlighted that “the surveys provide concrete evidence of what ordinary people think. We then work with government to help them address the needs expressed”.

In Uganda, the PDA conducted a political economy analysis which helped identify the power structures and application within Uganda. Among the findings of the analysis was the immense power that cultural institutions play in the society, and the need to engage the armed forces. As the cultural leaders were not part of the National Peace Architecture that had been set up previously with the PDA leading UN efforts, it was paramount to engage them within a track complementary to the architecture. The approach of *Obuntubulamu* (your humanity is inextricably linked to mine) was born. It brings together 5 cultural institutions to champions for peace and development. As a result, they have all incorporated *Obuntubulamu* in their strategic plans. This approach has been hailed globally as a model for catalyzing the attainment of Agenda 2030 by both BPPS SSMART and more recently, in the Turkey South to South Cooperation event. The relationship developed during the analysis process has provided an entry point for programming with the Armed Forces, Uganda Peoples Defence. UNDP now has a programme that responds to the social welfare of the armed forces and their families, building and sustaining peace, and prevention of violence against women.

The PDA in Tunisia was essential in fostering preventing violence extremism as a necessary element of conflict prevention and counter-terrorism approaches, both with national authorities and regional processes. While using Joint Programme funds to sponsor key meetings and policy research, the participation of the PDA as a subject matter expert and facilitator in multiple forums positioned the UN as a credible, impartial and catalytic partner. From this position, the PDA was able to become a “one-stop window” for the government to the UN. He was a principal resource on which the National Commission for Counter-Terrorism came to value for the development of a prevention of violent extremism project that relies on a development and human rights-based approach. As one international stakeholder observed, the PDA “could speak constructively with national stakeholders on very delicate subjects” and ensure “that national authorities, the UN and donors were meaning the same thing when talking about prevention”. The PDA described the process as starting with sponsoring the creation of new joint analysis and evidence, from which he could then convene national stakeholders and facilitate their joint reflection. With careful support, he then helped national stakeholders to translate this reflection into joint and sustainable plans and action. These were long, consultative and participatory processes, but because of this they were seen by interviewed national partners as resulting in more enduring national understanding and consensus about sustainable and rights-based prevention of violent extremism.

**PDA, one respondent stated, always seem to know how best to move the country forward during times of crisis, when most national actors seem perplexed and overwhelmed by it all.** Following the series of electoral and constitutional crises in Lesotho in the period under review, the PDA working with a short-term consultant (himself a former PDA) supported the government in 2016 to design a roadmap for reforms and facilitated buy-in from all political parties. Given the repeated crises, the PDA led an election scenarios building exercise ahead of the 2016 elections where a cross selection of

stakeholders from both government and civil society participated. One religious leader told the evaluation team that “because of the scenarios exercise we had participated in, we were able to read the situation, identify options and possible responses. We could sense that Lesotho was going to be on fire during the elections. We therefore decided to engage the political parties, all 29 registered ones. This resulted in their signing the peace pledge at UN House just before the elections”. These elections scenarios exercises have also been conducted in Uganda and Sierra Leone among others. The Joint Programme enabled 12 PDAs to undergo training in this and they now conduct these workshops in the countries that they work in as well as providing the same to other UNDP Country Offices. The PDA in Uganda supported the Sierra Leone UNDP Country Office to build scenarios ahead of the March 2018 elections.

Similarly, UNDP Kenya under the leadership of the PDA (who also served as team leader of the Peace Building and disaster Risk Reduction Cluster in UNDP) supported a scenario building exercise for UWIANO partners<sup>5</sup> in 2016 which resulted in the expansion of UWIANO platform members to include the media, faith institutions, the Registrar of Political Parties and the Council of Governors among others. This ensured a well-coordinated multi-actor approach to electoral violence containment ahead of the August 2017 elections. The partners commended UNDP for its technical support and continued commitment to the platform’s revitalisation.

Apart from these very specific interventions, **PDAs have provided skills training to government and civil society partners in many countries during the period under review, enabling these partners to effectively analyse local-level conflict and design appropriate interventions.** In Lesotho, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) with support from the PDA and the UNDP Governance Team identified a local-level conflict in Mafiteng District where infamous gang violence has divided the community and led to children being denied access to education and certain members of the community access to healthcare. There have been reported cases of gang-related murder in this once peaceful community. Through the CCJP, the Ribaneng Peace Making Committee has been established. The programme officer shared with the evaluators that this Committee is now being used as a pilot for similar district level structures which could eventually the creation of robust peace architecture in Lesotho. The Committee has brought the conflict to the attention of government which has since increased police deployment in the district and has undertaken to set up a Ministerial Committee to lead in finding lasting solutions to the conflict and avert its spread to other districts. In Ukraine, an observer noted, “Government partners have no idea of what peacebuilding or social cohesion mean.” Therefore, the PDA organised a seminar for government on peacebuilding with the Ministry of Occupied Territories and World Bank. This was a crucial part of the process to draft state target programmes for recovery and follow through of the Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment.

**Some RCs talked of how the PDAs have opened channels for them to engage with a wide array of stakeholders, thus enabling them to influence the peace and violence prevention discourse and efforts in-country.** In Nigeria for instance, the PDA was able to create entry points to support a sustained engagement in Northern Nigeria thus enabling the RC to meaningfully engage. In Sri Lanka, the RC highlighted the immense benefit she has derived from the PDA with regards to pointing here in the right direction as to who to engage on the government side to convey what message. At times, the formal approach is used with certain individuals while at others it is the informal. A government counterpart confirmed this, and mentioned how this way of working has facilitated the fast relay of key information to the highest offices in the land in a non-confrontational manner. Another key official spoke of a very cordial working relationship that has enhanced government’s confidence in the UN as

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<sup>5</sup> This is a network of state and non-state actors involved in peace building work in Kenya.

a trusted and credible partner. In Guyana in the months leading up to the 2015 elections, the RC, PDA and UNDP rapidly provided neutral space and catalytic support to an eminent person panel organized by civil society activists to monitor and prevent electoral violence. This included UNDP providing initial space for a 'situation response room' and the PDA providing his subject matter expertise for panel workshops and trainings of volunteers.

**PDA**s play an essential role in providing situational, political and conflict analysis and advice that enables RCs and UNCTs (as well as other international development actors to some extent) to more effectively avoid the inherent risk that their policy decisions and actions could inadvertently aggravate conflict. In their most basic day-to-day work, PDAs are vital do-no-harm assets; as described by one PDA, "one of my core tasks is preventing the UN from stepping on landmines". One RC told the evaluators, "My PDA knows what is going on and who is who, which all of us are blind to." A national UN staff member goes further, "The RC and UNCT could not safely and sensitively navigate complex national relationship without the PDA's advice". The evaluation found good evidence of PDA effectiveness as they disseminate contextual knowledge and promote conflict sensitivity through a variety of means, including weekly situational updates and media summaries, regular briefings, Bi-Monthly Reports, ad hoc thematic or situational briefings and presentations, facilitating and participating in inter-UN and other multilateral strategic and scenario planning exercises and either producing or sponsoring key pieces of research and analysis. These activities are crucial because, as one PDA said, "the UN and other external partners do not understand the risks of inadvertently promoting politicised interests that go with investing huge assistance towards conflict recovery, development and humanitarian needs". A national UN staff member saw a deeper need: "A majority of people in the UN system are development specialists or bureaucrats. While they are good people, they have no understanding of the deep roots of conflict here. They have great expertise, but their expertise does not prepare them for working in political and conflict situations." For example, the Myanmar context is one of the most complex in the world as the country moves through a 'triple transition' from multiple decades-long sub-national armed conflicts towards hopeful peace, from military rule to a civilian-led democratic government and from a closed to an internationalised and open economy. At the same time, armed conflicts persist in parts of the country and other tensions give rise to sporadic violence and crises (most recently in Rakhine State). In such hugely complex circumstances there is potential for large-scale violence and reputational consequences for the UN. Over the last two years, the PDA and PDS have been vital assets for tracking continuously changing dynamics, contributing to wider information/analysis sharing amongst development partners that has frequently resulted in better collective understandings of the context and providing a crucial voice reminding development actors of core UN principles and norms. The evaluation noted that, in the best circumstances, PDA advice, sensitisations, trainings and accompaniment has improved UN conflict sensitivity such that its development activities are having a positive impact on conflict situations. Some stakeholders suggested that PDA deployments could be deemed critical permanent posts on these factors alone.

**Largely, PDA and the Joint Programme approaches to build conflict sensitivity capacities of the UN in-country have been issue or process specific, on a request-by-request basis or ad hoc rather than systematic initiatives based on an assessment of need and with specific goals.** The bulk of such PDA advisory support is generally directed towards RCs while UNCTs generally get less attention (and often have less interest). As one head of agency said, "The UNCT does not make the most use of the PDA. The UN needs more analysis and support to use analysis as the basis for developing strategies and programming as well as specific roles the UNCT could and should play regarding conflict prevention." PDAs should be directed to engage UNCTs and be empowered to facilitate more joint UNCT discussions and positions on key peace and conflict-related issues. As one Head of agency stated "whereas before I used to view conflict work as purely UNDP, I now realise that in our engagements

and programmes, we experience and may at times contribute to a myriad of conflicts especially in a country that is reliant on donor support such as this. As such, I now realise that each UNCT member and each agency has a part to play in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution.” This would better ensure UN management internalises thinking about conflict ‘upstream’ rather than such thinking remaining a technical, programmatic or ‘downstream’ adjustment after decisions are made, strategies developed and programmes designed.

While this may be so, the evaluation learned that **the level of proximity between the PDA and UNCT is largely informed by the access given by the RC**. Some PDAs had no access to UNCTs while others were giving UNCT briefings and updates on a monthly basis, yet others only in times of crises. The evaluation also found that PDA analyses was not consistently shared with UNCT members in every context; again, the RC determined whether or not it is and if so what aspect and to what extent. Some RCs cited context sensitivity and previous breaches of confidentiality as reasons for restricting access to the PDA reports and analysis.

**Those heads of agencies who have received strategic advice and input from the PDA relating to their agency-specific programmes, however, have a better understanding of the value that a PDA brings.** One head of agency in Lesotho shared how the advice received helped her have deeper insights into how a particular high profile programme was inadvertently doing harm. She told evaluators that the PDA has helped her in understanding the complex web of relationships among interlocutors, as a result, she has navigated this well. Elsewhere, a deputy head of agency noted the PDA was instrumental in ensuring that another agency’s report “did not create a scandal” because it did not consider the political consequences of its recommendations.

**PDAs have been essential catalysts, facilitators, coordinators and subject matter experts enabling the establishment of strategic multilateral and UN-wide conflict prevention planning and response mechanisms.** For example, the PDA provided essential coordination management and substantive conflict prevention inputs into the Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPA) published in March 2015, a collaborative product authored jointly by the EU, UN and World Bank Group. The PDA coordinated the ‘Strengthen Social Resilience, Peacebuilding, and Community Security’ component), providing narrative drafting and advising the senior management team. The PDA properly steered attention towards the complexity of the situation, considering not just internally displaced people but also host communities. The PDA steered a line that kept this multilateral evidence-based process focused on delivery of needs and the text impartial so that it did not aggravate the conflict situation. Within the UN, PDAs have been valued for sometimes coordinating ad hoc UN ‘peace focal points’ groups, facilitating UNCT strategies and applications for accessing PBF funding and providing intensive support to CCA and UNDAF process such as providing special context analyses products, undertaking conflict sensitivity awareness briefings and co-leading UNDAF working groups related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

**PDAs have potential to catalyse and facilitate improved UNCT mindfulness of human rights.** In Ukraine, for example, the PDA was instrumental in supporting OHCHR to undertake the Human Rights up Front (HRuF) Stocktake exercise in June 2017. The UNCT used the PDA as a sounding board on how to organise the process and what analytical input would be useful. The PDA facilitated the UNCT to undertake political, economic and social contextual analysis and develop potential scenarios, including assessing what human rights risks exist in the country and potential UN efforts that prevent or respond to these risks. The HRuF Stocktake usefully brought all agency heads together for the first time to have a substantive internal discussion on the human rights dimensions in Ukraine and agree on how to better position the UN on human rights in the country. Numerous stakeholders noted the potential for PDAs to promote greater convergence between peace, development and human rights actors.

**PDA**s provide linchpin partnership building, coordination, technical and design inputs into UN and UNDP conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming. In many cases, UN conflict prevention and peacebuilding projects would simply not have existed without the presence and involvement of a PDA. In Myanmar, the PDA was instrumental in responding to fast changing circumstances when the UN was asked by national actors managing the national Peace Process for UN capacity support to the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC). The PDA coordinated and led a process involving the PBSO, UNDP and DPA-PMD to rapidly put in place interim PBF funding support to the JMC, conduct a technical needs assessment of the JMC and then design a JMC Support Platform Project. In Tunisia, the PDA was essential for generating key new analysis, coordinating the development of the UNCT framework on Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and catalysing an interagency workshop with the National Counter-Terrorism Commission on strategic planning, PVE and human rights. Following this, the PDA provided crucial technical inputs into the development of the UNDP PVE project. In Ukraine, the PDA and PDS have been the driving force behind a number of direct UN conflict prevention projects, including the Ukraine Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index as a new programme stream in partnership with UNDP, IOM and UNICEF. In the first instance, this programme will strengthen and deepen joint UN M&E and conflict sensitivity capacities in five eastern Ukraine regions affected by ongoing conflict dynamics through extensive local-level surveying and data gathering. However, in areas where little local-level information gathering and analysis is taking place and experiencing highly politicised conflict, the SCORE Index will also provide systematic and local-level social cohesion baseline and targeting evidence for all government, civil society and development actors. The SCORE Index will enable better conflict prevention advocacy, policy development and responses by the UN, international and national stakeholders in examined areas. In such situations, PDA were sometimes described as partly becoming “a CTA without project management duties” who provided strategic design, planning, advocacy, partnership building and resource mobilisation inputs.

**PDA**s are changing development culture towards acceptance of conflict prevention as a priority, often “promoting peacebuilding by stealth”, through advocacy, provoking necessary discussion and using development and recovery topics as entry-points for engaging on conflict prevention. For example, in Thailand, multiple UN and international development partners praised the PDA’s proactive ‘Research Agenda’ approach to sponsor briefings, translate the draft new constitution and convene national experts for roundtable discussions on sensitive political topics as vital inputs to ensure their development strategies were informed by both unfolding political realities and over-the-horizon challenges to political transition in the country. In Ukraine, the PDA introduced management and policy discussions to bring greater clarity of UN rules of engagement in relation to human rights and humanitarian law in non-government controlled areas. The PDA also supported the organisation of a conference on infrastructures for peace with development actors. As one national stakeholder observed, “Despite many smart ideas from the UN and OSCE, most international actors do not really understand what infrastructures for peace are in the Ukrainian context. The PDA has made a very long effort to educate the UN System on what infrastructures for peace are actually about.”

The evaluators however found mixed evidence of meaningful contribution by PDA in mainstreaming conflict prevention and conflict sensitivity within UNDAFs and agency-specific programme strategies such as the UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD). While there were some cases where stakeholders felt that PDA involvement and facilitation resulted in strong conflict responses in these documents, there were many cases where this was not achieved. When evaluators probed into this, PDA, UNCT members and RCs alike recognized this gap and cited reasons such as the PDA having limited time to engage in such processes and at times did not see this as a priority compared to other tasks they perform; or unfamiliarity with UN programming on the part of the PDA, particularly those working with the UN system for the first time or those who had hitherto not worked in a country office. Some pointed out that they were deployed well into the UNDAF cycle and could

not influence it at implementation stage. This is a matter that the Joint Programme needs to address as it provides good opportunity for a coherent UN response to the conflict dynamics of the country. Greater efforts should be made in Joint Programme M&E systems to explicitly track whether and how PDAs are promoting integration of conflict prevention and conflict sensitivity into UN country strategies as per the RRF. Additionally, the Regional hubs need to provide regular feedback to the Joint Programme on progress made by PDAs in each region.

**Some RCs talked of how the PDAs have opened channels for them to engage with a wide array of stakeholders thus enabling them to influence the peace and violence prevention discourse and efforts in-country.** In Nigeria for instance, the PDA was able to create entry points to support a sustained engagement in Northern Nigeria thus enabling the RC to meaningfully engage. In Sri Lanka, the RC highlighted the immense benefit she has derived from the PDA with regards to pointing here in the right direction as to who to engage on the government side to convey what message. At times, the formal approach is used with certain individuals while at others it is the informal. A government counterpart confirmed this, and mentioned how this way of working has facilitated the fast relay of key information to the highest offices in the land in a non-confrontational manner. Another key official spoke of a very cordial working relationship that has enhanced Government's confidence in the UN as a trusted and credible partner. In Guyana in the months leading up to the 2015 elections, the RC, PDA and UNDP rapidly provided neutral space and catalytic support to an eminent person panel organized by civil society activists to monitor and prevent electoral violence. This included UNDP providing initial space for a 'situation response room' and the PDA providing his subject matter expertise for panel workshops and trainings of volunteers.

## **Output 2: Enhanced mechanisms and capacities for collaboration and dialogue**

The evaluation found good evidence of PDAs having supported national capacities in this regard. This ranges from Collaborative Leadership and Dialogue workshops that were conducted in Malawi, Uganda and more recently the Gambia. These have typically involved parliamentarians, political and religious leaders all with the aim of fostering a culture of dialogue as a means of addressing challenges and exploring possible solutions in a constructive and non-confrontational manner. The evaluators, in reviewing secondary data and through interviews found that national counterparts derived much benefit from these workshops and that as a result tensions have been reducing especially among political leaders. The use of dialogue as a means of unblocking political deadlock has been used most effectively in Lesotho, specifically with political impasses from 2016-2017.

In Nigeria, the PDA supported the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), a Government institution under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abuja, to convene a four-day community dialogue between the Yoruba community of Share and the Nupe Tsagari in Kwara State. This conflict dates back over 40 years and has seen destruction of property and loss of life as a result of episodes of violent clashes such as in 2015 and 2016. Community leaders, including women and youth, participated in the four-day dialogue in June 2017. At the end of the retreat, both communities committed to living peacefully and to using dialogue to resolve future conflicts. The IPCR team told the evaluators that this was one of their major achievements and expressed gratitude for the technical support given by the PDA and UNDP Nigeria.

The evaluators found an innovative approach that could sustain collaboration and dialogue in Kenya, where the PDA worked with the UWIANO platform to foster collaboration and dialogue among key institutions that are mandated to lead on social cohesion and peacebuilding work with civil society, media and religious leaders. This resulted in avoidance of duplication of efforts, leveraging each partners' core competences in both outreach and response to episodes of violence and conflict. The

evaluators found this model to be one that could be replicated in other contexts to avoid resource competition and to strengthen the effectiveness of national peacebuilding efforts.

In Ukraine, the PDA and PDS have developed wider relationships and partnerships with civil society and community based organisations to support capacities for dialogue and relationship building across both sides of the Donbas conflict through the Donbas Dialogue process. This is an online and remote dialogue facility that prioritises key issues of interest to civil society peace builders on both sides of the conflict who then hold online ‘Dialogue Marathons’ to explore these issues more fully in partnership. The group has created and sustained a live virtual network of peace builders stretching across both sides of the conflict that has, according to civil society activists, “created new channels of communications between actors that did not exist before, identified and generated mutual interests and allowed for the exchange of knowledge and objective information.” They believe the “Donbas Dialogues are unique in that they are engaged right at the hot-face of the conflict and relationships are being built now in anticipation of future peacebuilding.” Interviewed national partners described how the PDA and PDS have created space for Donbas Dialogue partners to present proposals to donors and mobilised continuation funding through Joint Programme catalytic funds. The PDA also organised national and international subject matter experts to provide technical inputs and support to Dialogue Marathons. While long-term impacts are still far off, interviewed stakeholders believed that the immediate-term impacts of PDA support have been significant, including: enabling civil society groups outside of the capital and across the line-of-control to gain access to other national peace builders, decision-makers and donors; increasing civil society participation in the Dialogues because they see the UN an impartial actor that only supports non-partisan processes; and ensuring civil society actors in conflict affected and non-government controlled areas were subsequently included in wider national civil society dialogue platforms and processes.

In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the ‘Dialogue for the Future’ project is the only dialogue initiative the tripartite Presidency has supported and is one of the few issues on which it has demonstrated a unified approach. The PDA and national PDS coordinated three UN agencies to work with the Presidency and facilitated the development of a joint work plan. This resulted in a first phase project funded by the PBF for two and half years and a subsequent project phase is being submitted for further PBF funding. The project is credited with re-starting inter-ethnic dialogue that was the norm of the past as well as being the first initiative to establish a vertical inter-ethnic dialogue link between youth and the Presidency.

Community-level mechanisms have sometimes been the most appropriate entry point for support to dialogue. Cognisant of the myriad of conflicts that occur at the local level, the PDA and UNDP Kenya supported the re-establishment of District Peace Committees and the creation of 10 County Peace Forums to oversee coordination of peacebuilding initiatives and resolution of conflicts. By building local capacities to mitigate conflicts, the programme has proved effective in addressing the diverse conflict typologies both in the different counties as well as within. Inter-communal peace agreements have been signed and in certain counties, continued revenge killings have been averted. This forward thinking and preparedness on prevention of electoral violence proved effective in that those counties such as Tana River, which are known hotspots, reported relative calm during the primary nomination process.

### **Output 3: Mechanism for deployment of short-term expertise to respond and engage in crisis settings**

The evaluation found that PDAs and country offices have often accessed short-term expertise to support their work through the use of UNDP and DPA rosters managed from Headquarters. The Joint

Programme itself has used the UNDP Express Roster for the recruitment of interim PDAs, as was the case with the deployment of the Caribbean Regional interim PDA in June 2017. PDAs have access to it and can either select pre-vetted consultant from it or submit requests and ToRs to the roster manager to source suitable CVs. While this Roster was established in 2009 it is updated regularly, at least annually thus increasing the pool of available expertise. This is a valuable partnership for the Joint Programme.

The Joint Programme has also provided support to PDAs through the Insider Mediator Programme where mediation training has been availed to key mediators who often at times accompany the initiatives that PDAs work on. In Kenya for instance, one of the members of the UWIANO platform attended an advanced training course for inside mediators at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands. In the UWIANO planning meeting that the evaluator attended as an observer, she shared experiences from fellow course participants thus enriching the discussion in its search for ways of mitigating electoral violence.

All these have contributed to the successful execution of PDA mandates and provided for the critical support that RCs and countries required to move the conflict prevention agenda forward. The head of one of the key government commissions on reconciliation in Sri Lanka applauded the calibre of technical advisors and the speed with which they were deployed through the efforts of the RC and the PDA, thus enabling them to improve their communication and engagements with targeted stakeholder groups. That said, the above represents only anecdotal evidence; the Joint Programme has experienced challenges in actively documenting or comprehensively capture information about activities or results under this Output.

#### **Output 4: Coordinated and complementary UNDP and DPA support, analysis, and engagement in target countries**

The evaluation found that during the period under review, the Programme has deployed UNDP staff (such as members of the Conflict Prevention Team and staff from UNDP regional hubs) and DPA staff (including members of the Mediation Support Unit and the Standby Team of Mediation Advisors) to support specific processes such as conflict analysis, scoping missions, technical needs assessments and election assessment missions in support of PDA work, resulting in timely response and design of appropriate strategies for engagement and ultimately programme interventions. A very recent and welcomed example was the deployment of a member of the Joint Programme Secretariat to support the Bosnia and Hercegovina PDA in drafting the PBF project proposal for the second phase of the 'Dialogue for the Future' project. Yet another mechanism has been the deployment of PDAs themselves through detail assignments to provide specialised support such as elections scenarios building. The then PDA in Malawi was sent to The Gambia as an interim PDA and was subsequently recruited there.

#### **Output 5: Enhanced capacity of UN Country Teams, DPA, and UNDP to share good practices, lessons learned, and engages in community of practice**

**Overall, expected results in practice, learning and knowledge management have been only partially achieved; management acknowledged this, but pointed to funding conditions as having limited its ability to invest resources towards the full delivery of this Output area.** Management also felt that progress had been made in recent years on several strategic elements of deepening practice and learning (see further below).



In the E-Survey, PDAs reported on average that their performance as a PDA ‘improved moderately’ as a result of Joint Programme learning and knowledge products and services.<sup>6</sup> Previous and existing learning and knowledge products and services appreciated highlighted by PDAs included:

- PDA Induction<sup>7</sup> – In the E-Survey, PDAs reported on average that the Induction usefully prepared them for their assignments mostly ‘to a greater extent’.<sup>8</sup> The Induction has evolved over the years, with greater emphasis on taking advantage of extremely experienced and capable people coming through the programme and increasingly using reflective and peer-to-peer learning methods. Prevalent suggestions for improving the Induction included: including more of an in-depth “crash course on the UN system” for those PDAs coming from outside of the UN; promoting PDAs to develop their own result-based country strategies; and involving Headquarters stakeholders in joint strategy development and work planning with PDAs;
- Biannual PDA Retreats – These were nearly universally praised as extremely useful opportunities to compare notes and share experiences with peers from other contexts. Two prevalent suggestions to improve these would be to (i.) include a menu of brief specialised trainings on key issues and (ii.) to involve more non-PDAs (RCs and DPA/UNDP staff from Headquarters and regional offices) and staff from outside of DPA and UNDP;
- Oslo Governance Centre fellowships – Were noted by some as providing an important opportunity for honest reflection on a key professional and thematic area, with practical experience shared among colleague PDAs and the production of a concrete practice paper. However, the practice papers from the first cohort in 2016 are still to be finalised; and
- Generally gaining more access to specialised trainings, including the DPA ‘Women Peace and Security’ training that several PDAs credited with improving their ability to programme and strategise ‘n women's engagement in peace processes.

Joint Programme management highlighted key areas efforts in recent years to develop new strategic elements related to learning. This has included the further elaboration of PDA Inductions and the establishment of Oslo Governance Centre PDA fellowships, which took considerable time and effort to develop. Management also pointed to progress on other initiatives that they felt bolstered knowledge and capacities through means other than ‘training’ and ‘products’. The new PDA Roster system was seen as a major means for building up an expert cadre base. The FBA partnership was felt to have injected greater access to academic and practice knowledge, as well as enhanced PDA capacities through FBA deployments of Peace and Development Specialists. The establishment of a second post in the Joint Programme Secretariat focused on knowledge management was also highlighted (though given intense Secretariat workloads, learning and knowledge management was only one of many priorities for this staff member). Management felt there was improved dissemination of information about the substance of the Joint Programme within DPA and UNDP, therefore increasing awareness of key issues and practice. Management felt that it had also generally improved responsiveness to PDA needs and requests for contacts, key resource materials, publications and access to the relevant knowledge products and trainings of other entities.

Joint Programme Management acknowledged that some important initiatives remained “in pipeline”, such as: a guidance note on Infrastructures for Peace; a lessons learned on PDAs working with the DPA Stand-by Team; guidance pieces for PDA work in relation to gender mainstreaming, cross-border

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<sup>6</sup>The weighted average response to this question was 2.75 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was ‘no effect on my performance’ and 5 was ‘my performance improved exceptionally’.

<sup>7</sup>As one PDA noted: “The induction in NYC was amazing! It was amazing because the facilitators were expert practitioners and facilitators. It was one of the few really hands-on learning moments that I've had as a PDA with other PDAs.”

<sup>8</sup>The weighted average response to this question was 3.8 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was ‘not at all’ and 5 was ‘to a full extent’.

peacebuilding and supporting different parts of the UN system; a PDA ‘mini-manual’ to accompany PDA Induction; restarting the RC reflection series (i.e. Montreux Retreats); revitalizing the Innovative Practice Paper series; and finalizing and launching the online Infrastructures for Peace portal.

Apart from PDAs and those involved in Joint Programme management, there was often limited awareness amongst interviewed UN stakeholders of what specific learning and knowledge management value the Joint Programme has produced. Greater efforts could be made to disseminate and share Joint Programme learning across DPA, UNDP and the wider UN conflict prevention and peacebuilding community of practice. As one DPA MSU staff described: “The Joint Programme has great potential for significant thought leadership and best practice development. It has people on the ground day-to-day doing innovative work; their experiences must be extracted for the wider UN system to learn from.”

Key suggestions from stakeholders for further advancing and deepening the capacity development, learning and knowledge management objectives of the Joint Programme included:

- Adopt a more systematised professional development approach – The Secretariat has undertaken at least two surveys of PDAs during the period under review to assess capacity development and training needs, as well as regularly includes a self-administered capacity assessment for PDAs participating in Inductions. The Secretariat makes accessible to all PDAs a list of regularly occurring trainings and regularly sends training notices to all PDAs. Though, there is no overall learning/training strategy in the Programme. More systematic capacity assessments and analysis of the results could assist in determining whether current capacities are meeting needed PDA skill-sets (though this may also be challenged by an ever-shifting PDA cadre and changing country contexts from year to year). Additional needed trainings could then be better developed and/or sourced and PDAs more systematically invited based on these assessed needs. PDA capacity development might be more effective and grounded if it was directed by more systematic PDA learning plans linked to their performance assessments.
- Focus on results-based programme management and political analysis/advisory trainings – Stakeholders frequently highlighted the political-analytical versus peace-programmatic PDA profiles in the Programme and suggested that further efforts could be made to ‘balance-out’ PDAs that strongly fell into one category or the other. The different ‘clinics’ at the 2017 PDA Retreat present a good start in this direction, though perhaps investments could be made for PDAs receive more in-depth exposure and training on these elements.
- Focus trainings not only on technical competencies, but also personal competencies – The main function of PDAs is to work with people; therefore, there is a need to emphasise their personal competencies for listening, empowering people and inspiring hope, moving people and processes towards common goals, working well and collaborative with others and how to open doors.
- Promote more peer-to-peer and mentoring – While this could be accomplished through virtual means, it could include more PDA exchange and ‘shadow’ visits as the first step of longer-term peer-to-peer relationships. While a great deal of peer support relies upon inter-personal connection, commitments to peer support need to be accountable and made part of work plans and performance assessments. This could be helped by revitalizing the PDA Advisory Board.
- Promote the regularization of regional PDA retreats – UNDP Regional Hubs have sponsored a few such retreats of different lengths and depths to ensure more exchange between PDAs in region.
- Organise regular reflective practice exercises on stories from the field and specific topics – As one DPA staff suggested, “We could learn so much more from experienced PDAs. Get 6 to 8 of the most experienced PDAs together for reflective practice exercises that involves not just the Joint

Programme, but other people from inside and outside of the UN". Involving a wider set of external actors in such exercises would also help generate more and deeper external partnerships.

- It would be useful for the Joint Programme to regularise an annual training budget – During 2016 and 2017, the Programme accessed DPA extra-budgetary funds to cover much of its training costs when these were not fully funded by training organisers. In a first step, for 2018, Programme management has decided to allocate \$30,000 for training, though emphasis will continue to be on sourcing fully-funded trainings, cost-sharing training with RCOs and access to no-cost online learning resources. Management should closely monitor how effective and efficiently the 2018 training budget is used so as to learn how to best regularise a training budget in the Programme.

Stakeholders frequently observed that ultimately effectiveness gains expected from learning and capacity development investments with the PDA cadre still risk being undermined by RCs that do not have basic necessary perspectives, understandings or skill-sets for operating in conflict prevention and political settings. While it may be outside the strict scope of the Programme, suggestions were frequently made that the Joint Programme should support efforts for the UN development system to broaden the spectrum of RC profiles, place more emphasis on deploying RCs with backgrounds in fragile, conflict and crisis settings and invest in more learning and capacity development to prepare RCs for such contexts.

The evaluation noted that the Joint Programme has, because of its effectiveness in contributing to national capacities strengthening, that UN Country Offices such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe (among others) have adopted the 'PDA-type' model through recruiting international staff who carry out the same functions as PDAs. In the evaluation team's interviews with the Dialogue Specialist in Zimbabwe as well as some of the key partners, there was evidence of successful initiatives such as: the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission; The Great Zimbabwe Scenarios Project led by 5 Convenors; and the establishment of over 30 Local Peace Committees through partnership with the Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum. All these mechanisms were playing a key role in influencing peacebuilding discourse as well as national development. The Dialogue Specialist shared how he has often participated in PDA retreats and has through them, been able to tap into the wider PDA community and share experiences. It is the view of the evaluation, that this 'PDA-type' approach can be replicated in other contexts where a conventional PDA deployment is not feasible.

## 2.4 EFFICIENCY

The evaluators faced challenges in assessing efficiency of the Joint Programme, which had few systems for collecting data and measuring efficiency. Therefore, the evaluators looked at what various aspects of programme efficiency that could be examined. Initial findings indicate that programme resource uptake is satisfactory. Very recent improvements appear to have been made in catalytic fund approval turnaround times and PDA deployment times.

A consistent observation from stakeholders was that the costs of deploying PDAs in the big scheme of UN operations was relatively small and that **PDAs have often succeeded in delivering value and leveraging / mobilising follow-on funds that are disproportionately greater than their costs**. More efforts are needed to objectively assess how much value PDAs leverage in comparison to their costs, but it is clear that the costs of their deployments to initiate preventative action (hundreds of thousands of dollars) are significantly less than the costs of post-conflict responses that might otherwise have been needed (tens or hundreds of millions of dollars). Though quantitative data is not available, subjective stakeholder observations point towards a cost/benefit calculation that favours investing in the preventative modalities of the Joint Programme.

**While the Joint Programme should always explore whether there are more economical alternatives to international-PDA posts, interviewed stakeholders consistently responded they could not consistently imagine any alternative to the international-PDA modality as being more cost-effective.** Most stakeholders felt that the international-PDA “brand” is very strong; that people listen to and respect PDAs on the basis of their reputations as unique UN conflict and peace specialists. Suggestions were made that, under certain specific circumstances, some services and functions of an international-PDA could be delivered by national or individual contractors, institutes, non-governmental organisations or private sector actors. However, the numerous downsides of using such actors were also identified (bias, self-serving agendas, no guarantee of confidentiality, less understanding of the needs of the UN system, etc.) and it was pointed out that using such actors would depend greatly on the local context, the nature of the tasks they would be contracted to undertake and the very specific characteristics of these actors.

**The only consistently suggested more cost-effective alternative to an international-PDA was greater use of national-PDAs, though this was highly dependent on the dynamics of any given context and on the very personal attributes of any given national-PDA.** It was often argued that national-PDAs have much greater depth of context knowledge, have greater access to a wider network of national actors and their language skills enabled the UN to better understand what was going on. Inherent risks were also identified in using national-PDAs, including risks of national-PDAs: being perceived to be biased or affiliated to different sides of national conflicts; having less comparative experience and perspective in conflict prevention practice; not fully understanding the wider UN system (particularly at the Headquarters level); not being perceived by senior UN management to be as credible as international staff; and, most importantly, potentially being placed in danger by doing contentious political work within their own national conflicts. Overall, stakeholders believed that international-PDAs should more often than not be the preferred modality. Nevertheless, processes for assessing needs and determining engagement strategies for Joint Programme countries should include consideration of whether there is reasonable scope for a national-PDA post, either on its own (if circumstances are right) or in support of an international-PDA.

**There is evidence that approval processes for PDA \$50,000 catalytic funds have sometimes been protracted and disbursements delayed, though the number of approved applications and the speed of approvals appears to have significantly increased from 2016 onwards.** In particular, with supplemental resources provided to the Programme in 2016, the management put in place an ‘surge’ call for proposals for catalytic funds in September 2016—31 applications were submitted and 21 were approved. Because of the high-volume of this one-off process, approval processes for most of these stretched to just under three months. Four catalytic fund applications were submitted and approved during 2017, with approvals and financial authorisations being made on average within 15 days of submission. Surveyed PDAs that had accessed catalytic activity funds from 2015 to 2017 on average viewed the ease and efficiency of accessing these funds as partway between ‘neutral’ to ‘somewhat easy and efficient’.<sup>9</sup> The evaluators did hear from some interviewed PDAs of instances in the past when protracted application processes and/or delayed disbursements had a negative bearing on their effectiveness; especially in the first year of deployment, such situations partly undermined the PDA’s demonstrable value addition during their crucial settling-in period. It is suggested that Programme management further strengthen the systems it uses to track the efficiency of application approvals, as well as obtain efficiency data of other UN funding approval mechanisms so as to measure the Programme’s efficiency performance in comparison to other parts of the UN.

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<sup>9</sup>The weighted average response for this question was 3.4 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was ‘very difficult and inefficient’ and 5 was ‘very easy and efficient’.

**Efficiency around PDA recruitment was largely satisfactory, with some evidence that PDA recruitment times and efficiency have increased with the use of the new Roster.** In the PDA E-Survey and interviews, PDAs reported a satisfactorily efficient recruitment process in line with UN standards and sometimes exceeding their previous recruitment experiences with the UN. When they occurred, the principal frustrations were a result of unclear guidance or conflicting expectations surrounding the PDA role (as highlighted in Section 2.2) and the availability of funds for their operational support when they arrived in post (see further below). Only in a few cases did survey respondents note administrative complications or major time delays in the recruitment process. Data analysis presented from newly established Programme management systems showed that (excluding a small number of PDA recruitments with special circumstances outside the control of the Programme) roster-based PDA recruitment times during 2017 averaged just less than 4 months.

**For the most part, PDA Inductions were conducted efficiently.** According to responses to the PDA E-Survey, only a very small handful of former PDAs (8.3%) did not receive an Induction during the period under review. The majority of PDAs (62.5%) received their Inductions after deploying, on average 6.5 months after the start of their assignment. Only 12.5% were still awaiting theirs, so far on average for 4.4 months. **Lack of clarity over responsibility for operational costs of PDA deployments has sometimes been an inefficient draw on PDA and Programme management time and energy.** Some PDAs have been deployed without full agreement on the source of funds (Joint Programme, RCO, UNDP or UNCT) to cover PDAs' necessary operational costs (e.g. office space and supplies, computer, telephone, limited in-country travel, etc.). This has led to disputes over such costs in-country between PDAs and RCOs/UNDP/UNCT and disputes between in-country management and the Joint Programme, in some cases undermining the working relationships of the PDA and in turn undermining PDA effectiveness and efficiency. Programme management has pointed to the need for in-country stakeholders to cover such costs as a small demonstration of ownership and responsibility for the PDA deployment; in-country stakeholders have argued that such resources are simply not available in the first place, hence why they sought Joint Programme support in the first place. Not clearly establishing from the outset which parties are responsible for covering what are relatively small operational costs has sometimes created irritants, consumed PDA and management time and effort and created efficiency challenges. There needs to be clear agreement on the extent of such costs and agreement over exactly who will cover these from the very outset of PDA deployments.

**Regional PDAs should be equipped with funds to cover their regional travel from the outset.** Most of the few regional PDAs have been deployed without or with only very limited amounts of funds to cover travel; as one described, regional PDAs are “incapacitated without a travel budget”. This has not been noted yet as having dramatic impact on the effectiveness of PDAs. However, it is a routine cause of diminished efficiency as frustrated PDAs and RCs spend not insignificant amounts of time and efforts to “beg, borrow and steal” funds from numerous sources to cover the costs of travel required to get key PDA regional work accomplished. Programme management indicated that it has reached agreements to cover regional travel costs through PDA catalytic funds, though the consequence is that regional PDAs then have fewer available dollars to implement catalytic activities. In the future, it is suggested that the Joint Programme will more efficiently yield results if it factors in and provides modest and appropriate operational budgets to regional PDAs for the regional travel that is inherently part of their work.

Overall, **the evaluators are cognisant of the limited number of Secretariat staff and this capacity stretch may have a significant bearing on monitoring efficiencies of management processes.** If the Joint Programme further enhanced its management capacities (further elaborated below in the report), it would be in a better position to develop criteria and enhance its data collection systems for measuring different elements of efficiency.

## 2.5 SUSTAINABILITY

Given the achievements of the Joint Programme and the experiences that RCs shared on the value of having PDAs, coupled with increasing fragility and internal conflict in some regions, there are increasing demands and requests for PDAs and other Joint Programme support. The Joint Programme has responded well in seeking to broaden its donor base and increase funding from current partners. These efforts are commendable and should be continued so that more countries can be served without pulling out PDAs from the existing pool of country engagements. The evaluators noted with concern that the generally short nature of Joint Programme commitments to fund PDA deployments for one to two years (though in practice this has sometimes eventually been extended longer) in relation to how long it takes to build relationships and sufficient trust among key stakeholders at national level, may have a negative impact on sustainability of results. In effect, this could then call into question the return on investment during the two years vis-a-vis meaningful changes in the context dynamic as a result of the PDA presence. The question of why the Joint Programme was so “short-term focused” was raised frequently, especially recognising that conflict prevention and peacebuilding are longer-term processes.

Though recognised as a crucial, sustainability and exit strategies for PDA deployments were largely afterthoughts that generally arose only once funding starts to run out. There was strong contention by many PDAs, RCs, UNCT members and national partners that the Joint Programme cannot continue defaulting to short-term funding for PDA deployments on the expectation that they will either successfully “put themselves out of a job” or otherwise mobilize continuing funding from other sources in such a short period of time. More investments need to be made in sustainability of efforts and results. In some countries, this is being done through the recruitment of national-PDA; however, there are limits to how much access these have among their compatriots especially at senior levels.

Another level of sustainability that the evaluation explored is that of suitability of results at the country level. Here, generally the programme has fared very well in countries where national institutions have been anchors to the conflict prevention efforts. Be that as it may, the evaluation noted that the departure of a PDA does invariably leave a vacuum, particularly in terms of analysis and finding the right entry points. Many contexts were ongoing conflicts with unpredictable and evolving dynamics, so did not easily lend themselves to a linear framework of ‘transition’ to which the Joint Programme could plan sustainable capacity development and a PDA ‘exit’. Overall, the Joint Programme needs to better assess contexts for sustainability issues when designing country engagements and PDA deployments and funding timeframes and sustainability strategies for PDAs need to be discussed and agreed among the Joint Programme, DPA, UNDP, RCs and UNCTs in advance of PDA deployments.

## 2.6 MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CAPACITIES

**The Joint Programme Secretariat was nearly universally appreciated and valued for its positive approach, responsiveness and professional conduct.** Many PDAs and RCs shared that they could often draw upon strong support from the Secretariat for access to best practice, resources, and contacts, programme design support, strategizing and problem-solving in times of need. Good effort has been made at information management given existing staffing and the evaluators found the Secretariat to be responsive in providing documentation and clarification on management queries.

Many stakeholders also noted a number of key improvements to management systems and capacities during the period under review, including:

- Establishment of the ‘PDA Roster’ as a means for expediting the identification, retention and recruitment of PDAs;

- Further welcomed enhancements to ‘PDA Inductions’ that prepare PDAs for their assignments;
- Introduction of a more objective decision making over the allocation of PDA posts through the Criticality Assessment;
- Regularizing the provision of catalytic activity/programme funds (\$50,000) during PDA’s first year;
- Doubling the size of the joint Secretariat;
- Conducting the first ever Joint Programme Partners meeting in June 2017 as an important step for creating greater awareness and accountability for the Programme; and
- Undertaking the Mid-Term Evaluation and the 2017 Audit.

When asked in the PDA E-Survey how well managed and coordinated is the Joint Programme, PDAs on average assessed it as partway between ‘satisfactorily managed and coordinated’ and ‘well managed and coordinated’.<sup>10</sup> When asked to what extent their performance as a PDA improved as a result of management support and direction from Joint Programme management, PDAs on average reported closest to their performance having ‘improved moderately as a result’.<sup>11</sup> A fifth of respondents did not feel their performance had improved at all as a result of support from the Joint Programme management. All in all, almost all stakeholders recognised that management systems and capacities need significant strengthening, particularly if the Programme is to undertake many of the enhancements suggested by this evaluation and/or to significantly scale-up in coming years.

**Firstly, Joint Programme management is not structured to provide significant specialized conflict/peace technical support to PDAs; provision of such support has been largely dependent on DPA and UNDP providing organizational conflict prevention and peacebuilding technical resources.** The time and efforts of Secretariat staff are devoted almost entirely to programme implementation responsibilities, diminishing opportunities for them to provide significant technical support to PDAs. Technical Committee co-chairs have ongoing management responsibilities outside of the Joint Programme and are not positioned to provide any significant technical support to PDAs. Many stakeholders observed increasing DPA attention to and advisory/technical backstopping to the Joint Programme, though the provision of such support was not automatic and contingent on how support requests factored into wider departmental priorities. Many stakeholders (both within and outside of UNDP) observed that UNDP backstopping interest and capacities have eroded in recent years; many attributed this to UNDP organisational restructuring in 2014-2015. Overall, these stakeholders observed that UNDP Headquarters and Regional Hubs have not been able to keep up with Joint Programme support needs. The Conflict Prevention Team at UNDP Headquarters comprises only a handful of people as most capacities were decentralised to Regional Hubs. However, the Regional Hubs are felt by many stakeholders to be overstretched; they also operate on a transactional business model that means Joint Programme support requests are often deprioritized in favour of “projects with money”. RCs, PDAs and UNDP staff regularly pointed out a clear differentiation in UNDP interest and ability to backstop the Joint Programme since the elimination of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). In light of this, the Joint Programme may need to set aside resources to acquire needed conflict/peace technical backstopping capacities through short-term or retainer contracts or partnerships that provide more comprehensive technical backstopping.

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<sup>10</sup>The weighted average response for this question was 3.4 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was ‘very difficult and inefficient’ and 5 was ‘very easy and efficient’.

<sup>10</sup>The weighted average response to this question was 3.5 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was ‘very poorly managed and coordinated’ and 5 was ‘exceptionally well managed and coordinated’.

<sup>11</sup>The weighted average response to this question was 2.8 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was ‘no effect on my performance’ and 5 was ‘my performance improved exceptionally’.

**Secondly, while there were justifications for current management structures, they are not built for optimal project management effectiveness and need to adapt to become more robust and coherent.**

The Joint Programme has not had a project manager; instead, a two-person Secretariat has served a project coordination function to three-levels of DPA-UNDP project management committees: the apex ASG-level Steering Committee and a Technical Committee with two different co-chair levels—Senior Level Co-Chairs (Director level) and Technical Level Co-Chairs (P5 level)). While the Secretariat has been empowered with some levels of day-to-day coordination of the Programme, weekly meetings (in-person or virtually) with the DPA and UNDP Technical Level Co-Chairs are where most ongoing management decisions have been made. Members of Joint Programme management believed it to be a “well-oiled machine”, but acknowledged that from the outside it may look “overly top-heavy” and involved a convoluted “multitude of management layers”. Even though these required a great deal more consultation, they believed that such layers were necessary for maintaining trust and ensuring consensus in a joint initiative.

Without negating the need for ensuring joint DPA-UNDP consensus, others involved in Joint Programme management noted it has drawbacks. Facilitating such continuous and intense consultations among management layers was time consuming and undermined the small Secretariat’s ability to give due attention to other key programme management responsibilities (such as results-based M&E, tracking management efficiencies, learning, knowledge management, partnerships and PDA technical backstopping). While there has been constant communication on day-to-day issues, the Technical Level Co-Chairs already have fulltime management responsibilities elsewhere and generally can only “part-time manage” the Joint Programme. As a result, they are “mostly reactive” and can mostly only concentrate on immediate issues to the detriment of putting into action the longer-term and strategic needs of the Programme. As one stakeholder remarked, “There is a big build-up of ideas, but now we need the capacity and time to implement.” This also means that many decisions take longer than expected to resolve; numerous PDAs and RCs noted that decisions on their queries and questions often “passed endlessly back and forth” amongst different levels of DPA and UNDP management. As one PDA described the situation, “Who is in-charge? Who do I call to get a decision?”

At present, the locus of project management is diffused amongst part-time Co-Chairs and the Secretariat can only solve so many issues and be so effective with its project coordination authority. As one PDA described the current situation, “The [Secretariat] coordinators are fantastic and super helpful but coordinating and managing are two different things.” Establishing and delegating an appropriate level of decision-making authority to a Joint Programme project manager would likely streamline management processes and ensure more day-to-day attention to strategic positioning, programme effectiveness and efficiency. A more senior project manager would also have a greater mandate when dealing with senior management, regional management and RCs than current mid-level Secretariat staff. While some management members expressed concern that having a singular project manager could undermine the joint consensus at the foundation of this DPA and UNDP partnership, this could be mitigated by ensuring the project manager reports to both sides of the partnership. It has been contended by some that the Joint Programme is a modest-sized “boutique” programme that should prioritise resources towards PDA deployments and investments in-country rather than into “management overhead”. On the other hand, other voices argue that if the Programme is to take advantage of significant opportunities for it to play a much greater strategic and scaled-up role in the UN’s response to conflict prevention, it will need to significantly scale-up its management capacities. At the very least, it would be prudent even in a ‘status quo-plus’ situation to investment in some additional management capacity for a programme that is beginning to exceed \$10 million a year and delivering in greater numbers of volatile and often high-profile contexts.



**The new PDA Roster was a very welcome and useful innovation that Programme management will need to continue to refine and improve.** Many stakeholders related that establishment of the Roster was a mammoth but important task; principally it has sped up and improved the efficiency of PDA recruitment. To strengthen this valuable management instrument, stakeholders suggested a number of further adjustments. Firstly, the Programme needs to continue expanding the spectrum of skill-sets and profiles on the Roster (including some specialized people for specialized needs) to meet the demands of new and ever more complex contexts for PDA deployments. As one stakeholder put it, “our people pipeline needs to be more complex and comprehensive.” This will require mindfulness of maintaining balance in profile typologies, especially between political versus peace type PDAs and PDAs with analytical/advisory versus programmatic skill-sets. Alternatively, as an observer from the PBSO remarked, “we need more people with experience of ‘being the nexus’ between political, peace, development and human rights issue and between analytical, advisory, strategic and programmatic.” Finding people with such cross-cutting experience, skill-sets and personal attributes has not and will not be an easy task. Recognising that few candidates perfectly match the criteria of the ‘generic’ PDA profile, Programme management might create different PDA profiles, typologies or categories within the Roster. This could aid in better recruiting the ‘right PDA for the right job’. Programme management should explore how to increase publicity within and without the UN systems for Roster openings and what active measures might be feasible to attract wider pools of potential PDA talent. Secondly, more efforts are needed to expand diversity in the Roster. The Roster has largely succeeded in reaching gender parity targets; these advances will need to be maintained. But more attention and solutions need to be found for greater inclusion on the Roster of candidates with disabilities and people with regionalized language skills (a large portion of posts needed to go to external vacancy announcements are those requiring non-English language skills). Thirdly, a roster is a living instrument and processes need to be put into place to continually refresh it. The Programme has established a mechanism to build up a limited second-tier or ‘interim’ roster of candidates based on sufficiently qualified applicants to those PDA posts that had to be externally advertised. Management should weigh the costs and benefits of finding means for regularly reviewing the Roster and enabling intakes more often than once every three years. Lastly, comments were often made that more needed to be done to more rigorously test the qualities and competencies (both technical *and* personal) of candidates through methods that go beyond UN recruitment requirements; as one PDA remarked, “This is not a standard UN job, so you can’t rely on a standard UN assessment process.” Programme management might explore and learn from the assessment and recruitment practices of other organisations that source highly integrative and specialised professionals.

**All stakeholders endorsed the need for an objective and transparent decision-making mechanism in allocating PDA posts and the Criticality Assessment was seen as an important management innovation towards this goal.** Nonetheless, some stakeholders expressed frustrations with the Criticality Assessment. Many RCs did not feel that there has been adequate opportunity for them and UNCTs to input their feedback into the process and to get transparent explanations for the final decisions on allocation. Though they recognize that they are just one voice amongst a wider group of stakeholders, most RCs and UNCT members felt that they were also an important tier of feedback that should carry at least equal weight than DPA and UNDP regional/desk staff that have limited direct knowledge of the country context and/or PDA performance and contributions. It was suggested that Criticality Assessment cycles be better aligned to PDA deployment contracts to avoid PDAs often having extremely short-term notice on whether they would be renewed or not. Most strongly, there were criticisms that adjustments are needed to improve the effectiveness of methods for objectively assessing countries (some stakeholders admitted the weighted points system was open to “rigging” by regional desk and bureau staff pursuing their own priorities) and the transparency of how final decisions are communicated back. Overall, there was significant consensus amongst stakeholders of

the continuing need for resource allocation decisions to be “based on a thorough understanding and prioritization of needs rather than on the availability of funding.”

**PDA**s equipped with modest programme funds feel more relevant and capable. Most interviewed PDA

s and many other stakeholders believed that being equipped with programming funds made PDAs more effective and empowered actors, giving them more access to and credibility with stakeholders in their country context because “they brought something to the table” other than simply their analysis and insight. To these ends, PDA access to Joint Programme catalytic funds has been vital. Most interviewed PDAs recognized their priority should be mobilizing such funds by instigating new useful projects or leveraging the work of existing projects. But there were frequent suggestions that it would be extremely useful for the Joint Programme to continue providing after the first year of deployment very modest annual funds to PDAs for key activities or initiatives.

**A number of PDA**s expressed frustration with different post levels for PDA assignments, noting that PDA

s were by and large performing similar duties regardless whether they were at the P4 or P5 level. They believed the “unfair” and “arbitrary” approach to post levels was largely a result of budgeting constraints rather than reflecting the actual level of a PDA’s responsibility. They observed that a PDA’s “rank” effects their credibility with RCs, the UNCT and national stakeholders; assigning P4 level PDAs to posts that require P5 levels of responsibility and credibility risks undermining PDA performance.

A crucial ingredient for PDA leadership is real data-driven analysis. PDA are more credible when their analysis derives from a data and evidence based analytical system, not from just from them being a “smart person”. The Joint Programme should invest more in supplying and supporting data-based analytical systems that serve not just PDA

s but the needs of multiple actors to improve conflict-informed strategy and policy development, planning, advocacy, project development/design, M&E and other action.

## 2.7 PARTNERSHIPS

The evaluators assessed the extent to which the Joint Programme created and leveraged various partnerships to enhance the quality and reach of its work. It assessed how these partners have enabled RCs and PDA

s to be more effective as well as to strengthen their own understanding and expertise thus being able to better respond to conflict dynamics and needs in the countries where they serve.

The Programme has forged partnerships within the UN as well as externally. One such partnership that has made significant contribution to the efficacy of the Joint Programme with the Folk Benardotte Academy which has been leading the PDA Inductions and has now seen the deployment of eight FBA secondees as Peace and Development Specialists. The evaluation noted for the Nigeria experience that this additional pair of hands in a country as vast and complex as Nigeria has been long overdue. The FBA secondee there had been deployed less than three months before the evaluation mission visit but had, just like the PDA, quickly found his bearings and was engaging well with partners, the UNDP programmatically and the RC. The PDA and the secondee plan and share the work in such a way that the PDA now focuses on the strategic aspects and the secondee largely on the more technical. The relationship allows for coaching and has scope for professional growth on the part of the secondee who shared that in a few years, he would like to apply for a substantive PDA position. The evaluation also saw evidence of the vital role and support PDS’s provide to the work of the PDA and Joint Programme through their deployments in Myanmar and Ukraine.

While these partnerships seem to be yielding result, the real challenge is that they are still short-term international deployments which while providing the much-needed human resource, are not a means

of addressing the long-term needs for such capacities. Additionally, being less experienced and much younger in age, they would not be able to stand-in for the PDA post withdrawal or during his/her absence with the same level of seniority. Therefore, there is still need for the Joint Programme to explore more options of addressing this.

The evaluators observed that presently, only Swedish nationals are deployed under this partnership. There may be the need seek opportunities for similar partnerships with other Member States to be established to enable other nationals to gain experience through this modality. Countries from the global south where most of the current deployments are made should be particularly encouraged to do this. Middle-level civil servants could be seconded with the Joint Programme sourcing funding to pay a stipend over a period of two years or more funds permitting.

Within the UN, the partnership with the UN Volunteers programme has also resulted in the deployment of UN Volunteers to provide support to PDAs. The UN Volunteer in Lesotho had been there only a month but the PDA shared how, already, she had taken on a significant amount of the work that he had been previously doing thus freeing him to concentrate on the urgent constitutional reform process and other higher order tasks.

Peace and Development Advisors generate a wealth of knowledge and insights in the course of their work; yet because of the enormous pressure they work under, this knowledge goes undocumented. Through the partnership with the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre in Norway, PDAs (particularly those about to complete their tour of duty) are given a two-week fellowship to reflect and write. The Joint Programme is commended for his innovative way of capturing this wealth of information. PDAs shared how the fellowship is a means of retreat and escape for them but also an opportunity to take time out and reflect on their practice in a place removed from the context where they work and to critically assess their contribution. The evaluation noted that these have the potential to feed into the broader conflict preventions discourse and strategies within the Joint Programme and the UN system. There is opportunity for these to be compiled into a 'lessons from the field handbook' as compelling evidence of the tremendous contributions made by PDAs and the Joint Programme. At the time of the evaluation, the practice papers developed by the first cohort of fellowships from 2016 had not yet been published.

Beyond fellowships, the Joint Programme should further explore partnership opportunities with think tanks, universities and research/practice institutes that could greatly increase the Programme's ability for reflective learning, knowledge management and developed best practice, as well as distribution of the Joint Programme's collective knowledge with the wider global community of peace practice. It is hoped that this can be done in the new programme cycle.

The PBSO partnership has proved invaluable in providing PBF funding for PDA-initiated and led programmes in many countries. At the country level, this has enabled closer inter-agency collaboration and joint programming in some instances. There is need to strengthen this kind of partnership in countries where there is a PDA deployment but where the PDA has not accessed PBF funds (provided of course that those countries qualify for PBF funding).

The Joint Programme has the opportunity for wider partnerships with other entities at the Headquarters level (such as UNICEF, DOCO, OCHA, OHCHR) that could lead to greater country-level buy-in for agencies to fund PDA post and work. There is also scope for working more with RECs and regional bodies through Regional PDAs.

## **2.8 NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP**

Evaluators found good evidence in all visited countries of good national ownership and leadership of PDA supported initiatives, including establishment of different I4Ps, national strategies and national and local dialogue processes. What is not demonstrated is regularised Member State (whether as countries hosting PDAs or as funders of the Programme) involvement in the Joint Programme at the global level. If the Programme is about building national capacities for and national ownership of conflict prevention, it seems against the aspirations of the Programme to not involve Member States in some way or another with the global level of the Programme. The June 2017 Joint Programme Partners Event demonstrated significant interest and support from those Member States hosting PDAs, funding the Programme and otherwise promoting the conflict prevention and sustaining peace agendas. Given the Programme's emphasis on national ownership and the generally positive support demonstrated at the Partners Event, some elements of Member State consultation and partnership must be reflected in the Joint Programme's management processes.

A director of a Ukrainian civil society organization had this to say in buttressing the point about national ownership and leadership of initiatives: "I'm tired of organisations and people parachuting into Ukraine and promoting dialogue without proper understanding of the situation or focusing on need of building local capacities. Outsiders have their own idea of what dialogue is in Ukraine and they end up having mixed results because of that. However, the PDA is different and shares in a collaborative approach that reinforces local priorities and capacities. Here, the PDA respects that dialogue; peacebuilding and conflict prevention require long-term capacities and commitment. He recognises that results should be thought of in terms of what is left behind afterwards, that building local capacity is about building the capacity for local communities to affect change and continue their conflict prevention activities."

Similarly, in Kenya and Lesotho, as well as in other settings, evaluators found that PDAs worked very well with civil society partners in the implementation local level efforts towards dialogue and peacebuilding. Evaluators found this to serve a dual purpose, that of enhancing civil society capacities as well as extending the PDA's reach to communities and aiding understanding their needs and challenges so as to better inform upstream level engagements and policy-making. By so doing, PDAs are able to distil appropriate upstream level efforts and results and ensure coherence between peace writ large and peace writ little, resulting in an holistic approach to peacebuilding.

In all the countries where PDAs have supported the establishment of I4Ps, it has normally been done with a key Government Ministry or an Independent Commissioning in the lead. A government of Malawi Official told evaluators that this approach is commendable as it places the responsibility of sustaining the effort post-PDA deployment in the hands of the leadership and citizens in that country. This approach ensures buy-in and long-term commitment from the onset. In certain contexts, local-level and civil society mechanisms have been established and they have served the same purpose and/or subsequently feed into formal efforts.

# Chapter Three

## Conclusions and Recommendations

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This section outlines conclusions and recommendations made based on the evaluation findings above. These are intended to inform both the requisite adjustments of the current programme phase as well as to inform the design and implementation the next iteration of the Joint Programme.

### 3.1 CONCLUSIONS

In its totality, the evaluators assess the Joint Programme as meeting standards and expectations, even exceeding standards and expectations in some areas. The evaluation has also identified some challenges and suggests where adjustments and improvements should be made. Overall, most involved stakeholders see the Joint Programme as valuable and needed; there is strong demand for it to not only continue but to consider how it can be further scaled-up and enhanced.

Regarding strategic positioning and relevance, the Joint Programme often exceeded standards and expectations. It is one of very few initiatives conceived and implemented at the strategic political-development crossroads of the UN, patching a gap or even what some stakeholders described as a “design flaw” in the system itself. It is extremely relevant and well situated in the newly vitalized UN priority areas of conflict prevention and sustaining peace—Joint Programme modalities should be considered a fundamental aspect of any re-structuring of the UN’s peace/security and development systems. The Programme’s flexibility has permitted it to adapt appropriately to ensure its relevance to the needs of the different country and regional contexts in which it operates.

The Joint Programme often exceeded standards and expectations for effectiveness. It has sometimes achieved essential results in some contexts, though through a wider set of outcomes and change pathways than its current Project Document and RRF suggest and often characterized by ‘intangible’ or qualitative changes that needed to be more effectively captured and assessed. Where national capacity building for conflict prevention, dialogue and collaboration was the explicit objective and direct area of PDA work, this has more often than not yielded good results. However, the principal objective of many PDA deployments has been to improve the capacity of the UN and other development partners in relation to conflict prevention. Many stakeholders see this ‘internal’ capacity building as essential in its own right but also as a necessary, though a few degrees removed, contribution to building national capacities; the causal logic of this link needs to be better articulated, monitored and assessed. Given fundamental constraints of the UN’s complex internal cuisine and the still too often siloed approaches of its departments, agencies and programmes, the Programme has done well to deepen the partnership between the peace and development sides of the UN. Though the Programme has succeeded in widening participation beyond DPA and UNDP, more work needs to be done on deepening and expanding UN and external partnerships. The Programme has the potential for building an enduring conflict prevention community of practice within the UN, but more efforts and resources would need to be invested.

Programme efficiency overall meets standards and expectations. PDA deployments have often succeeded in establishing and deepening preventive capacities and action, the value of which is disproportionately greater than the relatively small investment required for a PDA post. Moreover, PDA costs were significantly less than the potential costs of post-conflict responses that might otherwise have been needed. Greater efficiencies were also achieved through the introduction of the

PDA Roster and the re-invigoration of processes for disbursing PDA catalytic funds. At the same time, the Programme also exhibited challenges in its management processes that meant it did not always maximise the efficient use of its resources.

The evaluators suggest that the Joint Programme has generally performed well despite shortcomings in its approaches to results-based design, management and M&E and challenges with some of its management systems and capacities. The Programme should not be ‘scaled-up’ without changes and new investments in these areas. Programme approaches to sustainability are mostly satisfactory, but sustainability needs to be ‘built into’ improved results-based design and funding frameworks need to be linked to intended results. While the Programme has made tangible efforts, and achieved progress regarding gender parity and other gender considerations, conflict sensitivity, inclusion and human rights cross-cutting considerations have not been institutionalised.

*Table 1: Programme Performance Rating*

| Rating   | 1                         | 2                        | 3                                | 4  | 5   |
|--|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Evaluation Criterion                               | Major improvements needed | Some improvements needed | Meets standards and expectations | Often exceeds standards and expectations | Consistently exceeds standards and expectations |
| Strategic Positioning and Relevance                |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |
| Effectiveness                                      |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |
| Results-based Programme Design, Management and M&E |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |
| Efficiency   |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |
| Sustainability                                     |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |
| Partnerships                                       |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |
| Management Systems and Capacities                  |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |
| National Ownership and Leadership                  |                           |                          |                                  |  |   |

The following principal conclusions and recommendations have largely been formulated to provide constructive suggestions for how Joint Programme management might further improve upon the successes of the Programme:

**Conclusion 1:** The PDA-modality is the flagship of the Joint Programme and has largely been a success across a broad spectrum of different country contexts. Through PDAs, the Joint Programme has made an impact at the country level among national partners and demand for PDA deployments is increasing. PDAs are so valuable that the modality is at risk of becoming a victim of its own success if the Joint Programme becomes seen as a PDA ‘rostering service’. As the Joint Programme matures and potentially scales-up in its next programme phase, management has the opportunity to enhance its

approaches and more comprehensively respond to the requirements of different country contexts with a wider spectrum of results-based support than simply deploying PDA-types. Such a future route was often argued by many stakeholders, who described the next programme phase as an opportunity to strive for a “Joint Programme 2.0” or an enhanced “Status Quo-Plus” that would more fully elaborate and enhance current Joint Programme approaches

**Conclusion 2:** The Joint Programme faces unique challenges for employing results-based programme design and management methods. Programme management has progressed in recent years, but is still striving to meet key standards and requirements from the perspective of results-based programming. A central challenge has been effectively defining results, consistently capturing these through the Programme’s M&E systems and then translating these into a coherent narrative about the Programme’s impact. More attention and resources need to be devoted to results-based design and M&E to ensure the Programme can demonstrate its impact, both for accountability and to maintain confidence of its funding base. At a deeper level, though, the Joint Programme has neither been designed nor operated on the premise of an explicit and coherent ‘theory of change’ (ToC) from which the rest of the strategy flows, reflecting the fact that different stakeholders have different expectations of the Programme. The process to design the next phase of the Joint Programme presents an excellent opportunity to further strengthen the Programme’s: theory of change; results strategies at the country-level; and results-based M&E systems.

**Conclusion 3:** The Joint Programme has been ahead of UN thinking and practice in terms of conflict prevention, with ground breaking interventions (such as eminent persons panels), at the country level. The Programme possess great potential for translating its lessons, good practice examples and evidence-base into vital inputs for conflict prevention and sustaining peace policy development at the global, regional and national levels (as well as for replication in other countries under the Joint Programme). While more work is needed to realise the Programme’s largely internally focused learning and knowledge management results under Output 5, the Joint Programme also possess great potential to strategically input into the conflict prevention and sustaining peace community of practice across the wider UN.

**Conclusion 4:** Given the global nature of the Programme, number of outputs, requisite levels of interactions and engagements across so many countries and stakeholders and need for much stronger results-based programme and the enhancement of other management capacities, the current Programme management team is overstretched. While the existing team proved largely effective in responding to requests for information and clarifications, keeping the programme on-track and advancing some new management innovations, additional staff and other solutions are required to reinforce programme management capacity. This will especially be the case as many stakeholders see great potential and significant opportunities to scale-up the Joint Programme.

**Conclusion 5:** The results achieved through PDAs are attracting increased global interest and attention, inside and outside of the UN. The visibility and strategic positioning of the Programme is good across DPA, UNDP and PBSO. Most stakeholders involved with or benefitting from the Joint Programme see it as a valuable and much needed innovation and PDAs as strategic assets for the UN, national actors and the wider international community. At the same time, many wider stakeholders at the country and global levels, particularly UN entities outside of the Programme management team, do not understand or take advantage of the full value of PDAs or the Joint Programme.

**Conclusion 6:** There is sufficient evidence that at the country level, national ownership and leadership of PDA-supported initiatives is strong and that by working with institutions, strategically positioned individuals and community-level initiatives (mainly though civil society partners), the chances of sustainability of results beyond PDA deployment is high. The challenge however is that commitment

and coordination is largely dependent on the personal relations and understanding of leadership of the PDA and RC. This presents a risk of reversal of gains once these individuals leave. Apart from this, there is no regularised Member State involvement or consultation in the management processes of the Programme, an element that evaluators deemed essential.

**Conclusion 7:** The Joint Programme has been strategic in its partnerships to enhance programme delivery through PDAs. The FBA, UNV programme and the Inside Mediator project have made significant contributions. However, there is need for continued effort in forging partnerships with other sectors that could augment the current set and contribute to attainment of results.

### 3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** In potentially enhancing and scaling-up the Joint Programme, it is suggested that management prioritise improving the *quality* and *breadth* of Joint Programme support to each country engagement rather than the *quantity* of country engagements. This would require regularising more rigorous and collaborative needs assessments of country situations that involve all key stakeholders (such as UNDP, DPA, RCs, UNCT and national actors) to converge expectations into basic multi-year ‘engagement frameworks’. Such frameworks would identify a spectrum of needs-based support or ‘solutions packages’ tailored to each country context, rather than necessarily defaulting to a PDA deployment approach. Some engagement frameworks might fall short of a PDA deployment and only involve the provision of limited and time-bound support (e.g. surge expertise, short-term technical specialists, technical needs assessments, reflective or stock-take processes, etc.), for example in the case of a pre-election scenario. In other intense or unpredictable situations, an engagement framework might commit, for example, to a multi-year timeframe for a ‘Peace and Development Unit’ that equips a PDA with additional competencies required for the context (e.g. media monitoring, specialised research and analysis, data management, various technical specialists, strategic communications, field liaison, etc.). Working from an agreed framework, the Programme could also build-in sustainability outcomes and exit strategies from the outset. Such an approach would likely result in country engagements on average becoming more resource intensive. As a consequence, management might effectively have to adopt a ‘narrower but deeper’ approach that would likely plateau the number of country engagements rather than maximizing the total number of countries across which the Programme stretches its resources (though this depends on overall growth of Programme resource mobilisation).

**Recommendation 2:** The evaluation recommends the Joint Programme take key steps as it designs its next programme phase to progressively increase the use of results-based management practices:

- Firstly, the design process should be inclusive and collaborative to ensure convergence of expectations, but also to deepen understanding of the goals of the Programme and deepen buy-in among stakeholders and partners;
- Management could facilitate a process to review and develop a coherent and viable Theory of Change that reconciles the goals and aims of the Programme’s different stakeholders;
- Once a ToC is established, management could then design a new Results Framework with realistic and clear Outcomes and expected Outputs to guide the implementation of the Programme;
- Workable indicators could be designed and baselines established so that management can monitor and aggregate country-level results into global impact statements. This would be aided by instituting ‘engagement frameworks’ for each targeted country with results linked to the Joint Programme’s Outcomes and ultimately stemming from the Programme’s ToC;



- Joint Programme indicators and baselines could also be established for global results the Programme might seek to achieve (e.g. wider policy development, reflective learning, UN cooperation, etc.), elements of programme management performance (e.g. PDA deployment efficiencies, gender parity, expenditure rates, etc.) and criteria for future evaluations; and
- While developing workable indicators, management would have the opportunity to re-develop its M&E systems with practical reporting mechanisms that document results (not just outputs).

Taking these steps will be demanding for the existing Secretariat to implement given its ongoing workload. Management should consider the addition of an M&E Specialist to the Secretariat so that it can effectively carry the additional workload of designing the next programme phase, but also the enhanced M&E approaches required for the next programme phase. Alternatively, project design and M&E specialists could be procured over the short-term to support the Secretariat during a new programme design process. Advice and support could also be sought from UNEG and/or the PBSO, which is experienced in managing a global peace-related programme across multiple and diverse country contexts. The Joint Programme could also explore collaborative partnerships with peace research and other institutions that could enhance the Programme's ability to demonstrate impact and results through reflective design processes, enhanced monitoring methodologies and innovative data management technologies.

**Recommendation 3:** The Joint Programme is recommended to take steps to increasingly position itself in closer support to the centres of conflict prevention and sustaining peace policy development and practice within the UN. More immediately, the Joint Programme could draw on Technical Committee members to take stock of current UN policy advocacy opportunities (particularly the ongoing peace and security architecture and development coordination system reform processes) and develop a basic communications strategy. This strategy could include convening a roundtable with key players supporting the SG's Prevention Agenda where national partners of the Programme and PDAs would have an opportunity to share their experiences. More long-term, the Joint Programme should explore during the design of its next programme phase how it might prioritise policy advocacy as an outcome area and develop a more meaningful communications strategy; design consultations could identify how evidence from the Joint Programme's work in scores of contexts over the last 14 years could usefully influence and shape the evolving UN conflict prevention and sustaining peace policy agendas. Similarly, the Joint Programme should explore during the design of its next programme phase how it might expand its current learning Outcome and strategies for the benefit of the wider UN conflict prevention and sustaining peace community of practice.

**Recommendation 4:** The evaluators recommend that the Joint Programme both restructures the Secretariat and seeks additional partnerships to reinforce its programme management capacities. Firstly, the Secretariat should be expanded. A minimum team to enable the Programme to moderately scale-up and implement many of the enhancements recommended in the evaluation would include: a project manager with delegated decision-making authority supported by a project coordinator to adequately handle the responsibilities of a programme of this nature; a full-time specialist to establish and run the results-based M&E and reporting systems; a full-time specialist to expand and run a professional development and learning strategy directed not just at PDAs, but a wider spectrum of key stakeholders; and a finance/admin assistant. Secondly, the Joint Programme should identify and deepen strategic partnerships with think-tanks, specialised institutions and even private sector actors that may be willing to contribute resources, systems and skill-sets for enhancing the Programme management capacity and performance.

**Recommendation 5:** The evaluation recommends the Joint Programme invests more to strategically position itself through partnerships across the wider UN system, particularly the development and

human rights pillars. In the near-term, Joint Programme management could develop a communications and strategic engagement strategy to enhance awareness of its work and explore how it might enhance its strategic partnerships across the UN system. Including DPA regional divisions as direct members of the Technical Committee would also deepen understanding of the Joint Programme across DPA. More long-term, the Joint Programme should explore during the design of its next programme phase how it might prioritise enhanced inter-agency involvement and joint initiatives both at the global level and through joint-programming at the country level (potentially in closer partnership with the PBSO). As part of this, management needs to instigate more dialogue with senior UN management about how the Joint Programme will converge with the structural changes taking place both with the UN's peace and security architecture and its development system. Suggestions were even made by some stakeholders that an opportunity exists to utilise the successes, approaches and lessons of the Joint Programme as a foundation for establishing a strategic UN conflict prevention platform that comprehensively integrates the peace and development pillars of the UN system in support of the Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace Agendas.

**Recommendation 6:** It is recommended that PDAs and RCs identify strong institutions (either state or non-state) that can be supported to coordinate national actors in conflict prevention work such that, even when the PDA leaves, national institutions can sustain the work. Regarding the involvement of Member States in the programme leadership, it is proposed in the next programme cycle that an ad hoc structure of programme advisors be created involving 7 Member States where PDAs are deployed. These could meet with Joint Programme management annually, with one or two virtual meetings in between. Membership can be rotated every two or three years. This group could serve as Member State advocates for the Joint Programme.

**Recommendation 7:** It is recommended that the Joint Programme conduct a partnership review and develop a Partnerships Strategy that more thoroughly considers foundations, research institutes, peace practice organisations, private philanthropies and the private sector as potential partners. This would enable the Programme to expand its resource base and lead to enhanced programme quality, reach and impact.

# ANNEXES

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## ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

### Background

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and more recently the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), have been collaborating on the *Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention*. First launched in 2004, the programme has grown significantly in recent years.

In 2015/2016, the Joint Programme has provided support to 45 countries globally through the UN Country Teams' conflict prevention programmes, in many instances involving the deployment of Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs). The deployment of PDAs represents the most visible element of the partnership, though the programme provides broader support (see below outputs).

Previous deployments of PDAs, coupled with other types of remote support from DPA and UNDP, have enabled UN contributions to violence-free elections or referenda in countries as diverse as Guyana, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Togo, Lesotho, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Uganda, and the Solomon Islands; breaking deadlocks and resolving conflicts in Lesotho, Bolivia, Ghana, and Kenya; sustaining viable platforms for dialogue or conflict resolution in Chad, Guinea, Fiji, Georgia, FYROM, Cyprus, and Malawi; and initiatives to reduce insecurity at the local level in Ecuador, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Mauritania. During 2017, the programme aims to deploy between 35-39 PDAs and to increase the support being provided to joint conflict analysis and programmatic interventions.

The programme has the following outputs:

- Peace and Development Advisers deployed to help build long-term capacity of national partners and UN Country Teams to undertake conflict/political analysis, and design and implement conflict-sensitive programming;
- Enhanced mechanisms and capacities for collaboration and dialogue;
- Mechanism for deployment of short-term expertise to respond and engage in crisis settings;
- Coordinated and complementary UNDP and DPA support, analysis, and engagement in target countries;
- Enhanced capacity of UN Country Teams, DPA, and UNDP to share good practices, lessons learned, and engage in community of practice.

The 2015 reviews of UN Peace Operations and the Peacebuilding Architecture both highlight the Joint Programme as one of few examples of effective collaboration across the UN system on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and an effective vehicle through which the UN is able to engage with national stakeholders to prevent and resolve conflict.

Current partners of the Joint Programme include the European Union, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In the last two years, the Joint Programme has enhanced partnerships with Sweden's Folke Bernadotte Academy on training and capacity support, as well as with UNV, both in an effort to strengthen the technical capacities and support to PDAs.

The first phase of the programme ended in mid-2015 and the second phase was developed for 2015-2018. The programme engages in multiple conflict prevention initiatives at the country level and regularly receives positive feedback from the Country Teams on the ground. At the same time, the programme team has been engaged in reviewing the standard operating procedures of the programme during 2016 to address any inefficiencies in the programme implementation.

Currently the programme is being implemented in the following five regions: Europe, Asia Pacific, Africa, Arab States, Latin America/Americas, with the majority of the advisors being deployed in Africa.

## Objectives

The evaluation will assess the performance of the Programme in achieving its intended results. The evaluation will specifically focus on the following components:

At the country level

- Evaluate the Programme vis-à-vis its intended objective of building national capacities for conflict prevention;
- Assess to what extent the Programme leverages UNCT's role in building prevention capacities at the country level;
- Review whether PDAs strike a balance in building national capacities, serving the Resident Coordinator and the UNCT, and the colleagues at the HQ;
- Review to what degree PDAs are successful in mainstreaming their political and conflict analysis into UNCT programming and monitoring;
- Assess the gender sensitivity of the work of the PDAs at the country level, and whether they are engaged in promoting women, peace and security related work at the country level;
- Gauge the degree to which the PDAs and the Programme engages other UN agencies and funds, including leveraging PBF/PBSO resources and EU-UN Insider Mediation Programme;
- Assess whether the functions of the PDAs are consistently understood and applied; and how context specific the functions become at the country level (noting some PDAs are deployed in mission settings, some have sub-regional roles);
- Explore whether the deployment of FBA seconded capacity, UNVs and other seconded staff have made an impact on the programme;
- Assess whether Country Teams in selected fragile countries that do not have a PDA would benefit from having such a function;
- Propose options for a framework for monitoring and evaluating the work for PDAs going forward; and for assessing the impact of the programme.

At the global level

- Evaluate the degree to which the programme achieves the cross-fertilization of expertise and lessons learned between the cadre of PDAs;
- Evaluate to what degree the PDAs are able to leverage on the opportunities to connect to the larger community of practice of governance, conflict prevention, political and mediation expertise in UNDP and DPA;
- Evaluate the extent to which the Programme contributes to enhancing Joint UN action on prevention;
- Review the contribution of the Programme in enhancing UN collaboration between UNDP, DPA and PBSO/PBF.

- Assess the possible contribution of the Programme to the sustaining peace agenda and the SG's agenda on enhancing UN prevention capacity.

At the Programme management level

- Review the management, operational, financial and administrative structures, including business processes (standard operating procedures) of the Programme and whether they are fit for purpose;
- options for the sustainability of the PDA cadre including options for cost-sharing of the function;  
Assess whether the Programme has the required resources (human and financial) to achieve its intended objectives;
- Explore options for further enhancing the gender balance within the PDA cadre;
- Assess the relevance of and the capacity of the Programme to respond to the bi-annual Montreux retreat recommendations.

## Duties and Responsibilities

### Scope of work:

This evaluation will be carried out by a team of two consultants with the support of the Joint Programme team in New York. The evaluators will jointly undertake the following tasks:

- Consult with the Joint Programme management team in New York on the scope of work, methodology and country case studies to be selected;
- Draft the inception report outlining the evaluation methodology as well as interview and mission plan and schedule (each consultant should be expected to travel to two countries each);
- Develop the research questions and interview questionnaires based on the agreed evaluation plan and methodology;
- Conduct interviews with the relevant UN colleagues (including DPA, PBSP and UNDP), donors, Resident Coordinators, PDAs, and other selected stakeholders;
- Undertake missions to the selected countries to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme at the country level;
- Conduct phone interviews with at least two countries agreed with the Joint Programme management that do not have a PDA to assess needs in these countries;
- Draft the evaluation report based on the findings for the review of the programme team;
- Consult with the Programme team and adjust the report based on feedback from the Joint Programme management;
- Submit final evaluation report to the Programme Management team

### Expected outputs and deliverables:

Deliverables and Timelines

**Deliverable 1** - Inception report outlining the evaluation methodology and suggested report outline (Due 2 weeks after commencement of assignment)

**Deliverable 2** - Submission of interview reports (Within two months of contract signature)

**Deliverable 3** - Presentation of the initial findings of the mid-term review to the JP management by 12 June 2017

**Deliverable 4** - Draft evaluation report for the team review (within three months of contract signature)

**Deliverable 5** - Final report, based on feedback received from the programme team (Within four months of contract signature)

A comprehensive analytical report (not exceeding 50 pages, Word format, single spaced, in English)

*The report shall include, but is not necessarily limited to, the following components:*

- Executive summary
- Description of the evaluation methodology
- Analysis of the results, impact, resources, partnerships, management/working methods, and implementation strategy
- Presentation of key findings
- Conclusions and recommendations (including for M&E framework)
- Annexes
  1. Questionnaires developed by consultants and used for the evaluation
  2. List of persons interviewed, summary interview and mission reports
  3. Any other relevant material that supports evaluation findings and recommendations
  4. List of documents reviewed

### **Management Arrangements and Reporting**

The two consultants will report to the Programme Manager of the Joint UNDP-DPA Programme and will liaise with the whole programme team during the assignment.

Evaluation methodology

The evaluator will rely mainly on the following sources of information:

Desk review of relevant programme and policy documents and interviews with a wide range of stakeholders and partners. Interviewees will include the programme agencies (UNDP, DPA and PBSO), key partners in government and civil society, and Peace and Development Advisors in selected countries.

Missions to two countries where the programme would be implemented should be undertaken to conduct direct observation.

The final methodology for the evaluation will be completed within the first two weeks of the contract in consultation with the programme team.

### **Competencies**

Substantive and technical expertise in one or more of the following issues:

- Peace, Security and Development, Conflict prevention and resolution; governance and peacebuilding.

- Good understanding of UNDP programming modalities, particularly in crisis and post-conflict settings is an asset.
- Strong Proactive in problem-solving and recommendation for conflict prevention and resolution;
- Ability in managing confidential and politically sensitive issues, in a responsible way, and in accordance with protocols.

Interpersonal and communication skills:

- Strong communication skills and proven ability to collaborate between different actors and high level of internal and external relationship management;
- Uses tact and sensitivity when delivering sensitive information or resolving delicate issues;
- Demonstrates openness to change and ability to manage complexities;
- Remains calm, in control and good humoured even under pressure.
- Demonstrates strong ability to manage, facilitate, and engage in discussions with multiple stakeholders in a formal setting, seeking to encourage participation in an open and collegial environment.
- Proactive in problem-solving and recommendation for conflict prevention and resolution;
- Strong communication skills and proven ability to collaborate between different actors and high level of internal and external relationship management;
- Uses tact and sensitivity when delivering sensitive information or resolving delicate
- Demonstrates openness to change and ability to manage complexities;
- Remains calm, in control and good humoured even under pressure.

## ANNEX 2 – LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

### United Nations Headquarters and Regional Offices

#### *Joint Programme Management*

- |    |                        |                                   |
|----|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. | Miroslav Jenča         | Assistant Secretary General, DPA  |
| 2. | Magdy Martínez-Solimán | Assistant Secretary General, UNDP |
| 3. | Stephen Jackson        | RC, Burkina Faso (fmr. DPA)       |
| 4. | Eiko Ikegaya           | DPA                               |
| 5. | Patrick Keuleers       | UNDP                              |
| 6. | Katy Thompson          | UNDP                              |
| 7. | Sanna Tasala           | Joint Programme Secretariat       |
| 8. | Ilona Lecerf           | Joint Programme Secretariat       |

#### *UN Department of Political Affairs*

9. Rohan Edrisinha
10. Jean-Francis Joh Epoko
11. Angelica Ghinda
12. Yoonie Kim
13. Erwan Pouchous
14. Ajay Sethi
15. Cecile van Manen
16. Shin Umezu
17. Simon Yazgi

#### *United Nations Development Programme*

18. Lin Cao
19. Simon Alexis Finley
20. Jason Gluck
21. Malin Herwig
22. Joanna Kazana
23. Celine Moyroud (now UNDP Country Director Lebanon)
24. Ozonnia Ojielo
25. Jelena Raketic
26. Noella Richard
27. Monica Rijal
28. Nika Saeedi
29. Livio Sarandrea
30. Corrado Scognamillo
31. Helina Tadesse

#### *UN Peacebuilding Support Office*

- |     |                         |   |
|-----|-------------------------|---|
| 32. | Oscar Fernandez-Taranco | Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support |
| 33. | Patrice Chiwota         |   |
| 34. | Tammy Smith             |   |

#### *Executive Office of the UN Secretary General*

- |     |               |   |
|-----|---------------|---|
| 35. | Tamrat Samuel | Assistant Secretary General, Internal Review Team on UN Peace and Security Architecture |
|-----|---------------|---|



### *UN Development Operations Coordination Office*

36. Bradley Foerster

37. Karin Lucke

### *UNICEF*

38. Sharrif Baaser

## **Peace and Development Advisor Types**

### *Africa*

39. Eric Mbok

PDA, Great Lakes Region

40. Melina Nathan

PDA, Burundi

41. Lucy Wanjiru Ndungu

PDA, Uganda

42. William Tsuma

Dialogue Advisor UNDP Zimbabwe

### *Americas*

43. Rae-Ann Paert

PDA, Caribbean Region

### *Arab States*

44. Omar Aboud

PDA, Sudan

### *Asia-Pacific*

45. Ellen Alradi

PDA, Fiji and Pacific Islands

46. Sonja Bachmann

DPA (fmr. PDA Fiji and Pacific Islands)

47. Michael Bäk

Advisor to the UN Resident Coordinator, Thailand

### *Europe-CIS/Central Asia*

48. Ivan Lupis

PDA, Bosnia-Hercegovina

49. Dalila Sadinlija

PDS, Bosnia-Hercegovina

50. Maria Van Ruiten

fmr. PDA, Georgia

## **Supervising UN Resident Coordinators and Special Envoys**

### *Africa*

51. Said Djinnit

Special Envoy, Great Lakes Region

52. Rosa Malango

RC, Uganda

### *Americas*

53. Richard Blewitt

RC, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten

### *Arab States*

54. Marta Ruedas

RC, Sudan

### *Asia-Pacific*

- |                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| 55. Deirdre Boyd  | RC, Thailand   |
| 56. Luc Stevens   | fmr. RC Thailand   |
| 57. Osnat Lubrani | RC, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu |
| 58. Roy Trivedy   | RC, Papua New Guinea   |

### *Europe-CIS/Central Asia*

- |                     |                        |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| 59. Niels Scott     | RC, Georgia            |
| 60. Sezin Sinanoglu | RC, Bosnia-Herzegovina |

### **Additional Interviews**

- |                         |   |
|-------------------------|---|
| 61. Ayesha Rhekhi       | Embassy of Canada Bangkok, Canada   |
| 62. Marjorie C. Shema   | Office of President and Cabinet, Malawi   |
| 63. Lotta Segerström    | SIDA, Sweden  |
| 64. Helena Bådagård     | SIDA, Sweden  |
| 65. Marcel Stoessel     | SDC, Switzerland  |
| 66. Franziska Kohler    | DFID, United Kingdom  |
| 67. Craig Patchett      | UK Mission to the UN, United Kingdom  |
| 68. Andrew L. Armstrong | U.S. Embassy Bangkok, United States of America                                    |
| 69. Henning Glaser      | German-Southeast Asian Centre of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance |
| 70. Martin Hart-Hansen  | UNDP Thailand   |
| 71. Jane Lawson         | UNV Asia-Pacific Office   |

### **Guyana Country Visit Interviews**

- |                               |   |
|-------------------------------|---|
| 72. Mikiko Tanaka             | UN Resident Coordinator                         |
| 73. Srdan Deric               | PDA   |
| 74. Fabio Oliva               | fmr. PDA (now PDA Cambodia)                     |
| 75. Rueben Hamilton Robertson | FAO   |
| 76. William Adu Krow          | WHO/PAHO  |
| 77. Martin Odiit              | UNAIDS  |
| 78. Paolo Marchi              | UNICEF  |
| 79. Jean Ricot Dormeus        | Office of the OAS General Secretariat in Guyana |
| 80. Tamara M. Evelyn Khan     | Office of the Prime Minister                    |
| 81. Paloma Mohamed            | University of Guyana                            |
| 82. Lawrence Lachmansingh     | citizen activist / PDA Induction Facilitator    |

### **Kenya Country Visit Interviews**

- |                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| 83. Siddharth Chatterjee | UN Resident Coordinator                     |
| 84. Eric Mbogo           | PDA Great Lakes                             |
| 85. Amanda Serumaga      | UNDP  |
| 86. Werner Schultink     | UNICEF                                      |
| 87. Karin Fueg           | UN Women                                    |
| 88. Milicent Okoch       | Social Cohesion Commission                  |
| 89. Raphina Monono       | UNON Political Advisor to DG                |
| 90. UWIANO FGD           | Civil Society and Government Platform Kenya |

## Lesotho Country Visit Interviews

|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| 91. Salvator Niyonzima   | UN Resident Coordinator  |
| 92. George Wachira       | PDA  |
| 93. Christy Ahenkora     | UNDP   |
| 94. Booi Mohapi          | Catholic Justice and Peace Commission                                |
| 95. Seabata Motsomai     | Lesotho Council of NGOs  |
| 96. Khosi Makubakube,    | Christian Council of Lesotho   |
| 97. Cornelia Atsyor      | WHO  |
| 98. Mabulara Tsuene      | UNDP   |
| 99. Fako Likoti          | Former Presidential Political Advisor                                |
| 100. Hon. T. Aumane      | Minister of Development Planning                                     |
| 101. Lira Ralebese       | Deputy Principal Secretary, Ministry of Law & Constitutional Affairs |
| 102. Mary Njoroge        | WFP  |
| 103. Thabo Mousenywane   | UNDP   |
| 104. Prof. Clever Nyathi | Short-Term Advisor- Reforms  |
| 105. Rose                | Peace Building Specialist UNV Seconded                               |
| 106. Asael Abdurahmanova | RCO  |

## Myanmar Country Visit Interviews

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 107. Renata Lok Dessallien     | UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator  |
| 108. Peter Barwick             | PDA   |
| 109. Linnea Lindberg           | PDS (Folke Bernadotte Academy)  |
| 110. Pablo Barrera             | RCO   |
| 111. Susu Thatun               | RCO   |
| 112. Chris Carter              | RCO   |
| 113. Dawn Del Rio              | UNDP  |
| 114. Dilrukshi Fonseca         | UNDP  |
| 115. Giuseppe de Vicentiis     | UNHCR   |
| 116. Kaori Ishikawa            | UNFPA   |
| 117. Nicholas George           | UNOPS   |
| 118. Domenic Scapelli          | WFP   |
| 119. Chris Hyslop              | OCHA  |
| 120. Morten N. R. Christiansen | Royal Norwegian Embassy   |
| 121. Melanie Littlejohn        | Embassy of Australia  |
| 122. H E Steve Marshall        | Ambassador of New Zealand, New Zealand Embassy  |
| 123. Stephen Wong              | New Zealand Embassy   |
| 124. Isabell Poppelbaum        | Delegation of the EU to Myanmar   |
| 125. Elizabeth Moorsmith       | Joint Peace Fund  |
| 126. Min Zaw Oo                | Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security (fmr. Director of the Technical Secretariat to the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee) |

## Nigeria Country Visit Interviews

|                                |  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| 127. Edward Kallon             | UN Resident Coordinator                            |
| 128. Zebulun Takwa             | PDA  |
| 129. Adam Bergman              | PDS (Folke Bernadotte Academy)                     |
| 130. Deputy Commandant-General | Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps           |
| 131. Matthew Alao              | Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Analyst      |
| 132. Gabriel Jiya,             | Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) |
| 133. Emmanuel Mamman           | Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) |
| 134. Tunde Olalekan            | Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) |
| 135. Zainab Anyadike           | Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) |

|                            |                               |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 136. Denis Jobin           | UNICEF                        |
| 137. Ominic Stolarow       | UNICEF                        |
| 138. Njeri Karuru          | UN Women                      |
| 139. Priscilla Achapa      | Women Environmental Programme |
| 140. Vincent Omuga         | OCHA                          |
| 141. Arthur-Martins Aginam | Kukah Centre                  |

## Sri Lanka Country Visit Interviews

|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| 142. Una McCauley    | UN Resident Coordinator  |
| 143. Gita Sarbhawal  | PDA  |
| 144. Zoe Keeler      | Programming on Peacebuilding   |
| 145. Jorn Sorensen   | UNDP   |
| 146. Vidya Perera    | UNDP   |
| 147. Jehan Perera    | Civil Society representative   |
| 148. Farah Milhar    | Civil Society representative   |
| 149. Pablo De Greif  | Special Rapporteur for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees for Non-Recurrence |
| 150. Juan            | Human Rights Advisor   |
| 151. Austin Fernando | Presidents Secretary   |
| 152. Dushanthi       | Peace Building Fund secretariat  |
| 153. Niro            | Peace Building Fund secretariat  |
| 154. Mano Tittawella | Secretary-General, Secretariat for Coordination of Reconciliation Mechanism          |
| 155. Mr. Tharaka     | Director UN and International Affairs  |
| 156. Mr. Faaiz       | SLMC Representative  |
| 157. Selyna Peiris   | Office of National Unity and Reconciliation and Reconciliation                       |

## Tunisia Country Visit Interviews

|                               |   |
|-------------------------------|---|
| 158. Diego Zorrilla           | UN Resident Coordinator   |
| 159. Giordano Segneri         | PDA   |
| 160. El Kebir Al Alaoui       | UNDP  |
| 161. Riccardo Barranca        | UNDP  |
| 162. Eduardo Lopez-Mancisidor | UNDP  |
| 163. Houssemeddine Ishak      | UNDP  |
| 164. Hedi Abdelkefi           | UNDP  |
| 165. Cheikh Diouf             | DSS   |
| 166. Dimiter Chalev           | OHCHR   |
| 167. Jihed Ghannem            | UNIC  |
| 168. Lila Pieters             | UNICEF  |
| 169. Mohamed Lassaad Soua     | UNAIDS  |
| 170. Gabriel El Khili         | UNESCO  |
| 171. Lorena Lando             | IOM   |
| 172. Wissem Benyettou         | OHCHR   |
| 173. Fehmi Ghadhab            | UNODC   |
| 174. George Abadjian          | UNICEF  |
| 175. Slim Ben Jrad            | Permanent Secretariat, National Counter-Terrorism Commission              |
| 176. Malek Kochlef            | Permanent Secretariat, National Counter-Terrorism Commission              |
| 177. Michaël Béchir Ayari     | International Crisis Group  |
| 178. Adnen Hasnaoui           | Maghreb Institute for Sustainable Development (IMDED)                     |
| 179. Amine Ghali              | Kawakibi  |
| 180. Hamza Meddeb             | Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute |

181. Kim Sitzler SDC, Embassy of Switzerland  
182. Luca Gervasoni International Institute for Nonviolent Action (NOVACT)

### Ukraine Country Visit Interviews

183. Neal Walker UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator  
184. Stan Veitsman PDA  
185. Therese Svensson PDS (Folke Bernadotte Academy)  
186. Filon Manuel Morar DPA Liaison Office in Ukraine (DPA)  
187. Van Nguyen UNDP (fmr. RCO)  
188. Ildar Gazizulin UNDP  
189. Natalia Sitnikova UNDP  
190. Victor Munteanu UNDP  
191. Tim Headington DSS  
192. Zuzana Zalanova UNV  
193. Sergei Volkov UNOPS  
194. Fiona Frazer UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (OHCHR)  
195. Anastasia Divinskaya UN Women  
196. Natthinee Rodraksa OCHA  
197. Vasyl Filipchuk International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS)  
198. Roman Koval Institute for Peace and Common Ground  
199. Nikolai Borisov Donbas Dialogues  
200. Valerii Shtaba Donbas Dialogues  
201. Daria Kuznetsova Donbas Dialogues  
202. Tatiana Kyselova Independent Researcher  
203. Inna Tereschenko Odessa Mediation Group

### ANNEX 3 – COUNTRY MISSION LIST AND SELECTION CRITERIA

| CRITERIA   | COUNTRY   | REGION                 |
|--|-----------|------------------------|
| Country emerging from Conflict and in transition; PBF co-funds PDA   | Sri Lanka | Asia-Pacific           |
| Country with ongoing conflicts and peace processes, while in transition; FBA secondee location                                       | Myanmar   | Asia-Pacific           |
| Country with repeated episodes of electoral conflict with REC intervention   | Lesotho   | Africa                 |
| Country where a PDA has exited in the last month, with at least 8 years of JP support  | Kenya     | Africa                 |
| Country with complex inter-ethnic, religious and resource conflicts  | Nigeria   | Africa                 |
| Post-conflict country in transition; significant PVE focus   | Tunisia   | Arab States            |
| Country experiencing ongoing internal and regional conflicts while in transition; FBA secondee location                              | Ukraine   | Eastern Europe and CIS |
| Country with repeated episodes of electoral and identity-based conflicts; newly deployed PDA, but with long history of JP engagement | Guyana    | Americas               |