



# **MID-TERM REVIEW**

**Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme on**

**Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention**

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# Table of Contents

Acronyms.....	2
Acknowledgements .....	2
Executive Summary .....	3
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .....	9
2. MID-TERM REVIEW FINDINGS .....	12
2.1 Effectiveness.....	12
Effectiveness—Outcome 1: Targeted initiatives and national capacities are more effectively contributing to conflict prevention and sustaining peace.....	12
Effectiveness—Outcome 2: UN Country Teams have strategies and programmes that are increasingly conflict sensitive, and are engaged in wider partnerships on sustaining peace .....	21
Effectiveness—Joint Programme contributions to UN gender and human rights priorities.....	30
Effectiveness—Programme Governance and Management .....	33
2.2 Relevance and Coherence .....	45
2.3 Efficiency.....	54
2.4 Sustainability .....	58
3. MID-TERM REVIEW CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	60
3.1 Programme Performance Conclusions .....	60
3.2 Additional Conclusions .....	62
3.3 Recommendations.....	64
4. ANNEXES .....	71
4.1 Document Review and Bibliography .....	71
4.2 MTR Approaches and Methods.....	72
4.3 Stakeholders Interviewed.....	75

## Acronyms

<b>ASG</b>	Assistant Secretary-General	<b>PMD</b>	Policy and Mediation Division
<b>CCA</b>	Common Country Assessment	<b>PMEAL</b>	programme monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning
<b>CRD</b>	Crisis Risk Dashboard	<b>ProDoc</b>	Programme Document
<b>CO</b>	Country Office	<b>PVE</b>	preventing violent extremism
<b>DCO</b>	Development Coordination Office	<b>RC</b>	United Nations Resident Coordinator
<b>DPO</b>	Department of Peace Operations	<b>RCO</b>	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
<b>DPPA</b>	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	<b>RPS</b>	Regional Programme Specialist
<b>DRR</b>	Deputy Resident Representative	<b>RR</b>	Resident Representative
<b>DSS</b>	Department of Safety and Security	<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>EAD</b>	Electoral Assistance Division	<b>TOC</b>	theory of change
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	<b>TORs</b>	terms of reference
<b>GPN</b>	Global Policy Network	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator	<b>UNCT</b>	United Nations Country Team
<b>HRA</b>	Human Rights Advisor	<b>UN CTO</b>	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office
<b>IFI</b>	international financial institutions	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization	<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>KII</b>	key informant interview	<b>UN Habitat</b>	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
<b>KR/WP</b>	Key Result/Work Plan	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>M&amp;E</b>	monitoring and evaluation	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>MTR</b>	Mid-Term Review	<b>UN ODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>HDP</b>	Humanitarian-Development-Peace	<b>UNSDCF</b>	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organisation	<b>UNSSC</b>	United Nations System Staff College
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	<b>UN Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	<b>USD</b>	United States Dollars
<b>PBF</b>	United Nations Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund	<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation
<b>PBSO</b>	Peacebuilding Support Office	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>PDA</b>	Peace and Development Advisor	<b>WPS</b>	women, peace and security
<b>PDS</b>	Peace and Development Specialist		
<b>PDT</b>	Peace and Development Team		

## Acknowledgements

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) Team would like to extend its appreciation to all those individuals within and outside of the United Nations who participated in this exercise and willingly shared their advice, insights and experiences. This particularly includes Joint Programme management and Secretariat colleagues who were highly collaborative, responsive and committed in their support of the process. A special thanks is also extended to those Peace and Development Advisors and Peace and Development Team members who so graciously and effectively organised the MTR Team's field missions.

# Executive Summary

## Introduction and background

It is important to situate the Joint Programme and this Mid-Term Review (MTR) within a wider global context where the agendas for sustaining peace, conflict prevention and multilateralism have experienced significant headwinds in recent years. The Joint Programme has also seen a significant demand-driven expansion and has grappled with a quantum step-up in scale and complexity while also having to adapt to the UN Development System reforms that took effect in 2019. The MTR comes at an important inflection point for the programme to consider not only ‘what is working well’ but to also examine its level of ambition going forward and what will be needed to adapt and deliver to that.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) have been collaborating on the Joint Programme since it was first launched in 2004. The deployment of Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs) and Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) represent the most visible elements of the Joint Programme, though the programme also provides other elements of support to national stakeholders and the UN system (including new Regional Programme Specialists (RPSs)).

During the current Dec 2018 to Dec 2023 cycle<sup>1</sup>, the Joint Programme sought to contribute to two mutually supportive outcomes:

- Outcome 1: Targeted initiatives and national capacities are more effectively contributing to conflict prevention and sustaining peace; and**
- Outcome 2: UN Country Teams have strategies and programmes that are increasingly conflict sensitive, and are leading partnerships on sustaining peace.**

Reviewing the period from Dec 2018 to Dec 2021, the MTR was conducted for the purposes of: supporting programme accountability; identifying needs for potential design and/or implementation improvements; and to make recommendations for undertaking possible improvements. Following UN Evaluation Group standards and guidelines, a two-person team of independent consultants undertook an impartial, non-attributorial<sup>2</sup> and participatory MTR and examined the effectiveness, relevance, coherence, efficiency and sustainability of the Joint Programme. Using the mixed method approach, the MTR conducted: a thorough document review; semi-structured interviews with 302 key informants at the global, regional and country levels; and in-person and virtual field missions to 7 ‘case locations’ (Côte d’Ivoire; Kenya; Malawi; Jordan; Bangladesh; the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia; and the Caribbean).

<sup>1</sup> As per the current [programme document approved 1 Dec 2018](#).

<sup>2</sup> Specific individuals or organisations are not attributed to specific statements. Random codes have been assigned for all key informant interview (KII) quotes.

## Effectiveness findings

The Joint Programme concretely delivered expected results for building national capacities for sustaining peace/prevention (Outcome 1) in the following variety of ways:

- Policies, strategies and legislation for sustaining peace/prevention established, operationalised and strengthened;
- National infrastructures for sustaining peace/prevention established, operationalised and strengthened;
- Inclusive and cross-pillar stakeholder participation in sustaining peace/prevention established, operationalised and strengthened, especially civil society and women's and youth groups and leaders;
- Skills for sustaining peace/prevention across a strategic range of national and local stakeholders established, operationalised and strengthened;
- UN preventative, good offices and mediation efforts de-escalated tensions and reduced conflict risks;
- UN engagements decreased risks for election violence and promoted peaceful elections;
- Entry-points for peacebuilding and conflict transformation established, operationalised and strengthened.

The Joint Programme engaged a wide variety of stakeholders and partners on the ground during implementation. The breadth and scope of these engagements varied from context to context, but usually demonstrated an expansive view of what constitutes 'national capacities.' The Joint Programme also demonstrated that it accessed, mobilised and leveraged a wide array of UN, regional and international technical, financial and political resources in support of national capacities for sustaining peace/prevention.

The Joint Programme concretely delivered expected and often exceeded expected results for building UN Country Team (UNCT) capacities for sustaining peace/prevention (Outcome 2) in the following variety of ways:

- UN cross-pillar knowledge and skills for conflict sensitivity, sustaining peace and prevention expanded and strengthened, including:
  - Conflict sensitivity trainings and accompaniment conducted, expanded and strengthened for UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) and UNCT heads, as well as UN management and teams (development and humanitarian);
  - Innovative data-driven UN risk, crisis, early warning and conflict/peace analysis systems and frameworks established, operationalized and strengthened at the country-level;
  - UN system access to context and conflict sensitivity advice regularised and strengthened; and
  - Adapted and more contextually sensitive UN postures, messaging, planning and behaviour in a range of challenging development situations;
  - UN cross-pillar capacities for strategic action on conflict sensitivity, sustaining peace and prevention expanded and strengthened, including:
    - Inclusive UN networking with diverse national and international stakeholders established, expanded and strengthened;
    - Mechanisms for collaboration, coordination and integration of UN programming/operations established, expanded and strengthened for a range of sustaining/peace agendas;

- Common Country Assessments (CCAs) / UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs) were increasingly sensitive and better calibrated to the sustaining peace/prevention needs of challenging development contexts;
- ‘Non-standard’ internal UN sustaining peace/prevention strategies were increasingly applied enabling the UN to go beyond ‘business as usual’; and
- UN headquarter mechanisms and accountability processes were increasingly sensitive and better calibrated to the sustaining peace/prevention needs of challenging development contexts;
- UN cross-pillar strategic programming for sustaining peace/prevention expanded and strengthened, including:
  - Design, adaptation and implementation of UNCT, joint UN agency and UNDP sustaining peace/prevention programming—at a national level, but also regional and cross-border; and
  - Responsive and coherent technical, financial and political resources from the larger UN system were mobilised and leveraged.

Joint Programme activities, outputs and results under Outcome 2 were the more visible aspects of the programme, particularly for UN stakeholders who were frequently the more direct ‘clients’ of PDA/PDT/RPSs. PDA/PDT/RPSs are mostly perceived as extremely valuable ‘system assets’ that provide public goods for the RC, UNDP Country Office and UNCT, but also for different levels and entities at UN headquarters and regional offices (and sometimes for multilateral and bilateral development/diplomatic actors, international financial institutions and international non-governmental organisations). Focus on Outcome 2 and UN system capacities is frequently regarded as a necessary pathway to supporting activities, outputs and results for Outcome 1.

Joint Programme global governance systems and relationships were generally observed to be working collaboratively and effectively. Many stakeholders remarked on the synergies between UNDP and DPPA in maintaining focus on the best interests of the Joint Programme rather than simply their own organisational interests. The Joint Programme has made important adaptations, improvements and standardisation of many management systems and tools. The Joint Programme Secretariat and Co-Technical Leads are highly regarded by most stakeholders for quality of delivery, collaborative approaches and professional commitment. The management and Secretariat clearly put effort into intentional relationship and collaboration building between the different entities and stakeholders involved in the programme. However, some aspects of programme governance and management are experiencing strain, partly due to the increasing scale and complexity of the Joint Programme but also the UN Development System structural reforms that took effect in 2019.

## Relevance and Coherence findings

The Joint Programme was largely perceived as highly relevant to and coherently aligned with a wide range of national and UN stakeholders at the country, regional and global levels. It was frequently described as an essential inter-stakeholder bridge, cross-pillar integrator and direct manifestation of the ways of working and priorities underlying Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG16), the UN Sustaining Peace Resolutions and the Secretary-General’s recent “Our Common Agenda”. Joint Programme’s relevance to differing national needs is partly evidenced by the diverse range of priorities and methods employed by PDA/PDTs—the flexibility of delivery in-country has been essential. The nature and alignment of PDA/PDT work is usually heavily adapted to and

continuously informed by collaborative and integrated analysis, feedback from national actors and exploration of feasible entry-points.

UN stakeholders underscored a wide spectrum of ways in which PDA/PDT/RPSs are relevant to RC, UNCT and UN system needs. Emphasis was placed on the view that no one entity in the UN development pillar is specifically 'mandated' for sustaining peace/prevention or structurally linked to the peace/security pillar—the UN needs this 'integrator' because no one entity can take responsibility. PDA/PDT/RPSs were regularly referred to as one of the most important and vital RC resources, and as a principal instrument for the concepts and priorities in the new 'Our Common Agenda' or otherwise advancing UN 'doctrines' of sustaining peace/prevention in the system.

More specifically, PDA/PDT/RPSs were viewed as relevant to the UN because they provided: political/contextual analysis and advice normally unavailable in development settings, especially experimenting with innovative methods for informing strategies and programming; analytical, technical and process facilitation support to the design, adaptation and implementation of UNCT, joint UN agency and UNDP sustaining peace/prevention informed programming; and facilitation, collaboration and coordination support to strategic processes, strategies and relationships. PDA/PDTs were also seen as an essential asset for mobilising UN technical, financial and leadership resources for UNCTs and agencies.

## Efficiency findings

In examining Efficiency, it is important to note the rapid expansion of the scale of the Joint Programme. The Programme has seen continuous growth in revenue and expenditure over the last 10 years. To give some perspective, Joint Programme's annual expenditure has grown more than eight-times in size from 10 years ago (713%) and 52% of the last decade's worth of expenditure occurred in the last three years (2019-21). There were frequent observations from stakeholders that the costs of deploying PDA/PDTs in a preventative mode paled in comparison to larger scale special political missions and peacekeeping operations. The Secretariat and management generally prioritise maximizing use of funds to deploy assets for delivery on Outcomes 1 and 2. The Joint Programme has also regularly leveraged additional in-kind contributions, secondees and complementary programme implementation funding (such as for training) and considers these important efficiency multipliers. More widely, certain management, planning and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools/systems are perceived as burdensome and/or needing more convergence to be efficient. The new ambitious PDA Roster process has taken longer and become significantly more complex than originally envisioned, putting strain on programme management.

## Sustainability findings

The Joint Programme does not monitor or have specific metrics for sustainability. There have been efforts during the start of this programme cycle to establish a baseline and track progress towards the establishment/strengthening of national capacities for sustaining peace/prevention in programme countries (country specific 'Outcome 1 Matrices'). It is too early to determine if they will be effective and efficient means for tracking results over the long-term and gauging the sustainability of Joint Programme interventions in specific countries as well as at the global aggregate level. The Criticality Assessment is useful for prioritising the allocation

of Joint Programme deployments to the ‘neediest’ locations; however, there is little evidence that explicit ‘exit strategies’ are in place and the Criticality Assessment does not assess whether the programme is achieving sustainable results in target locations. Joint Programme management recognises that effective, relevant and sustainable PDA/PDT engagements need at least a medium-term outlook.

## Core Conclusions

In its totality, the MTR finds that the Joint Programme has demonstrated a positive trajectory of programme implementation that meets standards and expectations. The near universal regard that the Joint Programme provides crucial and sometimes essential value for UN sustaining peace and prevention efforts cannot be over-emphasised. There is strong demand for this strategic capacity to not only continue but for a further evolution that would deepen its effectiveness. Though the programme has experienced challenges, stakeholders frequently cautioned: “don’t try to fix what’s not broken.”

At the outcome level, the Joint Programme is meeting and often exceeding expectations. Effectiveness is more apparent regarding UNCT capacities for sustaining peace/prevention, where the programme sometimes exceeds expectations in certain aspects and locations. But the view is that strengthening and mobilising the UN system (Outcome 2) is often the most effective and sustainable way for supporting and strengthening national capacities (Outcome 1).

The Joint Programme is experiencing ‘growing pains’ as it expands and faces effectiveness and efficiency challenges in programme governance and management. The new set-up for tripartite-management of PDA/PDT/RPSs is not working well everywhere. The programme also needs to more fundamentally reckon with how it can best deliver value to the UN-system given UN Development System structural reforms, including the most effective mode for Development Coordination Office participation and that of other UN entities. Significant governance and management improvements and capacities have been put in place during the current programme cycle. However, some programme management tools, systems and practices are not optimal and the Secretariat is experiencing capacity challenges in the areas of: operations and administration; PDA human resource management; knowledge management and learning; results-based design, management and M&E; and PDA gender balance.

The programme is often exceeding standards and expectations for relevance and coherence—there is simply no other UN capacity currently positioned and capable to do the cross-pillar and integrated analytical, advisory and capacity support necessary for advancing sustaining peace/prevention agendas. The Joint Programme and PDA/PDT/RPSs are nearly universally regarded as offering considerable and sometimes essential relevance to national stakeholders and the UN system. The programme clearly operates and delivers results within the outcome domains of UNDP’s and DPPA’s corporate strategic plans<sup>3</sup> and many targets of SDG16, as well as other SDGs. The Joint Programme offers ‘good value’ but needs to adapt, strengthen and improve internal management tools/systems in order to better measure and optimise programme efficiency. Efficiency is a prime management priority, including how to maximize PDA/PDT deployments and cost/benefit considerations and get the best value for money in all activities. Interviewed stakeholders did not convey compelling arguments that similar results

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<sup>3</sup> Though it is important to note that current UNDP and DPPA Strategic Plans came online after the start of the current Joint Programme cycle.



could be achieved through a more economical model. Programme sustainability mostly meets standards and expectations, though it needs to adapt, strengthen and improve internal management tools/systems in order to better measure and optimise programme sustainability.

## Recommendations

While the Joint Programme is performing well, aspects are under strain and management should consider that the programme has reached an important inflection point in its evolution. On this basis, the MTR presents the following recommendations for consideration:

- 1. Instigate an ‘expectation reset’ with Joint Programme core stakeholders and funding partners.**
- 2. Review inclusivity of participation in programme governance, management and operational arrangements to achieve the greatest possible effectiveness, relevance and coherence.**
- 3. Adopt a ‘narrow but deep’ programme model that prioritises greater investments in the quality, depth and tailoring of Joint Programme engagements before increasing the number of programme locations.**
- 4. Deepen the Joint Programme’s prioritisation of gender and women, peace and security.**
- 5. Provide enhanced support and regularised engagement with PDA tripartite-managers to establish clearer expectations, standards and guidelines, as well as to oblige greater management accountability.**
- 6. Review Secretariat and management staffing and capacity needs, bearing in mind the increasing scale and complexity of the programme and associated challenges, the results of consultations regarding the programme’s long-term vision and that a ‘fit for purpose’ Secretariat remains essential for maintaining successful delivery.**

# 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

## Background and context

1. It is important to situate the Joint Programme and this Mid-Term Review (MTR) within a wider global context where the agendas for sustaining peace and conflict prevention have experienced significant headwinds in recent years. Many stakeholders participating in the MTR noted that the programme has entered a different era, where deeper geopolitical divisions are undermining trust in the ability to find collective solutions. That the world is experiencing a profound crisis of multilateralism at the same time it faces unprecedented global challenges: the COVID-19 pandemic and its evolving consequences; existential climate crisis; the erosion of the social contract and human rights worldwide; the spread of misinformation, disinformation and trust; and increasing armed conflict, protracted conflicts and levels of violence outside of armed conflict.
2. Operating within this evolving global landscape, the Joint Programme has also seen a significant demand-driven expansion, both from UN system stakeholders but also from a recognition of the importance for locally-owned sustaining peace/prevention. The programme is now working in not just a much larger number of contexts but ever more diverse contexts. It has grappled with this quantum step-up in scale and complexity while also having to adapt to the UN Development Systems reforms that took effect in 2019. Therefore, the MTR comes at an important inflection point for the programme to consider not only 'what is working well' but to also examine its level of ambition going forward and what will be needed to adapt and deliver to that.

## Brief overview of the Joint Programme

3. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) have been collaborating on the Joint Programme since it was first launched in 2004. The deployment of Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs) and Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) represent the most visible elements of the Joint Programme, though the programme also provides other elements of support to national stakeholders and the UN system.
4. During the current Dec 2018 to Dec 2023 cycle<sup>4</sup>, the Joint Programme sought to contribute to two mutually supportive outcomes and deliver on three outputs:

<b>Outcome 1:</b>	<b>Targeted initiatives and national capacities are more effectively contributing to conflict prevention and sustaining peace; and</b>
<b>Outcome 2:</b>	<b>UN Country Teams have strategies and programmes that are increasingly conflict sensitive, and are leading partnerships on sustaining peace.</b>
<b>Output 1:</b>	<b>UN peace and development capacities enhanced and high-quality and context-specific professional advice, expertise and accompaniment to the UN system, partner governments and civil society provided;</b>

<sup>4</sup> As per the current [programme document approved 1 Dec 2018](#).

<b>Output 2:</b>	<b>Catalytic and context-specific conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives implemented; and</b>
<b>Output 3:</b>	<b>Effective strategies for deployment and partnerships, as well as professional development and learning for PDAs created and implemented.</b>

5. As of the end of 2021, the Joint Programme reported it was deploying 103 personnel based in 66 locations and supporting 67 Resident Coordinators (RCs) and UN Country Teams (UNCTs) across five regions: Africa, Arab States, Asia/Pacific, Europe/Central Asia and the Americas. This includes 31 Peace and Development Teams involving national PDAs, Peace and Development Specialists (PDSs), UN Volunteers and secondees working with international PDAs, as well as 6 Regional Programme Specialists (RPSs) that have been deployed since 2020. The scale of expenditure has increased over the last decade and the programme had a total expenditure of USD 20.1 million for 2021.

### Purposes, scope and methodology of the MTR

6. This MTR was conducted for the purposes of: i.) supporting programme accountability to management, partners and stakeholders by providing independent and objective information regarding programme performance and progress; ii.) identifying potential needs for programme design and/or implementation improvements; and iii.) formulating recommendations for possible adjustments to improve design and/or implementation.

7. The MTR examined the effectiveness, relevance, coherence, efficiency and sustainability of the Joint Programme at the global, regional and country levels between Dec 2018 and Dec 2021. It undertook a holistic review of overall programme performance and progress to date, including internal management aspects that may impact effective delivery. The MTR did not include summative ‘impact evaluation’ because the programme is at the midpoint of its current cycle, and it is too early to assess for impact.

8. The MTR was conducted in accordance with UN Evaluation Group, UNDP and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee standards and guidelines by a team of two independent consultants. Mixed methods were employed, using qualitative and quantitative research methods and the triangulation of information from different sources to demonstrate how the programme has performed in relation to its goals, targets and other performance expectations. The MTR employed three data collection methods: document review; semi-structured key informant interviews across all key programme stakeholder groups (global, regional and country levels); in-person and virtual field missions to 7 ‘case locations’ for observation, in-depth interviews and elaboration on results and lessons at country level (Côte d’Ivoire; Kenya; Malawi; Jordan; Bangladesh; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; and the Caribbean). The MTR interviewed a total of 302 key informants.

9. The MTR was partly impacted by the global COVID-19 pandemic, which diminished the full scope of case location missions and the availability of some key informants for interviews. It is also important to note that the MTR is not a ‘catalogue’ of programme results. Given constraints and purposes, it does not present elaborated case studies or examples. It synthesises findings and recommendations based on evidence acquired from an examination of *overall* programme performance; it recommends that programme management should conduct

deeper examination of specific areas in follow-up to the MTR. There are obvious limitations in the nature and the methodologies of the MTR; it will inadvertently exclude certain voices or not satisfactorily cover all issues of importance to all stakeholders. Therefore, its findings are presented with modesty and humility.

## 2. MID-TERM REVIEW FINDINGS

### 2.1 Effectiveness

10. The MTR reviewed three components for Effectiveness—to what extent is the Joint Programme demonstrating effectiveness in the delivery of: i.) Outcome 1; ii.) Outcome 2; and iii.) Programme governance and management. It also looks at the extent of the programme’s effective engagement on the UN’s gender and human rights agendas.

#### *Effectiveness—Outcome 1: Targeted initiatives and national capacities are more effectively contributing to conflict prevention and sustaining peace*

11. **Outcome 1 is perceived by many stakeholders as the ultimate *raison d’etre* of the Joint Programme:** “Concretely, the Joint Programme’s goal should be building, updating, maintaining and adapting national peace infrastructures to their changing contexts.”<sup>5</sup> Many stakeholders see the Joint Programme as a key “pioneer” in testing ways in which to best support national stakeholders to meaningfully “operationalise” sustaining peace and prevention.<sup>6</sup>

12. **The Joint Programme concretely delivered expected Outcome 1 results in a wide variety of ways to support national capacities for sustaining peace and prevention.** Based on evidence from country case missions, key informant interviews and review of documentation, **Table 1** summarizes the most evident types of Joint Programme contributions and results in support of national capacities since 2018. Although it uses the Joint Programme’s Outcome 1 Indicators as a starting point, the MTR suggests that the ‘actual work’ and results of PDA/PDT/RPSs on the ground over the last three years took different forms and could be organised along the lines of the below ‘typologies’:

**Table 1: Outcome 1 Matrix – Summary**

<b>OUTCOME 1:</b> <b>Indicators</b>	<b>OUTCOME 1:</b> <b>Typologies of most evident results (Dec 2018 – Dec 2021)</b>
<b>1. Improved government policies and strategies relating to conflict prevention and sustaining peace</b>	<b>1. Policies, strategies and legislation for sustaining peace and prevention established, operationalised and strengthened, including:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Inclusive national peace and development analysis involving partnerships with civil society, UN and development partners developed/endorsed by governments;</li> <li>○ Legislation to establish and strengthen national statutory mechanisms responsible for sustaining peace/prevention enacted and developed;</li> </ul>

<sup>5</sup> KII CZDF.

<sup>6</sup> KII VWMP.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ National sustaining peace/prevention related strategies and policies enacted and strengthened;</li> <li>○ Regional sustaining peace/prevention related strategies and policies enacted and strengthened;</li> </ul>		
<p><b>2. Targeted components of national peace architecture are created or improved</b></p>	<p><b>2. National infrastructures for sustaining peace and prevention established, operationalised and strengthened, including:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Inclusive consultations and dialogue to develop sustainable and whole-of-society national infrastructure(s) for peace conducted;</li> <li>○ National/sub-national statutory mechanisms for sustaining peace/prevention, dialogue, reconciliation, mediation and preventing violent extremism (PVE) established, re-activated, operationalised and strengthened;</li> <li>○ National peace agreement/ceasefire mechanisms and processes strengthened;</li> <li>○ Sustaining peace/prevention related awareness, outreach and communications initiatives conducted by national/sub-national peace structures and stakeholders;</li> <li>○ National and sub-national early warning/early response mechanisms for conflict, violence and human rights violations established and strengthened;</li> </ul>		
<p><b>3. Greater range and variety of national stakeholders/groups are involved in national conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, including women and youth groups</b></p>	<p><b>3. Inclusive and cross-pillar stakeholder participation in sustaining peace and prevention established, operationalised and strengthened, including:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Women’s and youth groups, leaders and mechanisms strengthened, more connected and more directly participated in processes and decision-making;</li> <li>○ Collaboration with and role of civil society strengthened and increased;</li> </ul>		
<p><b>4. Targeted national stakeholders are demonstrating stronger skills and understanding of conflict prevention and sustaining peace</b></p>	<p><b>4. Skills for sustaining peace and prevention across a strategic range of national and local stakeholders established, operationalised and strengthened, including for:</b></p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ collaborative leadership and dialogue;</li> <li>○ conflict resolution/transformation, dialogue, mediation, dispute resolution, negotiation;</li> <li>○ designing, facilitating and managing multistakeholder dialogue, consensus-building and mediation processes;</li> <li>○ insider mediation;</li> </ul> </td> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ early warning/early response;</li> <li>○ conflict sensitivity;</li> <li>○ managing and resolving land and conflict issues;</li> <li>○ multilateral diplomacy for sustaining peace</li> <li>○ data, research and analysis;</li> <li>○ sharing/exchanging international experiences and practices;</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ collaborative leadership and dialogue;</li> <li>○ conflict resolution/transformation, dialogue, mediation, dispute resolution, negotiation;</li> <li>○ designing, facilitating and managing multistakeholder dialogue, consensus-building and mediation processes;</li> <li>○ insider mediation;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ early warning/early response;</li> <li>○ conflict sensitivity;</li> <li>○ managing and resolving land and conflict issues;</li> <li>○ multilateral diplomacy for sustaining peace</li> <li>○ data, research and analysis;</li> <li>○ sharing/exchanging international experiences and practices;</li> </ul>
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5. Level of influence that joint UNDP-DPPA programme support has had on a) early warning systems, b) diplomacy, c) mediation and d) national dialogue

**5.1. UN preventative diplomacy, good offices and mediation de-escalated tensions and reduced conflict risks, including for:**

- Electoral crisis/tensions;
- Political crisis/tensions;

**5.2. UN engagements decreased risks for election violence and promoted peaceful elections and transfers of power, including:**

- Strengthened and more coherent international technical, financial and political support for peaceful elections and transfers of power;
- Strengthened electoral commission capacities to prevent, mediate and de-escalate tension;
- Strengthened capacities for nonviolent security responses in adherence with human rights;
- Strengthened electoral conflict/violence risk monitoring and ‘early warning’ mechanisms;
- Mechanisms and initiatives responsible for trust-building, conflict/violence prevention, mediation and ‘social cohesion’ during election periods;
- Mechanisms committing political actors to non-violent conduct;
- Identifying, mitigating and preventing election related gender-based violence;
- Democratic approaches/principles and consensus building within political parties and for candidates (including women’s/youth participation);

**5.3. Entry-points for peacebuilding and conflict transformation established, operationalised and strengthened, including:**

- Trust, common understandings, agendas for change and entry points for context-appropriate approaches expanded and strengthened;
- Application of data, research and evidence-based analysis for sustaining peace/conflict transformation expanded and strengthened;
- Application of digital/online technologies and practice innovations for conflict transformation tested, expanded and strengthened;
- Inclusive transitional justice processes, institutions and mechanisms expanded and strengthened.

13. **The Joint Programme engaged a wide variety of stakeholders and partners on the ground during implementation.** The breadth and scope of these engagements varied from context to context, but usually demonstrated an expansive view of what constitutes ‘national capacities’, including a wide array of: state/government and non-state actors; international, regional, national and sub-national stakeholders and partners; and thematic/subject areas relevant to sustaining peace/prevention. It also demonstrated the Joint Programme accessed, mobilised and leveraged a wide array of UN, regional and international technical, financial and political resources in support of national capacities for sustaining peace/prevention.

**Table 2: Spectrum of Joint Programme stakeholders/partners (summary)**

State stakeholders	
<p><b>Senior government officials</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ offices of presidents</li> <li>○ offices of prime ministers</li> <li>○ national cabinets</li> </ul> <p><b>Ministries, agencies and councils responsible for:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ state/interior affairs, justice, security, civil protection, defence and policing</li> <li>○ national security, counter/anti-terrorism</li> <li>○ foreign affairs, international cooperation</li> <li>○ planning, culture, labour, vocational training</li> <li>○ peace, solidarity, social cohesion, national unity, civic education, human rights</li> <li>○ youth affairs and protection of children</li> <li>○ gender, women, family affairs</li> <li>○ information, media, telecommunications, IT</li> </ul> <p><b>Other state bodies</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ national commissions/offices related to human rights, missing persons and women/gender equality</li> <li>○ national electoral bodies</li> <li>○ local government structures and bodies</li> <li>○ national centre for the arts</li> <li>○ national museum for peace, reconciliation, memory and human rights</li> </ul> <p><b>Legislatures / Parliaments</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ members of parliaments/legislatures</li> <li>○ speakers of national assemblies and senates</li> <li>○ networks of women parliamentarians</li> <li>○ parliamentary staff</li> </ul>	<p><b>National and sub-national statutory bodies and mechanisms for sustaining peace/prevention</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ national commissions, councils and committees responsible for: dialogue, peace, conflict management, reconciliation and/or mediation</li> <li>○ national commissions, authorities and forums involved in aspects of sustaining peace/prevention agendas in given contexts, such as for: national reforms and ethnic relations</li> <li>○ national ceasefire monitoring and peace process mechanisms</li> <li>○ state/provincial/district committees, councils and forums responsible for: peace, PVE, dialogue and reconciliation</li> <li>○ local para-statal and traditional authorities with sustaining peace/prevention mandates</li> <li>○ National early warning/early response mechanisms, such as</li> <li>○ Early Warning and Early Response Committee (e.g., NPRC, Zimbabwe)</li> <li>○ National Emergency Coordination and Operations Centre (e.g., Office of the Prime Minister, Uganda)</li> <li>○ Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (e.g., Ministry of Internal Affairs, Uganda)</li> <li>○ Peacebuilding Platform (e.g., Office of the Prime Minister, Uganda)</li> <li>○ Situation Room (e.g., National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, Kenya)</li> </ul>
Non-State Actors supporting sustaining peace/prevention agendas	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ political parties and inter-party mechanisms</li> <li>○ research institutions, think tanks, academics, universities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ private sector leaders and organisations</li> <li>○ elders, traditional and local leaders</li> <li>○ former combatants</li> </ul>



- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations</li> <li>○ youth organisations, networks and leaders</li> <li>○ women’s organisations, networks and leaders</li> <li>○ faith-based organisations, leaders, networks</li> <li>○ media: journalists, national media bodies, social media influencers</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ displaced people, host community members and representative organisations</li> <li>○ people with disabilities</li> <li>○ typically marginalised and excluded peoples and representative organisations</li> <li>○ diaspora members and organisations</li> </ul> |
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**Non-state bodies and mechanisms involved in sustaining peace/prevention**

- inter-, multi- and all-political party committees/associations
- national and local civil society organisations, networks and platforms for peace, prevention and mediation (e.g., Uwiano Platform for Peace, Kenya; Women’s Situation Room, Uganda; West Africa Network for Peacebuilding)
- civil society electoral observation organisations, networks and platforms
- multi-, inter- and all-faith platforms or bodies for peace, prevention and mediation (e.g., Public Affairs Committee, Malawi)
- women’s / youth networks, task forces, ‘ambassadors’ and platforms for peace, prevention and mediation
- professional/sectoral bodies (e.g., Paralegal Services Institute, Malawi)
- bodies convening traditional authorities and elders (e.g., Committee of the Wise, Niger)

**International stakeholders**

- regional organisations/unions (e.g., Economic Community of West African States; African Union; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; European Union; Council of Europe; Caribbean Community; Organization of American States)
- representatives of neighboring states (envoys, foreign ministers, heads of state/government)
- bilateral embassies/missions and international development partners
- international NGOs
- international research institutes/think tanks
- international social media companies (e.g., Facebook)

**UN stakeholders**

<b><i>Representatives of the Secretary-General</i></b>	<b><i>Other partner UN Secretariat and organs</i></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Under Secretary-General and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Nairobi</li> <li>○ Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel</li> <li>○ Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa</li> <li>○ Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region</li> <li>○ Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn Africa</li> <li>○ Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ OHCHR—incl. Human Rights Advisors (HRAs) deployed to RCOs</li> <li>○ UNHCR</li> <li>○ UN CTO—incl. PVE Coordinators deployed to RCOs</li> <li>○ UN ODC</li> <li>○ UN DSS</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar</li> <li>○ Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Youth</li> <li>○ Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide</li> <li>○ Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Sudan</li> </ul> <p><b>Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) / Department of Peace Operations (DPO)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON)</li> <li>○ UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)</li> <li>○ Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region</li> <li>○ Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn Africa</li> <li>○ UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)</li> <li>○ Office of the Special Envoy on Myanmar</li> <li>○ Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide</li> <li>○ DPPA-DPO Regional Divisions</li> <li>○ Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), DPPA</li> <li>○ Policy and Mediation Division (PMD), DPPA (including the Mediation Support Unit and Standby Team of Experts, Innovation Cell, Policy Planning Unit, Gender Peace and Security Unit, Guidance and Learning Unit)</li> <li>○ Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), DPPA</li> <li>○ Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPO</li> </ul> <p><b>Development Coordination Office (DCO)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ DCO regional bureaus</li> <li>○ Resident Coordinators</li> <li>○ Resident Coordinators’ Offices (RCOs)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Specialised agencies, programmes and funds</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ UNDP: Crisis Bureau, Regional Hubs and Country Offices (COs)</li> <li>○ UNICEF</li> <li>○ UN Women</li> <li>○ IOM</li> <li>○ UNFPA</li> <li>○ UNESCO</li> <li>○ WHO</li> <li>○ WFP</li> <li>○ FAO</li> <li>○ UN Habitat</li> <li>○ ILO</li> </ul> <p><b>Key UN Funding Streams for PDA/PDT initiatives</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Joint Programme Seed Funding</li> <li>○ DPPA Multi-Year Appeal</li> <li>○ UN Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)</li> <li>○ UN Trust Fund for Human Security (Human Security Unit-OCHA)</li> </ul>
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14. Certain dynamics and conditions better supported the Outcome 1 programme ‘theory of change’ (TOC) and enabled the achievement of results:

- **The space for supporting national capacities is ‘open’.** The Joint Programme was largely more successful in achieving Outcome 1 results in contexts where there was active demand from national stakeholders for support on sustaining peace and prevention. In such contexts, there were often pre-existing ‘infrastructures for peace’ previously supported by the Joint Programme, UNDP or other parts of the UN system, which sought additional strengthening and/or adaptation to new dynamics. Preparation for elections was a frequent open entry-point for PDA/PDT engagement, usually supportive of or and linked to wider UN electoral assistance. There were also open and collaborative national coordination mechanisms for peace-related development, to which PDAs often provided analytical, coordination and facilitation support. These were also contexts where certain PDA/PDT analysis or supported analysis was openly shared and viewed as an important objective input to national policy discourses, institutions and processes.

- **PDA**s are perceived as an important impartial third party with a distinct added-value. Even in situations where they were not at the centre of political or outright conflict prevention processes, PDAs were often still especially valued as a key multilateral impartial third party that could add distinctive value. This value has included integrated cross-pillar, ‘Humanitarian-Development-Peace’ (HDP) Nexus and ‘peacebuilding’ support rather than outright ‘political engagement’ or ‘conflict prevention’. Even where the UN was ‘not at the table’, PDA/PDTs still facilitated analysis, dialogue and engagement spaces that enabled the UN to contribute strategic value, even if it was unexpected, low visibility and/or niche.
- **PDA/PDTs and RCs prepare in advance for and/or can quickly pivot for changing dynamics in order to create entry-points.** Whether in more or less ‘permissive’ contexts, PDA/PDTs cannot assume automatic engagement on Outcome 1. Successful engagement was frequently the result of significant planning, positioning and relationship building by PDA/PDTs, RCs and the UN over the long-term in preparation for events and/or changing dynamics that created new entry points. This relied on analysis of actors, needs, the political-economy, scenario planning and the articulation and adaptation of ‘offers’ perceived by actors to add-value, so that PDA/PDTs and the UN were prepared and visible ‘when the time came’. In some situations, PDA/PDTs and RCs enabled the UN to quickly pivot in response to rapidly changing national circumstances or priorities and demonstrate new value.
- **PDA/PDT/RPSs influence and facilitate ‘system responses’ to support national capacities.** Outcome 1 results were more prevalent in situations where PDA/PDT/RPSs were able to influence and facilitate ‘system responses’ that supported national stakeholder capacities for sustaining peace/prevention—“Any efforts to significantly influence and sustainably build national capacities will ultimately rely on an effort by the whole UN system rather than just that by a PDA.”<sup>7</sup> Only in rare circumstances have PDA/PDTs on their own prompted ‘breakthrough’ preventative impacts (directly or indirectly). As the UNDP Administrator posed at the 2021 Joint Programme Partner Event: “Peace and Development Advisors [...] are never singular actors but embedded in a national process, embedded in the UN family, that is present both at national level and globally, they can become exceptionally useful resources.” While some PDA/PDTs were perceived to over emphasise Outcome 2, most did so on the premise that efforts to support genuinely sustainable and effective national capacities for sustaining peace and prevention could only be accomplished if the whole UN system had the necessary capacities, vision and engagement to support Outcome 1: “A single PDA can’t do it all. The focus should be how PDAs – with DPPA and UNDP support – get the RC and whole UN system to affect results.”<sup>8</sup> This was partly evidenced by the frequent inclusion of what would appear to be UN Outcome 2 approaches being reporting under Outcome 1 results in Annual Reports. The breadth of needs and entry points required for Outcome 1 were often too wide for solo PDAs: “You can’t do high-level political engagement *and* community-based engagement for sustaining peace and prevention with a one or two person team. The PDA is really great, but we need a few more.”<sup>9</sup> The best approaches to Outcome 1 benefited from inclusive communications and coordination between PDA/PDTs, RCs, DPPA, UNDP and agencies so there were no gaps between ‘strategies’ and ‘implementation’.

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<sup>7</sup> KII ZKDY.

<sup>8</sup> KII VRSB.

<sup>9</sup> KII WZDD.

## Outcome 1 Challenges

15. However, certain dynamics strained the Outcome 1 programme TOC and made achievement of results the most challenging aspect of the Joint Programme:

- **National contexts and needs vary greatly, meaning that there is no uniform set of activities, outputs and results that can simply be applied and monitored for every location.** Every PDA/PDT deployment was largely bespoke, straining the ability to aggregate, manage and monitor a holistic picture.
- **A degree of outcome and/or ambition inflation exists among some stakeholders who expect explicit peace and prevention results to be more evidently achieved through the programme.** The Joint Programme was designed with a clear TOC that building national capacities only *enables* national actors to be “*better equipped to mitigate the risks of conflict and fragility*” and “*more likely to be effective*” in sustaining peace and preventing conflict. The Joint Programme can be considered as one effort making contributions to wider national peace and prevention results, but it is not realistic or strictly ‘within scope’ to directly attribute wider national peace and prevention results to the Joint Programme. Unrealistically expecting ‘peace’ results from the Joint Programme also deflects and detracts ownership from national stakeholders who are ultimately responsible for sustainable peace in their own societies.
- **More fundamentally, some stakeholders directly or indirectly suggested that the TOC for Outcome 1 may be too ambitious or otherwise may not be entirely valid or working as expected.** This partly stems from the assumed causal link in the TOC between what the Joint Programme has ‘control’ over (building capacities) and what it does not (how national actors ultimately use those capacities for sustaining peace and prevention). Some stakeholders implicitly or explicitly expected more Joint Programme deployments to have come to an end as evidence that national capacities are both genuinely in place *and* that they are effectively sustaining peace and prevention.
- **Uptake and implementation of ‘change’ in many contexts is slow, complex, long-term and non-linear—**“Implementation of District Peace Committees is slow. This is not an easy or straight-forward process – you can’t expect instant results.”<sup>10</sup> Building genuinely effective national capacities for sustaining peace and prevention required complex, sensitive and sometimes contested processes of change. PDA/PDT efforts for consulting, designing, setting up and implementing more ‘tangible’ capacities such as national policies, laws and institutions can be daunting, even in ‘permissive’ contexts. These also need to be backed-up and inhabited by key ‘intangible’ capacities such as new skills, mindsets, values, approaches and networks that require equally challenging processes to foster. Change processes in such contexts often take a long time to show results and occur in unpredictable and non-linear ways.
- **Stakeholders are short-term and immediate focused.** National stakeholders, the UN and PDAs operating in crisis and stretched between multiple demands have sometimes been more likely to focus on immediate responses and less on long-term capacities. In some circumstances, national actors prioritised more ‘immediate’ application of UN support.

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<sup>10</sup> KII BPRW.

- **National stakeholders often want to make the shift from ‘crisis’ to ‘normal’, no longer seeing the need for conflict prevention.** National stakeholders in some contexts have sought to conclude a transition to ‘normal’ development operations and did not see the need for deeper-rooted approaches and capacities for sustaining peace and prevention. Sensitivities regarding conflict and peace in some contexts resulted in resistance to invest in long-term approaches and capacities for sustaining peace/prevention or otherwise to recognise the need for Joint Programme engagement.
- **Pre-existing national capacities have become moribund or non-responsive.** Major pre-existing capacities have effectively ‘plateaued’ or become moribund in some contexts and resisted the need to revitalise, update and adapt so they could become more responsive to emergent issues and crises.
- **Limited PDA/PDT access to technical and financial resources exposes an ‘implementation gap’—expecting too much with too little.** Stakeholders frequently remarked that an enormous and wide portfolio was expected of a single PDA or small PDT, who can only possess a finite bandwidth of skills and deploy small financial resources: “With only one or two people deployed, you can’t expect a revolution.”<sup>11</sup> Stakeholders often pointed out an imbalance between available resources and ambition on the ground. Even when preparatory and catalytic work started well, adequate and timely resources were sometimes not available or mobilised for aspired follow-on implementation. For example, “In the absence of enough funding for planned activities, social political and trend analysis is done but nothing follows.”<sup>12</sup> It cannot be assumed that PDA/PDTs will leverage or mobilise additional resources/partnerships or otherwise automatically draw in UNDP or PBF funded programming to bridge the ‘implementation gap’. The underlying assumption that ‘entrepreneurial’ PDAs with good entry-points will automatically mobilise resources may need a re-think. Not all PDA/PDTs appeared to have clear sight and access to globally available UN resources.
- **Perceived bias of the UN towards certain national stakeholders.** PDA/PDT engagement on Outcome 1 has been challenging in situations where the UN is perceived to be biased towards government. Other times, this has revolved around perceptions that the UN working too closely with or advocating for ‘opposition’ actors or critics of government. Engagement has also been challenging when there are perceptions of UN agencies favouring certain NGOs and civil society actors (e.g., the ‘usual suspects’ and/or NGOs perceived as ‘pro-government or ‘pro-opposition’) with privileged access, participation or technical/financial resources.
- **The space for supporting national capacities is restricted or even ‘closed’.** Numerous PDA/PDTs operate in contexts where work on sustaining peace/prevention is highly sensitive or even restricted, placing significant constraints on what PDA/PDTs can achieve in support of Outcome 1. Some contexts have long histories of peace infrastructures but are ‘suspicious’ of outsiders or those architectures are perceived to be ‘aligned’ in some way. Other contexts appear as open democratic spaces, but pressures exist for the UN to not engage ‘opposition’ actors or those perceived as ‘critics’. The Joint Programme also operates in ‘middle power’ contexts where governments can “easily push back” and do not accept the need for outside peace supports. However, as one stakeholder observed, “These are usually states that are one shot away from conflict and

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<sup>11</sup> KII NCLU.

<sup>12</sup> KII RIGQ.

need this support the most.”<sup>13</sup> In more extreme contexts, there is virtually no space for PDA/PDT engagement on Outcome 1.

In restrictive contexts, to varying levels of success, most PDA/PDTs pursued strategies to ‘create space’ and add value. They have accompanied processes and injected impartial technical expertise, trainings, sensitisations and analysis at the ‘right moments’ to influence decision-makers and processes. They have carved out dialogue spaces to exchange ideas and experiences, expand networks, build confidence and promote collaboration (e.g., between government and civil society actors) that led to small shifts that are intended to set-up deeper transformations. They have developed open-source data/analysis capacities and resources that other actors then used to influence contexts. Successful efforts involved a wide spectrum of stakeholders: government advisors and ‘proxies’; political party members; parliamentarians; civil society organisations, networks and leaders (including faith-based, women’s, youth, traditional, media); think tanks, research organisations, universities and academics; private sector and business organisations; and international actors (bilateral, regional organisations and INGOs). Efforts are also not always explicitly ‘peace’ focused; PDA/PDTs frequently use less sensitive topics and venues as a means to quietly but strategically integrate peace related topics, skills and issues—for example, national education, women’s participation, agriculture, the media and the SDGs.

In such contexts, results have largely been incremental, non-linear, often ‘qualitative’ and only discernable over the long-term. Engagement relied upon a careful analysis of context and actors (“It’s a matter of understanding the people you are working with”<sup>14</sup>) and sometimes modifying standard terms of reference (TORs) and job titles so they were appropriate for the context. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of such efforts is extremely problematic due to sensitivities and risks of undermining or placing such processes and stakeholders in harm’s way.

### ***Effectiveness—Outcome 2: UN Country Teams have strategies and programmes that are increasingly conflict sensitive, and are engaged in wider partnerships on sustaining peace***

16. **Joint Programme activities, outputs and results under Outcome 2 were the more visible aspects of the programme, particularly for UN stakeholders who were frequently the more direct ‘clients’ of PDA/PST/RPSs.** PDA/PDT/RPSs are mostly perceived as extremely valuable ‘system assets’ that provide public goods for the RC, UNDP CO and UNCT, but also for different levels and entities at UN headquarter and regional offices (and sometimes for multilateral and bilateral development/diplomatic actors, international financial institutions (IFIs) and INGOs). It was frequently remarked that PDA/PDT/RPSs prioritising Outcome 2 was more ‘obvious’ since their work tends “to start at home” due to their proximity to and participation in UN structures/processes, lower barriers of access and partnership when dealing with UN entities

**“Any efforts to significantly influence and sustainably build national capacities will ultimately rely on an effort by the whole UN system than just that of a PDA, so starting with the UNCT is also a sensible path. PDAs have to mobilise the whole UN system in order to have any real effect.”**

**KII ZKDY**

<sup>13</sup> KII ZGVZ.

<sup>14</sup> KII RIGQ.

and increasing demands from UN entities for Joint Programme support.<sup>15</sup> This is especially so for RPSs who have infrequent direct engagement with national stakeholders, though they have demonstrated some emerging partnerships with regional organisations/entities. However, as noted previously, focus on Outcome 2 and UN system capacities is frequently regarded as a necessary pathway to supporting activities, outputs and results for Outcome 1.

17. **The Joint Programme concretely delivered and often exceeded expected Outcome 2 results in a wide variety of ways to support UN system capacities for sustaining peace and prevention.** In some situations, the programme went well beyond UNCT conflict sensitivity, but sensitised the system as a whole (cross-pillar, as well as headquarters and regional elements) and catalyzed new and more effective sustaining peace/prevention programme and operational interventions. Based on evidence from country case missions, key informant interviews and review of documentation, **Table 3** summarises the most evident Joint Programme contributions and results in support of UN capacities since 2018. Although it uses the Joint Programme’s Outcome 2 Indicators as a starting point, the MTR suggests that the ‘actual work’ and results of PDA/PDT/RPSs on the ground over the last three years took different forms and often went well beyond what was expected in the Monitoring Framework. The MTR suggests results could be organised according to the below ‘typologies’:

**Table 3: Outcome 2 Matrix – Summary**

<b>OUTCOME 2:</b> <b>Indicators</b>	<b>OUTCOME 2:</b> <b>Typologies of most evident results (Dec 2018 – Dec 2021)</b>
<p><b>1. % of Joint Programme countries that have conducted or updated a peace and conflict analysis in the last three years.</b></p> <p><i>Applicable Output Indicators:</i></p> <p><b>1.2 Scale and quality of context-specific and conflict sensitive advice provided to UN RCs and UNCTs.</b></p> <p><b>1.3 Quality political analysis and reporting</b></p>	<p><b>1. UN cross-pillar knowledge and skills for conflict sensitivity, sustaining peace and prevention expanded and strengthened</b></p> <p><b>1.1. Conflict sensitivity trainings and accompaniment conducted, expanded and strengthened for UN RCs and UNCT heads, as well as UN management and teams across development and humanitarian pillars</b></p> <p><b>1.2. Innovative data-driven UN risk, crisis, early warning and conflict/peace analysis systems and frameworks established, operationalized and strengthened at the country-level</b></p> <p>These include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Integrated analysis ‘centres’;</b></li> <li>○ <b>Crisis Risk Dashboards (CRDs);</b></li> <li>○ <b>Social cohesion tracking and analysis systems</b> tracking social trust and tolerance in support of inter-community confidence building, dialogue and conflict transformation;</li> <li>○ <b>Scenario building/analysis and stakeholder mapping frameworks;</b></li> <li>○ <b>Online hate speech monitoring systems</b> (country and regional) using social media big data analysis to track scale, scope and intensity of narratives driving online hate speech, incitement and related political dynamics;</li> </ul>

<sup>15</sup> KII ZKDY.

are provided to UN system.

1.4 Scale and quality of external advice, support or engagement provided to partner governments, regional organisations, IFIs diplomatic community, civil society, women and youth groups

2.3 % of Joint Programme countries where PDA supported developing/strengthening/sustaining UN early warning/action system

2. % of Joint Programme countries where the Common Country Assessment is explicitly informed by joint conflict analysis.

- **Protest monitoring, data collection, visualisation and analysis;**
- **Early warning systems** monitoring risks and violent incidents and making recommendations to UN in-country and headquarters leadership;
- **Sub-regional-level context assessment and analysis systems/frameworks**, such as sub-regional risk, fragility and resilience assessments and frameworks;

### 1.3. UN system access to context and conflict sensitivity advice regularised and strengthened

Principally through PDA/PDT regular briefings, analysis and advice to:

- RCs (sometimes RCOs);
- UNDP Resident Representatives (RRs) (sometimes to UNDP COs and Regional Hubs);
- UNCT meetings and heads of agencies (sometimes with UN agency programme teams);
- DPPA-DPO headquarters desks, regional teams and regional / field / special offices;

Advice taking the form of: monthly reports; situational ‘spot reports’; briefing inputs and talking points to informal inter-agency mechanisms (in-country, regional and headquarters); direct and indirect briefing inputs to formal headquarter mechanisms.

### 1.4. Adapted and more contextually sensitive UN postures, messaging, planning and behaviour in a range of challenging development situations

- RCs and UNCTs have demonstrated increased capabilities to navigate contexts characterised by, *inter alia*, violent extremism, fraught elections, ongoing internal and inter-state violent conflicts, humanitarian consequences of crisis/conflict, UN peace operations transitions, public protests and civil unrest (including as a consequence of COVID-19 measures), and ongoing peace/confidence building processes;

## 2. UN cross-pillar capacities for strategic action on conflict sensitivity, sustaining peace and prevention expanded and strengthened

### 2.1. Inclusive UN networking with diverse national and international stakeholders established, expanded and strengthened

### 2.2. Mechanisms for collaboration, coordination and integration of UN programming/operations established, expanded and strengthened for:

- **Sustaining peace and conflict prevention**—principally through UNCT task forces/teams, monthly working groups, ‘prevention platforms’ and monthly expert groups focused on conflict, ‘prevention and integrated approaches’, social cohesion, early warning and hate speech and conducting information sharing, analysis, scenario building and coordination/response mapping;
- **Prevention of violent extremism**—principally through PVE working/reference groups for UNCTs and international development partners focused on sharing information, contacts, networks, analysis and activity/project coordination to enable more informed, coherent and coordinated UN engagement;
- **Election assistance and responses**—within the framework of UN electoral assistance, by facilitating and/or participating in: formal and informal election assistance coordination and analysis for the UN and international development partners; pre-electoral risk/foresight assessments; the alignment of UN and international messages on key electoral/political issues; strengthened national mediation and resolution capacities;



- **Cross-border and sub-regional responses and support**—by facilitating: joint UNCT and partner border regions assessments; scenario building/planning exercises for trans-border issues; and supporting UN regional strategies (e.g., UN Comprehensive Regional Prevention Strategy for the Horn of Africa);
- **UN HDP Nexus responses and support**—by facilitating context and conflict sensitive humanitarian contingency / preparedness planning, durable solutions and crisis operations with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Humanitarian Country Team in-country through: training; scenario planning; analytical and advisory support such as situational briefs, forecasts, hot-spot mapping, stakeholder mapping and social media analytics; providing conceptual and methodological frameworks for conflict sensitivity (including gender, farmer-herder conflict, coordination dashboards, etc.); and resource mobilization;

### **2.3. Common Country Assessments (CCAs)/UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs) increasingly sensitive and better calibrated to the sustaining peace/prevention needs of challenging development contexts**

Principally through PDA/PDT/RPSs:

- Designing CCA/UNSDCF methodologies, processes and outputs;
- Facilitating and coordinating CCA/UNSDCF processes/mechanisms—often lead facilitator and expert on peace-related aspects, but in some cases also co-lead or core team member for overall CCA/UNSDCF process;
- Developing and providing guidance notes (e.g., ‘conflict sensitivity cheat sheets’) and supporting DCO regional reviews;
- Formulating and inputting strategic peace-related or other research, data and analysis, such as: conflict analysis; fragility assessments; insecurity mappings; multidimensional risk analysis/assessments; leave no one behind, marginalization, and exclusion analysis; etc.;
- Facilitating, coordinating and managing multi-stakeholder engagement, dialogue and input processes;
- Directly drafting CCA/UNSDCF components and as co-lead drafter.

### **2.4. ‘Non-standard’ internal UN sustaining peace/prevention strategies increasingly applied to supplement and reinforce standard strategic frameworks (i.e., getting the UN to go beyond ‘business as usual’)**

Such as:

- UNCT conflict prevention strategies, ‘platforms’ or ‘doctrines’;
- UN Transition Roadmap for mission settings;
- UN hate speech action plans and strategies;
- County-level multi-partner trust fund windows for peacebuilding and stabilization;

### **2.5. UN headquarter mechanisms and accountability processes increasingly sensitive and better calibrated to the sustaining peace/prevention needs of challenging development contexts**

Mechanisms such as DPPA/UNCT inter-agency meetings, Regional Monthly Reviews, and Executive Committee/Deputies Committee meetings are supported directly and indirectly by

	PDA/PDTs through preparatory analysis, briefings and talking points, as well as sometimes directly briefing and participating in meetings.
<b>3. % of Joint Programme countries where PDA supported UNCT or its members programming for conflict prevention</b>  <i>Applicable Output Indicators:</i>  <i>2.4. Conflict prevention initiatives supported by Joint Programme seed funding are effectively contributing to conflict prevention</i>  <i>2.5 Extent to which PDAs support UNCT and its members programming in relation to conflict prevention</i>	<b>3. UN cross-pillar strategic programming for sustaining peace and prevention expanded and strengthened</b>
	<b>3.1. Design, adaptation and implementation of UNCT and joint UN agency sustaining peace/prevention programming extended and strengthened</b>
	<b>3.2. Design, adaptation and implementation of UNDP sustaining peace/prevention programming extended and strengthened</b>
	<b>3.3. Design, adaptation and implementation of UN cross-border and sub-regional programming sustaining peace/prevention programming extended and strengthened</b>
	<b>3.4. Responsive and coherent technical, financial and political resources from the larger UN community of practice on governance, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, political and mediation expertise mobilised and leveraged</b>

18. Reflecting on effective delivery of Outcome 2 results, the MTR highlighted certain dynamics that better supported the Outcome 2 programme TOC and enabled the achievement of results:

- Quality strategic analysis and technical advice have been essential foundations for establishing, extending and strengthening UN capacities.** PDA/PDTs provision of strategic analysis and technical advice to RCs, UNCTs, UNDP and headquarter entities has been a cornerstone for enabling the UN to act quickly, design/redesign initiatives based on trends and plan for future scenarios. Such analysis and advice frequently ensured that UN positioning, behavior and programmes were conflict sensitive, navigated ‘tricky political waters’ and found entry-points to promote sustaining peace/prevention priorities. The bulk of PDA/PDTs context and conflict sensitivity advisory support (mainly in the form of reports and briefings) was regularly directed towards RCs and DPPA-DPO regional teams/desks but was shared less regularly with UNDP RRs, UNCTs and RCOs (though frequency and intensity are determined on a country-by-country basis). In several contexts, this analysis and advice was characterised as having major impacts on the peace and prevention ‘mindsets’ and ‘political acumen’ of RCs, UNCTs and wider UN leadership. It was noted that such analysis/advice was more valuable and readily accepted because it came from a shared ‘UN asset’ rather being perceived as representing the potentially vested interests of a particular UN entity. While PDA/PDTs were not always direct participants in headquarter mechanisms and accountability processes, they frequently made significant indirect contributions by preparing RCs, DPPA-DPO desks/teams/regional offices and others—as remarked by one interviewee: “PDA conversations go well beyond just DPPA and UNDP.”<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> KII QTWG.

### The most effective PDA/PDT/RPS analysis is:

- **multi-dimensional**—it breaks down siloes and integrates pillars, levels, thematics and stakeholders;
- **multi-sourced**—it is derived from inclusive collaborative processes ensuring it informed by a diversity of stakeholders and perspectives;
- **evidence-based**—it is based on comprehensive data and systematic approaches (quantitative and/or qualitative); and
- **action oriented**—it not only ‘sets the scene’ but is tailored to provide ‘action oriented’ options for different audiences (i.e., it answers the ‘so what?’ question).

### What does PDA/PDT/RPS analysis accomplish?

In the best situations, analysis supports effective delivery of Joint Programme results by:

- ensuring the analysis of the development system is contextualizing political and conflict risks;
- triggering conversations and interactions that would not have otherwise happened;
- changing minds, vision and agendas of leaders, managers, organisations and processes/systems—in the best cases, catalysing a UNCT ‘prevention doctrine’;
- forging common understandings that then serve as a basis for internal and external collaboration, across entities and ‘levels’;
- flagging key trends and issues to maintain basic situational awareness and enabling agile responses before, during and after crisis;
- anticipating how contexts and crisis will evolve, outlining potential political, development, humanitarian and human rights consequences and suggesting appropriate responses to these;
- enhancing UN leadership and organisational credibility, legitimacy, relevance and, therefore, the ability to engage, convene and coordinate stakeholders; and
- providing an evidence base for risk-informed/conflict sensitive adaption and design of UN interventions, as well as for the development and implementation of specific sustaining peace/prevention interventions.

- **PDA/PDT/RPSs introduced innovation analytical/advisory processes and outputs, which increased the capacities, vision and engagements of RCs, UNCTs, UNDP COs and UN headquarters for conflict sensitive approaches and sustaining peace/prevention interventions.** This has included supporting the trialing and operationalising of new data collection, analysis and visualisation methods at the country and regional levels, such as monitoring/analysis for hate speech, protests, social cohesion, early warning/risk and various forms of contextual/conflict analysis. PDA/PDT/RPSs have been a major facilitator for the application of the CRD tools managed by UNDP’s Crisis Bureau. Some of this was a result of fostering innovation focused partnerships, including with the DPPA Innovation Cell and UNDP Crisis Bureau. PDA/PDTs have also promoted conflict sensitivity integration across both development and humanitarian pillars, including training, accompanying and permeating humanitarian contingency and other strategic planning processes.
- **Most vitally, PDA/PDT/RPSs acted as networking, convening and coordination ‘hubs’, promoting cross-entity, cross-pillar and even cross-country collaboration.** The more successful ones were repeatedly described as bridges, connectors, facilitators and integrators of stakeholders, organisations and processes; that they served as instrumental links who brought people together for collective action, very often quietly and with very low personal visibility to better ensure stakeholder ownership. In many locations, they

facilitated specific internal UN and external partner mechanisms (e.g., task forces, working groups, platforms) to operationalise system responses to conflict prevention, early warning, social cohesion, hate speech, PVE, peaceful elections and cross-border/sub-regional dynamics. The work to build trust, develop relationships, build common understandings and make processes functional was practical and essential, but often ‘invisible’ — “Working to understand where actors are coming from and why, as well as diffusing tensions that exist and managing the internal conflict prevention. These are huge elements of the work that don't make it into the reports or logframes.”<sup>17</sup>

- **PDA/PDT/RPSs substantively shaped strategic UNCT processes and frameworks to prioritise and integrate conflict sensitivity, sustaining peace/prevention and Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG16) in ways that were appropriate to different contexts.** This includes PDA/PDT/RPS heavy support of CCA and UNSDCF processes and substance. In some cases, PDA/PDTs have gone well beyond their standards TORs of leading the conflict analysis part of the CCA; in some situations, they provided wider and essential support to RCOs conducting CCA/UNSDCF exercises. It would be useful for the Joint Programme and DCO to reflect on the need for greater clarity on the labour distribution between PDAs and RCO staff in CCA processes. PDA/PDTs have often introduced and identified new entry-points or priorities that would have otherwise been over-looked or de-prioritised. They have also in some cases been instrumental in facilitating innovative research/analysis in support of CCA/UNSDCFs, especially ‘leave-no-one-behind’ (LNOB) and other marginalisation / exclusion focused analysis, as well as HDP Nexus informed approaches. From what was observable, significant efforts were made for CCA/UNSDCFs in Joint Programme locations to more accurately reflect the peace, conflict, fragility and security challenges of those contexts. RPSs have piloted guidance notes (e.g., ‘conflict sensitivity cheat sheets’) and facilitated inputs from DCO Regional Bureaus to promote more conflict and peace sensitive CCAs. However, nearly all such observed processes were just completed or still in process and it cannot yet be determined whether UNSDCFs implementation will be inline with and contribute to the sustaining peace/prevention goals of the Joint Programme.
- **PDA/PDTs have also been instrumental in testing ‘non-standard’ UN sustaining peace strategies operating in the background to supplement standard UN strategic frameworks.** Supplemental strategies seemed especially appropriate where situational sensitivities do not permit CCAs/UNSDCFs to explicitly integrate sustaining peace/prevention. Supplemental strategies were also often organised to more explicitly mobilise cross-pillar and whole-of-system synergies involving both UNCT, regional and headquarter entities for sustaining peace/prevention (rather than solely relying on the UNCT and development-pillar). In most instances, the extent and scope of such integration or existence of supplementary strategies would likely have been significantly less without a PDA/PDT presence. However, nearly all such observed processes were just completed or still in process; it cannot yet be determined what the *implementation* of such strategies will achieve.
- **PDA/PDT/RPSs in many locations are heavily involved in expanding and strengthening UN cross-pillar strategic programming for sustaining peace/prevention.** They did so by facilitating:

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<sup>17</sup> KII HRWB.

- thematic technical support and expertise—e.g., gender-based violence, social cohesion, PVE, prevention of electoral violence, climate security, etc.;
  - specialised data/analysis that generates compelling evidence-base and identifies key difficulties, challenges, priorities and entry-points for sustaining peace issues in different contexts;
  - conflict sensitivity training, advice, analysis, accompaniment and stakeholder/reflective feedback;
  - information sharing and coordination support;
  - networking and partnership building support, including outreach, advocacy and ‘securing stakeholder buy-in’;
  - training and technical support for project development, proposal writing and fund sourcing;
  - quality assurance and other advisory support for fund/project steering committees;
  - technical and peer review support to funding processes;
  - co-drafting programme/project documents in partnership with UN agencies; and
  - resource mobilisation support (especially for PBF eligibility application processes).
- **Not surprisingly, UNCT and UNDP stakeholders usually found the programme development support from and mobilisation of different resources by PDA/PDT/RPSs as the most valued inputs from the Joint Programme.** As many interviewees explained, the Joint Programme demonstrated its best added-value when it helped UN agencies *operationalise* strategies through their programme interventions. The presence of PDA/PDTs was often cited as a contributing factor to greater mobilisation and more effective use of PBF resources. Overall, stakeholders frequently identified PDA/PDT/RPSs as a linchpin for mobilising technical, financial and political resources in support of sustaining peace/prevention programming, both from across the UN system and external sources.

### Outcome 2 Challenges

19. However, certain dynamics strained the Outcome 2 programme TOC and made achievement of results challenging:

- **Hesitancy, reluctance and resistance to acknowledge or engage with the sustaining peace/prevention agendas by some UN leadership, UNCT members, agencies and funding partners.** ‘Conflict hesitancy’ still occurs with some UNCT leadership, agency programme teams, elements of UN senior headquarter leadership, who sometimes downplayed conflict risks or sustaining peace priorities identified by PDA/PDTs. UN management and leadership was characterised by some as generally ‘risk averse’ and ‘statist’, and thereby prone to discount emerging conflict dynamics or feel reluctant to involve the UN peace/security pillar in what otherwise are deemed ‘normal’ development contexts.<sup>18</sup>

Hesitancy also partly stems from: ‘mandate’ protection and siloed perspectives that prevent cross-entity/pillar collaboration; ‘analysis overload’ and conflicting conclusions arriving from different internal sources; fear of taking ‘risky’ actions in sensitive settings (though inaction itself *is* an action); trust deficits for information sharing or concern that beneficiaries could be harmed if confidential information is exposed; and the simple fact that agencies are so busy implementing in high pressure settings that they often do not have the time or

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<sup>18</sup> For example, “The UNCT didn’t expect or were reluctant to accept the conflict context, They were uncomfortable with acknowledging the reality of ‘ethnic conflict’, let alone ‘civil war’ context. They were thinking, how soon will this ‘war’ be over” (KII ZGVZ).

space for strategic reflection, information exchange or analysis/advice that challenges their basic operational assumptions. Moreover, funding partners are sometimes not prioritising conflict sensitivity/sustaining peace—in what appear to be ‘normal’ development contexts, “prevention is not a first thing for donors.”<sup>19</sup>

These factors were sometimes be overcome by PDA/PDTs conducting carefully targeted conflict sensitivity training/orientation, presenting compelling analysis and navigating the different levels within the UN. ‘Conflict hesitancy’ was also mitigated in settings involving RCs experienced with challenging and ‘political’ contexts and, again, who knew how to navigate internal UN leadership and facilitate strategic convergence among the organisation’s different parts.

However, and this is a larger UN systemic issue that will be highlighted in the conclusion, the work of PDA/PDT/RPSs is ultimately not reinforced by an overarching accountability framework that demands RCs, UNCTs and headquarter elements pursue sustaining peace/prevention agendas. Rather, the Joint Programme remains a ‘bottom-up’ attempt to persuade and incentivise the UN system towards sustaining peace/prevention.

- **The quality, regularity and accessibility of PDA/PDT/RPS reporting, analysis and advice varies, as does applicability of these outputs to the different needs of end-users.** There were some criticisms that PDA/PDTs were providing ‘traditional political affairs’ sitreps that did little more than summarise what was readily available from publicly available media and/or ‘siloed’ reporting/analysis that needed to be better integrated with that from other parts of RCOs (e.g., HRAs) and UNCTs (e.g., UNDP governance and peacebuilding teams). There was inconsistency in the frequency and distribution of PDA/PDT reports, meaning many parts of the system on the ground and at headquarters did not systematically receive these valuable inputs.

Most importantly, while UNCTs members and agencies appreciated general political/situational updates, they are generally seeking more ‘application-oriented’ analysis that advises specific action points for UN agency programming/operations (i.e., analysis that answers ‘So what does this mean for us?’). There were a few situations where UNCT members were not permitted or empowered to have full visibility of and/or access to PDA/PDTs; where PDA/PDTs were effectively used as personal advisors to RCs rather than as a system wide asset. There was some confusion among some UNCTs over the role of PDA/PDTs and whether their work was reserved only for RCs and/or UNDP, creating a barrier for agencies to derive maximum benefit from the Joint Programme. There were also a few instances where PDAs do not have full and regular access to RCs, but instead have to ‘go through’ RCO Heads of Office in their effort to provide advice.

- **Although good examples exist, there are significant challenges to develop and operationalise sub-regional and cross-border strategies/programmes.** This involved convincing and bringing a much wider and more diverse set of actors and interests together to find common purpose. UNCTs and resident agencies are country-focused and often do not contemplate or understand the need for cross-border sustaining peace/prevention efforts. The management and accountability systems for country offices are country-result focused and, therefore, agencies are not automatically ‘incentivised’ to prioritise scarce technical, financial and human resources for regional analysis and programming. A few stakeholders suggested that ‘multi-

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<sup>19</sup> KII MRIW.

country' strategies/programming should also be promoted among countries located in different geographic regions but facing similar contextual circumstances.

- **Unsurprisingly, many programme focused stakeholders would like PDA/PDT/PRs to focus more strongly on informing the design, adaptation and implementation of UN programming—this was an especially strong recommendation from many UNDP COs.** There was frequent feedback that PDA/PDT analysis, advice and support are most valuable for building national capacities when they were applied in support of UN programming for building national capacities. Workload demands on PDA/PDT/RPs for national stakeholder engagement, analysis and strategy development sometimes crowded out time available for UN programming support. However, some PDA/PDTs did not have regular access to UN agencies beyond UNCT meetings and heads of agency. More could be done in most locations so that PDA/PDTs and their reporting, briefing and analysis more systematically 'plug into' agency programme teams, who might then be better able to 'operationalise' this.

However, this issue also generally raises the question of just how much close programme advisory support a PDA/PDT can give to *all* members of the UNCT. In many locations, RCs strategically extended programme support by linking PDA/PDTs to UNCT Outcome Groups or other mechanisms rather than PDA/PDTs attempting to work agency-by-agency. PDA/PDTs also appeared to more effectively support UN programming through multi-agency joint programming, which ensured a more integrated approach and also maximised the number of supported agencies.

The 2019 UN Development System structural reforms (i.e., 'RC de-linking') also significantly diminished PDA/PDTs 'proximity' and involvement in UNDP programming in most locations. Whereas in the past many PDAs were heavily involved in or had direct access to influence UNDP programming, the reform has shifted many PDA/PDTs away from direct support to UNDP programming. Now, the attention of most PDA/PDTs is more fully on RCs and UNCTs, though often with UNDP as a 'privileged' UNCT member. Also, some UNDP COs have now asserted more 'independence' regarding their sustaining peace/prevention related programming. PDA/PDT/RPs now find themselves more often on the 'outside' of UNDP COs and are having a more difficult time gaining access and demonstrating their value to UNDP programme teams.

### **Effectiveness—Joint Programme contributions to UN gender and human rights priorities**

20. In many circumstances, gender and human rights are difficult issues to engage.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, in most country cases visible to the MTR, stakeholders acknowledged that gender, women, peace and security (WPS) and human rights were integrally connected to sustaining peace/prevention. According to available documentation and wider stakeholder interviews, most PDA/PDT/RPs appear to varying degrees to consider these as key agendas and seek to engage them as appropriate and possible given the specifics of the context.

#### **Human Rights**

21. **From what was observable, the Joint Programme contributes to promoting UN human rights agendas in many locations, though this is not a central objective of the programme.** Despite challenging contexts in

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<sup>20</sup> KII MRIW.

which human rights is often a sensitive issue, PDA/PDT/RPSs are contributing to the UN human rights agenda in different ways:

- where HRAs are not present, PDA/PDTs often to some extent take on roles normally associated with these positions, as well as coordinate and collaborate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and support Universal Periodic Review processes;
- where HRAs are present, PDA/PDTs and HRAs are often working in highly collaborative and integrated ways to reinforce cross-pillar human rights, peace and development capacities and approaches; and
- PDA/PDTs frequently engage in support of certain key human rights ‘thematics’ as part of locally relevant sustaining peace and prevention priorities.

22. Overall, human rights figure less prominently in the Joint Programme ProDoc, implementation and M&E<sup>21</sup> than might be expected given the close intersection of human rights and peace. The Joint Programme defers to and supports other UN entities (e.g., OHCHR) and programme responses (e.g., OHCHR’s HRA Programme funded by the Trust Fund for Mainstreaming Human Rights) that are principally responsible for human rights.

**“We worked with UNDP and the PDAs to train more than 40 women from different regions [...] in 2019. That was the starting point in our country. We received feedback from traditional leaders on how much the intervention has helped them. We reached out to different religions and ethnic groups and trained communities to reduce tension. The people are gradually accepting women in higher authority. Therefore, they now understand the importance of women in peacebuilding [...] Personally, we need the PDA to accompany us on this our journey with the involvement of women.”**

KII QAGY

### Gender equality, women’s participation and ‘women, peace and security’ (WPS)

23. **The Joint Programme can reasonably be determined to fulfill Gender Marker 2<sup>22</sup> requirements at the aggregate level and contributes to the UN’s agendas for gender equality, women’s participation and WPS.** The Joint Programme has made significant efforts to integrate gender into its design, implementation and management. Gender equality, women’s participation and the WPS agenda feature significantly in the ProDoc, which makes a strong commitment to “systematically gender mainstream all its activities”.<sup>23</sup> The Secretariat developed and tracked an internal Gender Workplan (2020-2021), where the second area of focus is to “Strengthen gender responsiveness of PDAs’ work” and includes 8 specific action points. Some gender components have been added to the Monitoring Framework and M&E processes, particularly Output indicators—for example, **Indicator 2.2.1** (% of Joint Programme countries where PDA made a special effort to enhance the participation of women in dialogue and mediation). The internal Outcome 1 Matrix tool also includes dedicated elements for women’s inclusion. Gender also figures prominently in the requirements for PDA/PDT ‘Key Result/Work Plan’ (KR/WP) documents and there are significant gender marker requirements in the guidelines for PDA “Seed Funding” proposals and reporting. According to Secretariat tracking, 14 out of 26 Seed Funding

<sup>21</sup> For example, there is only one indicator incorporating human rights promotion in the programme’s Monitoring Framework (1.2.10 “% of Joint Programme countries where PDAs include human rights considerations in conflict analysis in the last 3 years”).

<sup>22</sup> The programme makes “a significant contribution to gender equality and/or the empowerment of women and girls” ([UNDG Gender Equality Marker Guidance Note September 2013](#)).

<sup>23</sup> Joint Programme ProDoc (Dec 2018), p.11.



proposals since gender marking tracking began in 2020 self-assessed as Gender Marker 2 or 3 (i.e., gender equality and/or women's empowerment are a significant or the principal objective). The programme has also increased allocation for gender equality and women's empowerment in Seed Funding projects, including 28% of funding in 2020 and 47% of funding in 2021 (far exceeding the Secretary-General's target of 15%). From the country cases and documentation reviewed, many PDA/PDT/RPSs are undertaking considerable activities and achieving results in support of gender, including support to *inter alia*:

- the drafting and operationalising of UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans;
- WPS sensitisations and trainings;
- gender, women and WPS informed / focused analysis;
- training, accompaniment and leadership development for women;
- analyzing barriers to meaningful women's participation in decision-making;
- greater and more effective participation of women in dialogue, civic, political, policy, peace process, electoral and other decision-making spaces at local and national levels;
- women-to-women dialogue exchanges and women peacebuilding networks/platforms;
- women-led volunteerism and programming;
- national task forces on women/youth, peace and security; and
- women's business initiatives for building trust, cooperation and conflict prevention.

24. It was remarked in some interviews that PDA/PDTs were often able to explore and facilitate ways of overcoming challenging contexts to promote gender-responsiveness and women's participation, often in support of or in collaboration with UN Women, UNDP, governments and civil society stakeholders.

25. **The Joint Programme is contributing to results for gender equality, women's participation and the WPS; however, the MTR was not able to determine the extent of these results.** There was some stakeholder feedback that the level of 'uptake' on gender and WPS responsive activities, outputs and results varied among PDA/PDTs and depended a great deal on involved individuals and contexts. While there were examples of specific gender-informed/focused analysis, gender was not consistently a key element of PDA/PDT analysis. Important existing efforts by the Secretariat to promote gender and WPS need strengthening. While the Secretariat's Gender Workplan is laudable, deeper integration and prioritisation of gender in management and implementation might be strengthened if gender considerations were directly integrated into the Secretariat's main workplan. The extent and quality of the Joint Programme's gender results could be more strongly monitored if gender was integrated across the programme's Monitoring Framework and indicators.<sup>24</sup> And while there is a strong commitment in the ProDoc to improve gender expertise within the PDA cadre<sup>25</sup>, there were no apparent mechanisms to assess or track for this. While PDAs have clearly participated in different trainings and other knowledge/learning initiatives related to gender and WPS, their impact on PDA gender expertise and action on the ground is undetermined. The programme might benefit by using PDA inductions and professional development to ensure a more even knowledge base of and disposition towards gender, women's participation and WPS.

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<sup>24</sup> For example, **Indicator 2.1.2** (% of Joint Programme countries where PDA supported developing and/or improving national peace architecture or structures that can be built up to a peace architecture) does not include any measure of how gender-sensitive such capacities and architecture are or how they are integrating WPS elements.

<sup>25</sup> Joint Programme ProDoc (Dec 2018), p.6.

***Effectiveness—Programme Governance and Management: To what extent are governance and management of the Joint Programme effective, responsive and supportive of delivery? What works well and what needs to improve?***

26. **Joint Programme’s global governance systems and relationships are generally observed to be working collaboratively and effectively as per the programme’s ProDoc, TORs and Standard Operation Procedures.** Many stakeholders remarked on the synergies between UNDP and DPPA in maintaining focus on the best interests of the Joint Programme rather than simply their own organisational interests. The Steering Committee and Technical Committee have been updated to also include DCO participation in recognition of the UN Development System structural reforms and both committees involve global and regional headquarter participation from DPPA-DPO and UNDP. Many stakeholders observed that engagement from the UNDP and DPPA Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) Co-Chairs and Co-Technical Leads is high and equivalent. The Joint Programme Co-Chairs offer high-level oversight and representation, while the Secretariat is guided, technically-led, supervised and represented at the strategic level by the UNDP and DPPA Co-Technical Leads. Strategic decisions and senior leadership support are forthcoming and dialogue between different levels is ongoing, while the Secretariat is largely empowered to get on with managing day-to-day implementation. As remarked by one stakeholder, “You can't take this open and non-hierarchical relationship for granted” in UN systems.<sup>26</sup>

27. **The Joint Programme has made important adaptations and improvements in its current programme cycle.** Overall, programme management systems and tools have become more institutionalised and regularised compared previous programme cycles. As the programme has increased in scale and the complexity of the workload has increased, the Joint Programme is no longer a ‘small experiment’ and needed to deepen management ‘legislation’. The programme has put in place, standardised and/or regularised: unified ‘Standard Operational Procedures’ to govern much of its implementation; a ‘Tripartite Agreement’ to regulate the effective management of PDAs by RCs, UNDP RRs and DPPA-DPO; updated application/reporting guidelines for Seed Funding of Catalytic PDA Initiatives (including significant integration of gender requirements); a programme Risk Register; and ‘Temporary recruitment measures to achieve gender parity in the PDA cadre’ strategy. In the area of results-based design, management and M&E, the Joint Programme has developed and adopted: clear and explicit theories of change in the ProDoc; a more rigorous Monitoring Framework with a complete 2018-2019 baseline and gender indicators; standardised annual KR/WP templates to plan and guide PDA/PDT work; and annual monitoring surveys with RCs, UNDP RRs and DPPA-DPO divisions and country specific Outcome 1 Matrixes to collect qualitative and context specific progress data. The staffing of the Secretariat has also increased from three full-time staff members to seven full-time team members, although two of these posts are vacant as of the time of writing.

28. **The Joint Programme Secretariat and Co-Technical Leads are highly regarded by most stakeholders for quality of delivery, innovative and collaborative approaches and the personal degree of commitment from staff members—**“The Secretariat works well as a team. They are engaging, supportive and positive. They have developed a safe and welcoming work culture allowing the free sharing and testing of ideas.”<sup>27</sup> For the most part, the Secretariat is accessible and responsive when PDAs request support and trouble-shooting. It is also pro-active

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<sup>26</sup> KII VWMP.

<sup>27</sup> KII GBSK.

in convening PDA peer exchange through global and regional PDA retreats and making PDAs aware of training opportunities. The creation of the RPS posts have partly helped to extend programme to support PDA/PDTs (though RPS have more extensive roles than this). Secretariat personnel are largely seen as a key part of the success of the Joint Programme. The Secretariat and management clearly put effort into intentional relationship and collaboration building between the different entities and stakeholders involved in the programme.

### Joint Programme Governance and Management Challenges

29. Despite having put in place stronger systems and tools and meeting overall performance expectations, some aspects of programme governance and management are clearly experiencing strain. This is mainly due to the increasing scale and complexity of the Joint Programme, but also due to the UN Development System structural reforms that took effect in 2019. The Joint Programme needs to examine and respond to key governance/management challenges impacting effective delivery.

30. **There is a wide spectrum of experience regarding effective tripartite-management and reporting lines for PDA/PDT/RPSs.** PDA/PDT/RPSs find themselves in a highly matrixed management and accountability setting. In the simplest scenarios, they are accountable to 3 supervisors (the RC and UNDP RR ‘in-country’ and DPPA-DPO regional division at headquarters) and requirements from the Joint Programme governance/management itself. Some PDA/PDTs are covering sub-regions and serving multi-country offices, drastically multiplying their lines of reporting and accountability. RPSs have a similar tripartite-management arrangement at a regional level, but then also have to answer to Joint Programme governance/management requirements *and* commitments to both PDA/PDTs and even some RCs/UNCTs in non-PDA/PDT countries.

31. **To be clear, tripartite-management arrangements are working very well and following both the spirit and letter of the Joint Programme’s Tripartite Agreement and guidance in many locations.** In these places, there was effective collaboration between the RC, UNDP RR and DPPA-DPO to develop, share and supervise the PDA’s annual KR/WP, daily workload, regular analysis/reporting and annual Performance Management and Development appraisal. In these situations, the primacy of the RC reporting line was respected while UNDP RR and DPPA-DPO tripartite managers were actively involved in shaping and supervising the PDA’s workload, ensuring their expectations for delivery were included and met. As one stakeholder observed: “The future is about matrix management and inter-agency collaboration, so let’s figure out how to make it work.”<sup>28</sup>

32. **However, in some locations, the Joint Programme is not performing optimally because of tripartite-management challenges.** PDA/PDT/RPSs were sometimes ‘caught in the middle’ of breakdowns between points of the tripartite-management ‘triangle’—i.e., between RCs, UNDP RRs and DPPA-DPO supervisors. In some cases, not all tripartite-managers were actively engaged in or fulfilling their PDA/PDT management and accountability requirements. In a few worse-case scenarios, tripartite-managers ignored one another, blocked the participation of other tripartite-managers and/or ‘micro-managed’ or obstructed the work of the PDA/PDT/RPS. There were examples of RCs and DPPA-DPO supervisors restricting circulation of PDA reports and communications to other parts of tripartite-management. Sometimes PDA/PDT/RPSs were perceived as being ‘too close’ to one of the tripartite-managers (most commonly the RC or DPPA-DPO) and not satisfying the expectations of the others. Some PDAs were being effectively used as RCs’ personal political advisors. In a few cases, PDAs were effectively having

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<sup>28</sup> KII UIZM.

to report to RCs through RCO Team Leaders rather than directly and/or otherwise found themselves ‘on the outside’ with all tripartite-managers. Not a majority, but a sizeable cohort of UNDP managers especially sought greater time and value from PDA/PDTs to support UNDP programming. They felt that UNDP, as a ‘co-owner’ of the Joint Programme, was not having the expected privileged access to and support from PDA/PDTs (i.e., UNDP is more than just another member the UNCT).

33. While some challenges were minor and started with unintentional behavior or ‘trivial’ issues around management ‘inclusivity’, these sometimes escalated tensions and contributed to ‘institutionalising’ problematic tripartite-management behaviours and relationships. These challenges led to lost opportunities and contributed to instances of sub-optimal programme effectiveness; they have sometimes caused significant professional and personal stress for involved PDA/PDT/PRSs. Joint Programme management and the Secretariat have spent increasing amount of time and energy during the last few years troubleshooting tripartite-management challenges in various locations.

34. Again, these challenges were not present in most locations; however, when they were, stakeholders attributed them to a combination of factors, such as:

- some, especially new, RCs and RRs did not seem to be fully aware or felt they had not been made fully aware of how the Joint Programme works, what their expected tripartite-manager responsibilities were and what constituted appropriate roles, divisions of labour and tasks for PDA/PDT/PRSs;
- some tripartite-managers were perceived to expect ‘services’ from the Joint Programme without accepting the responsibilities and accountability that come with this;
- some PDAs themselves did not fully understand their own appropriate tripartite roles and required lines of reporting;
- some PDAs were perceived as ‘favouring’ a particular tripartite-management entity in alignment with their preferred future career pathways;
- Joint Programme grappling with the increased people- and matrix-management complexities that resulted from the shift from dual- to tripartite-reporting lines;
- perceptions that Joint Programme management and the Secretariat were not always consistently ensuring ‘equivalency’ in their interactions and communications with tripartite-managers;
- differing user-needs and expectations between different tripartite-managers/entities, which sometimes needed more pro-active and constructive ‘mediation’ to prevent tensions;
- inter-personal tensions and relationship conflicts between tripartite-managers and between them and PDA/RPSs; and
- perceived inter-entity tensions, competition and “fiefdom guarding”<sup>29</sup> behaviors within the UN that have been particularly accentuated by the UN Development System structural reforms—though these dynamics are outside the remit of the Joint Programme, the programme still needs to develop mitigation measures and coping strategies.

35. **Different stakeholders see different models for effective Joint Programme governance, management and/or operational arrangements.** While the Joint Programme continued its dual UNDP/DPPA Co-Chair

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<sup>29</sup> KII QTWG.

governance structure into the current programme cycle, delivery on the ground is effectively a tripartite arrangement between RCs, UNDP RRs and DPPA-DPO. The DCO now has a seat in the Joint Programme's Steering and Technical Committees. Some stakeholders see this as adequate, while others argue for more 'inclusive' governance, management and/or operational arrangements:

- **Many stakeholders see the UNDP-DPPA Co-Chair set-up as the most effective and relevant.** It streamlines governance and management processes and decisions. It ensures clear and direct collaboration between DPPA as the lead entity of the peace/security pillar and UNDP as the 'integrator' and largest development programming entity concerned with sustaining peace/prevention, which in itself has been richly deepened because of the Joint Programme. Many argued that the effective UNDP-DPPA partnership should not be taken for granted and could be undermined if the programme adopted a multi-entity governance structure. For example, there were strong concerns that a trilateral UNDP-DPPA-DCO governance set-up would push the programme to become 'DCO-centric' and PDAs would effectively become special political advisors to RCs, losing their ability to mobilise the UN system in-country and at headquarters in the ways that the current governance set-up enables. Or, for example, that moving to a multi-entity governance set-up would seriously slow-down and complicate management effectiveness, but also significantly 'water down' ownership and accountability among partner entities.
- **Some suggested a need for increased DCO participation within Joint Programme governance, management and/or operational arrangements, including DCO potentially becoming a Co-Chair.** This would reinforce and align the existing principal PDA reporting line to RCs on the ground with governance of the programme at the global level, but also enable the Joint Programme to more effectively interface with the DCO and promote sustaining peace/prevention 'doctrine' across the UN Development System.
- **Additionally, some suggested that more effective delivery and greater ownership of sustaining peace/prevention across the UN system policy ecosystem could be accomplished by establishing multi-entity governance, management and/or operational arrangements.** That a Joint Programme meant to support the UN system ought to have greater ownership by the system, not just UNDP and DPPA. This might be achieved by giving 'full member' or observer status in the Steering and Technical Committees to UN entities that are often closely linked to the work of PDA/PDT/RPSs, such as DCO, OHCHR, OCHA, DPO, UN Women. Some interviewees suggested that multi-UN entity governance, management and/or operational arrangements would significantly strengthen intra-UN partnerships and collaboration for cross-pillar sustaining peace/prevention from the headquarter-level downwards to implementation at the regional and country levels.
- **Lastly, there were some suggestions of involving 'representative' RCs, UNDP RRs and PDA/RPSs in Steering Committee, Technical Committee and other processes.** Such representation would improve delivery effectiveness by more clearly inputting 'ground realities' into Joint Programme governance, management and/or operational decisions and planning. Some funding partners also suggested that regularly scheduled 'donor meetings' would also ensure greater alignment of expectations and understanding of the Joint Programme.

36. **Despite best intentions and efforts, the scale of Joint Programme expansion in recent years is testing the upper limits of DPPA and UNDP’s management supervision set-up.** While empowered in many degrees, the Secretariat still requires significant interventions by its UNDP and DPPA Co-Technical Leads for both regular operational clearances (e.g., financial approvals, recruitment panels, etc.) but also management troubleshooting (e.g., liaising directly with RCs and UNDP RRs). Many inside and external stakeholders suggested that the current scale of the Joint Programme puts strain on the Co-Technical Leads’ abilities to support the Joint Programme while also managing multiple other teams/programmes. Any future changes to programme governance/management should consider how to create a more empowered Secretariat and streamline effective supervision of it by UNDP and DPPA.

37. **In some locations, stakeholders perceived mismatches or deficits between PDA profiles and needs on the ground.** This was sometimes apparent at the outset or sometimes where major context changes had occurred and different capabilities were then required. Most stakeholders acknowledged that PDAs need to be highly ‘hybridised’ professionals, but that it is unrealistic to expect ‘perfection’ of any one PDA working in complex and evolving contexts. Nonetheless, different contexts require different PDA skill-sets, backgrounds and orientations. The MTR did not see evidence of management tools to intentionally align PDA profiles with context needs during PDA post creation and recruitment. No needs analysis, multi-year engagement frameworks<sup>30</sup> or country-specific UN political strategies were specifically employed to calibrate PDA mandates, profiles and working strategies during post creation, recruitment and deployment.

38. **The effective and efficient application of some programme management tools and systems is uneven.** As noted earlier, the Joint Programme has significantly upgraded and regularised many of its management tools and systems; however, there was uneven application of many of these, which detracted from optimal delivery. During the current programme cycle, the Steering Committee only met once in Sep 2020 (it is supposed to meet at least annually) and the Technical Committee only met once annually in Apr 2020, Mar 2021 and Feb 2022 (it is supposed to meet at least twice a year). While PDA KR/WPs are required annually, only 56% for 2021 have been completed (some only in incomplete/draft form). The Joint Programme has a higher success rate with the submission of PDA Annual Survey and Outcome 1 Matrices for annual reporting (at 79% for 2021). Lastly, the frequency, quality and distribution of ‘monthly’ PDA reports appears to be highly context dependent but also inconsistent. As noted earlier, PDA report distribution in some cases was contested and did not follow Joint Programme requirements that all three tripartite-managers are included. The Secretariat was frequently not included in PDA report distribution and, therefore, had no means for ‘tracking’ whether PDAs are fulfilling requirements.

39. **Some programme management tools and systems are perceived as ‘burdensome’ or not having utility.** Planning and M&E elements were especially often cited as being too cumbersome and taking a great deal of time to complete. For example, most annual Outcome 1 Matrix reports are over 30-pages long; some are draft/incomplete, vaguely and/or not completed as instructed and involve significant repetitions. More broadly, the lack of convergence between planning instruments (i.e., KR/WPs) and monitoring instruments (i.e., monthly PDA reports, Outcome 1 Matrix, annual PDA Survey and individual Performance Management and Development plans) was sometimes cited as undermining coherent and effective PDA management, as well as contributing to

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<sup>30</sup> As recommended by the 2018 mid-term evaluation and expressed in the ProDoc.

feelings of burdensome 'over bureaucratisation' of programme management tools/systems. At the same time, some tripartite-managers acknowledged they were responsible to more effectively and systematically use these instruments to organise, coordinate and assess PDA/PDT/RPS effectiveness.

40. **Previous levels of consistent Joint Programme Secretariat and management engagement/support for PDAs and tripartite-managers has diminished in recent years.** For every feedback of praise for the excellent level of Secretariat and management engagement/support there was feedback that this 'wasn't what it used to be' or that there was no adequate or regular support. For example, some PDAs (especially those new to the programme) did not feel they had necessary access to all available UN headquarter technical, financial and leadership support via the Secretariat and management. At a more practical level, some PDAs continued to complain of minor but persistent administrative challenges that consumed time and energy that could otherwise be invested in delivery. Some interviewed UN Volunteers, PDSs, secondees and national PDAs felt as though they received 'second-class' engagement, recognition and support from the programme, despite often having to shoulder responsibilities 'over their pay grade'. There was frequent acknowledgement that the constraints of the global pandemic have partly contributed to this, including the postponement of in-person inductions and retreats. More generally, it was acknowledged that the Joint Programme's greatly expanded scale has meant that the Secretariat and management have necessarily become less 'personal' and 'bespoke' than before. Many stakeholders felt that some of these challenges were a factor of 'growing pains' but also consistently pointed to an overloaded Secretariat and management.

41. **The Joint Programme Secretariat is experiencing varying capacity deficits that diminish its ability for optimal effectiveness.** While the staffing of the Secretariat increased since the previous programme cycle, many stakeholders saw it delivering a much bigger programme with only a small increase of management resources—it was repeatedly characterised as "overloaded", "overburdened" and "overstretched." While many stakeholders prioritised the need to avoid 'empire building' and focused on lean management, there was recognition that the implementation burden has become too heavy with existing capacities. Stakeholders repeatedly pointed out that increasing 'transactions' and complexities of managing the deployment of diverse human resources across a greater number of challenging development contexts is straining existing capacities. There were concerns that precious human resources are working above their grades, not receiving due recognition and at risk of burn-out. The constraints of the pandemic have also strained the ability of the Secretariat and management to work as a cohesive team; some stakeholders pointed to elements of 'disconnect' among staff, the need to be 'more on the same page' and bottlenecks in accessing decision-makers. More broadly, Secretariat and management were perceived as being over occupied with operational (especially recruitment) and tripartite-manager troubleshooting, which detracted from their ability to focus on strategic issues or otherwise providing closer support to PDAs.

42. Key areas experiencing capacity deficits included: operations and administration; human resource, recruitment and roster management; knowledge management and learning; results-based design, management and M&E.

## Operations and administration

43. A programme now expending over USD 20 million a year across 66 locations only employs one Programme Associate to manage all finance, procurement, travel and operational matters, including for global retreats/workshops for RCs and PDAs and for supporting UNDP COs executing administrative support to PDA/PDTs. While short-term consultants have been brought in as surge support more recently for specific events like the 'Montreux Workshop for RCs engaged in complex political settings', this is not a long-term solution for a workload that is increasing annually. Not only is additional administrative/operational staff required, but they also need to be at a sufficient grade with Atlas/administrative rights to streamline the management of transactions.

## Human resource, recruitment and roster management

44. Human resource management demands appear to be surpassing existing Joint Programme capacities and the programme is beginning to not meet expectations regarding the efficient, effective and timely deployment of PDA and other expertise. The human resources workload has partly increased in the last three years due to greater numbers of PDA recruitments, now involving roughly 20-30 recruitment processes a year.<sup>31</sup> PDA recruitment is especially labour-intensive because of the additional processes put in place to ensure an inclusive and equitable tripartite exercise, but also to ensure that tripartite-managers uphold Joint Programme recruitment requirements. Increasing recruitment of national PDAs (which cannot use the global roster system) and secondments (from the Folke Bernadotte Academy and now also Swiss civil deployments) have also increased the recruitment workload.

45. The most significant contributor to an overwhelming human resources management workload has been the process to build a new international PDA Roster, which is still ongoing after nearly two years. The Joint Programme prioritised a new Roster partly because Roster recruitments take much less time (two-thirds of which are completed within 3 months) compared to external PDA recruitments (which can take anywhere from 8-12 months).<sup>32</sup> However, creating a more diverse, multi-lingual and gender balanced PDA Roster was seen as essential for the effectiveness of the Joint Programme, which ultimately depends not on the quantity of PDAs deployed but whether they have the sufficient qualities needed to impact on the programme's two objectives. The Roster process and wider recruitment procedures, systems and strategies were also perceived by many stakeholders as important measures to protect the integrity of the Joint Programme and PDA 'brand', as well as promote collaboration between UNDP, DPPA and DCO.

46. However, management and the Secretariat did not have in place the necessary capacities to effectively deliver such an ambitious and complex Roster process that received 3,933 submissions.<sup>33</sup> On the whole, the Joint Programme had to confront and overcome the challenges of devising and putting in place a substantively 'new way of working' at significantly larger scale than ever before while having to rely on systems/tools that were not built for the purposes, agility and scale required. Consequently, nearly all Secretariat staff have been pulled into the Roster process, diminishing their attention to other key management areas. The Roster process is further examined in **Efficiency**, but many lessons were learned. While the new Roster continues to be a 'heavy' exercise, the reputation and effectiveness of the Joint Programme depends on the transparency, credibility and quality

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<sup>31</sup> KIIs VUNM and YQTF.

<sup>32</sup> KII YQTF and Joint Programme Monitoring Framework (April 2020).

<sup>33</sup> After pre-screening for duplicate or incomplete submissions, a total of 3,621 unique applications were made to the Roster.



assurance of the process to create a diverse new pool of PDAs. The programme should consider what capacities will be required to maintain and nurture the Roster.

### Knowledge management, learning and professional development

47. The Joint Programme is not internalising sustaining peace/prevention knowledge within the UN system writ large in a systemic way; however, that is not currently a central component of its results framework. PDA/PDTs/RPSs have innovated a great deal with different forms of UN analytical and strategy outputs/processes to push the sustaining peace knowledge envelope, often experimenting with different ‘innovation hubs’ such as the DPPA Innovation Cell and various UNDP Accelerator Labs. PDA/PDT/PRs have also individually pushed UN knowledge and interest on emergent issues/methods over the years, such as for: PVE; hate speech; social cohesion; insider mediation; conflict sensitivity; climate security; leave no one behind analysis; social media analysis; mental health and psychosocial support in peacebuilding; etc. On an ad hoc basis, PDA/PDT/RPSs sometimes provided inputs/feedback into different UN policy briefs, guidance notes and case studies, particularly for UNDP and DPPA—such as the UNSDG guidance note on conflict-sensitivity, UNDP guidance note on mental health and psychosocial support in peacebuilding, DPPA practice note on local mediation, and DPPA-led discussions and case studies on addressing hate speech. PDAs have been invited as facilitators, contributors and speakers for United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) courses, as well as provided inputs into the design of courses in some instances. It is not clear whether PDA/PDT/RPSs were involved in UNDP’s Global Policy Network (GPN) in a systematic manner, though UNDP GPN material, trainings and webinars were regularly available to PDA/PDT/RPSs.

48. The Joint Programme’s knowledge management focus was largely inwards and prioritised ‘peer-exchange events’ rather than ‘knowledge products’—these were principally the RC Montreux Workshops and PDA Global Retreats held on alternating years, as well as regional/sub-regional PDA retreats that have become more common in recent years. These events were perceived by many stakeholders as crucial exchange, learning and networking processes that contributed to a strong community of practice among the Joint Programme, PDA/PDTs and core stakeholders. Perhaps the one persistent criticism was that, while these retreats needed to enable free-exchange, they also needed to include more concrete components, such as specific Joint Programme management, thematic and training components.

49. The Secretariat was frequently cited by PDA/PDT/RPSs as actively disseminating available UN and external training opportunities and extending resources as needed to participate in these (i.e., a largely ‘supply-drive’ approach to learning/professional development). Though the Annual Surveys showed that PDAs sometimes access the online Peace Infrastructures Portal, interviews suggested that the Portal is only infrequently used as a key knowledge product or community of practice hub. The Secretariat maintains an internal ‘PDA Resource Package’ with extensive links to thematic sources and tools, as well as provides access to a range of knowledge/learning resources through PDA induction exercises. UNDP and DPPA stakeholders observed PDA/PDT/RPSs as frequently requesting and accessing corporate knowledge/guidance products.

50. Cohesive knowledge management, learning and professional development strategies have not emerged in the Joint Programme. This is partly a consequence of staff diversion towards other priorities, but also because this area has been seen as ‘secondary’ to delivery in the principal outcome areas of the programme. A brief PDA

learning assessment/strategy exercise was partly conducted in 2019. It identified key learning issues and proposed a coherent strategy, though much of it was deemed too advanced for existing Secretariat capacities and programme priorities at the time, and it was not finalised. Nevertheless, it articulated sensible justifications for more strategic investment in knowledge and learning.

51. As programme scale has expanded, there are indications a strategic professional development approach is needed to level-up essential PDA/PDT/RPS skill sets (such as in the areas of conflict sensitivity, gender/WPS, programming, human rights, political engagement/analysis and adult learning/training methodologies) and ensure their expertise remains relevant with emergent issues and changing contexts. ‘Demand-driven’ and customizable approaches to training, peer learning and knowledge management are also justified by the expansion of PDTs, which involve different types/levels of experience and a diversification/specialisation of roles (national and international). More deeply, the PDA/PDT/RPS cadre represents a unique and valuable pool of cross-pillar sustaining peace/prevention expertise and practical experience that has not been systematically tapped to inform UN system policy, guidance and knowledge (including the UN discourse on the SDGs). This is a missed opportunity. A deliberate strategy and small investments in new capacities for knowledge management, learning and professional development would not only make the Joint Programme more effective but also more relevant for the rest of the UN system.

### Results-based design, management and M&E

52. As already highlighted, Joint Programme results-based design, management and M&E have advanced a great deal in the current programme phase. However, like all peace/conflict-related programmes, this remains a work in progress and challenges continue. The programme has invested in establishing a full-time M&E Specialist and ear-marked funds for monitoring-missions (though these have not been possible during the last two years of the pandemic), though this seems the absolute minimum M&E capacity for a programme of this scale. Articulating results—especially impact—to programme stakeholders and funding partners has been a challenge. While much of the Joint Programme’s work is intuitively useful, clearly capturing and articulating results remains elusive. The Joint Programme cannot ‘prove’ situations in which it contributed to the ‘non-occurrence’ of conflicts—though this is not explicitly one of the outcomes that can be directly expected of the programme in any case. As explored further in **Relevance & Cohesion**, some programme partners are expecting results ‘beyond’ what is laid out in the Results Framework, which seems unreasonable given that the Joint Programme has put in place an explicit set of indicators for results at the outcome and output levels inline with its programme TOCs. Some results also need to remain confidential because of risks to stakeholders and processes. In the best case scenarios, national capacities have stepped in while the UN and PDA/PDTs have rightfully remained background facilitators, catalyzers or supporters—therefore, programme ‘attribution’ is not possible.

53. M&E tools are almost exclusively quantitative, rely significantly on self-reporting without systematic validation measures and do not appear to be fully understood or consistently completed by many PDAs (especially those not from a programming background). As previously noted, there is little convergence between planning and monitoring instruments. A significant cross-section of stakeholders felt that annual reports are too anecdotal; that they need to better provide not only an understanding of the programme’s ‘aggregate’ results but also a higher-level ‘systemic analysis’ of trends in Joint Programme practice and results. Overall, and similar to knowledge management, developing strategic and innovative results-based management and M&E approaches

has been seen as 'secondary' to outcome delivery. As a result, the Joint Programme has largely employed "traditional ways of doing programme M&E at the UN."<sup>34</sup>

### PDA gender balance challenges

54. Gender barriers and bias in PDA recruitment processes clearly persist and still prevent the Joint Programme from reaching full PDA gender parity. Overall, women are still under-represented in the PDA cadre. However, the Joint Programme has demonstrated steady progress and recently exceeded its gender recruitment target of 40% female PDAs by 2023—it has risen from 33% female PDAs in 2019 to 43% as of April 2022. At every stage of the ongoing PDA Roster process, the programme has been able to increase the proportion of female candidates that have progressed. Only 40% of applicants were women; however, women candidate now comprise 51% of all candidates short-listed for upcoming interviews.

55. Joint Programme management and the Secretariat are aware that more needs to be done to ensure gender balance, greater diversity and gender-sensitive work environments for deployed and rostered PDAs. Joint Programme management and the Secretariat have taken some practical steps to identify and address some barriers and bias, including establishing "Temporary recruitment measures to achieve gender parity in the Peace and Development Advisors (PDA) cadre" in May of 2021. While these include measures to ensure at least 50% representation of female candidates during all stages of recruitment, they fall somewhat short of the Secretary-General's "Temporary Special Measures for the Achievement of Gender Parity" requirements.<sup>35</sup> The Secretariat and management have become more involved in recruitment processes, including to quality assure satisfaction of gender parity measures; Joint Programme management and ASGs have in some cases intervened to ensure that female candidates have not been discounted during recruitment processes.

56. **Small 'nudges' and barriers in PDA recruitment add up to persistent gender bias in the aggregate.** The MTR was not equipped to formulate a coherent analysis for the persistent inability to achieve gender parity in the PDA cadre but collected observations from a range of stakeholders about the issue. It is suggested that the Joint Programme is 'gender conscious' but that a range of explicit and implicit dynamics add up in the aggregate to create a pattern of gender bias. Some stakeholders perceive a longer history of female PDAs not being as visible or 'profiled' as male PDAs. Though this may be because most PDAs have been male, some stakeholders feel this sends the implicit message that the ideal PDA profile is 'masculine'. Potentially as a result, prospective female PDA candidates may not automatically see a natural career path in the PDA stream. Applications by women have remained proportionally fewer than those from men for P5 PDA posts, which then contributes to perpetuating an overall smaller pool of female candidates and PDAs at this level. Many involved stakeholders in Roster and recruitment processes observed that female applicants sometimes faced discrepancies and biases during evaluation phases that disadvantaged equal assessment of their qualifications in comparison with male candidates. Part of this may stem from RCOs and UNDP COs responsible for long-listing often not having the relevant peace/conflict expertise necessary to properly assess applicants, inadvertently narrowing down an already limited number of female applicants. Interview panels were also perceived by some stakeholders as being 'lenient' for male candidates and 'strict' in their assessments of female candidates. Different interview panels

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<sup>34</sup> KII CZDF.

<sup>35</sup> Which more specifically requires that "(a) The job opening shall be filled by one or more women candidates on the list or the roster, provided that the women candidates meet the requirements for the job opening and that their qualifications are substantially equal or superior to those of the competing male candidates;" (ST/AI/2020/5, Para 3.4)

were also thought by many stakeholders to have demonstrated different levels of awareness of and commitment to gender parity. In a few instances, female RCs preferred selecting a male PDA candidate in order to achieve 'gender balance' between the RC and PDA posts. Non-family duty station and hardship PDA postings generally received fewer women applicants. Lastly, in recruiting for some country contexts, obvious context dynamics were seen by some stakeholders as biasing against the selection of female PDA candidates. A few stakeholders strongly argued that some women and Global South candidates are 'put off' by what they perceive as inherently disadvantaging Anglo- and Global North-centric UN recruitment processes.

57. The above is highly anecdotal and incomplete—the MTR is not equipped to comprehensively assess gender bias in PDA recruitment. However, gender parity challenges clearly persist and need to be addressed. **Though an internal review in 2015 (“Examining the Gender Disparity in the PDA Cadre”) is now six years old, many of the challenges it raised continue to be observed and not all recommended counter-measures have yet been implemented.**

### Regional Programme Specialists (RPSs)

The six RPSs are a new development in the Joint Programme since mid-2020.<sup>36</sup> They are based in all five regions of the programme: Africa (one in Dakar for West Africa and one in Addis Ababa/Nairobi East/Southern Africa); Arab States (Amman); Asia/Pacific (Bangkok); Europe/Central Asia (Istanbul); and Latin America/Caribbean (Panama). They tripartite management with equal reporting lines to UNDP, DPPA-DPO and DCO regional bureaus/divisions. They are evenly deployed to tripartite stakeholders with two located in UNDP regional hubs, two in DPPA regional offices and two in DCO regional bureaus.

While RPSs performed some internal programme coordination support for the Joint Programme itself, they were not acting as 'programme officers' for internal Joint Programme management and did not supervise PDAs in their regions. They were working as 'programme inputs' and contributing to Joint Programme activities, outputs and outcomes from at the regional and sometimes country level. For the most part, there was evidence that RPSs were in frequent contact with PDAs in their regions and offered regular demand-driven support on a short-term and medium-term basis to PDAs. Not attached in 'real-time' to a specific country context in the way that PDA/PDTs are, this has given RPSs some space to experiment with their work. However, at the same time, they have also faced tripartite-management challenges while also having to face requests for support from multiple PDAs.

Though RPSs have specific TORs, there were different levels of understanding of and a variety of perspectives on the best role of this new asset (including their frequent misnomer as 'Regional PDAs'). Evidence suggests that RPSs have had increasing effectiveness and relevance in at least four areas of work:

- **Providing substantive advisory backstopping and support:** There were some examples of very specific and time-bound in-person/remote support (trainings, analysis and strategy development) usefully provided by RPSs to RC/UNCTs/UNDP COs both with and without PDAs in some of the regions. Such support has been nearly all demand-driven and, therefore, mostly unpredictable. RPSs were facilitating/supporting regular

<sup>36</sup> At the time of MTR data collection, most RPSs had only been in-post for roughly 1 ½ years. Given the short period and challenges experienced during the global pandemic over this period, it is difficult for the MTR to be categorical about the extent of RPS performance.

regional PDA networks for the purposes of troubleshooting, identifying necessary support and providing substantive advice. RPSs provided direct technical advisory services to PDAs in some cases (e.g., analytical and programme design), while in others that have acted as conduits for connecting PDAs to relevant technical guidance, expertise and resources.

- **Providing quality assurance and other support to CCA/UNSDCF processes:** RPSs have been involved in most regions in supporting DCO quality assurance processes for CCA/UNSDCFs. This has included their valued participation in DCO ‘Peer Support Groups’ that review and input into CCAs. RPSs have applied technical expertise to instigate additional necessary reflection on and integrate elements of conflict sensitivity, prevention and sustaining peace into draft CCAs and UNSDCFs (especially those from UNCTs without PDAs). Experiments by RPSs have included developing a checklist for ‘Better Reflecting Conflict Risks and Peace and Social Cohesion Opportunities in CCAs’ and promoting ‘Multidimensional SDG Risk Analysis for CCAs’.
- **Promoting and facilitating regional/cross-border approaches (analysis, strategies and programming):** Though challenging, RPSs have found a regular role in supporting country-focused RCs, UNCTs, and UN agencies and UNDP, DPPA-DPO and DCO regional bureaus/divisions that are largely ‘compartmentalised’ from each other to recognise the value of integrated cross-border approaches and to help them overcome the complexities involved in such approaches. There is emerging evidence of an essential facilitative role that RPSs play in the development and/or implementation of new regional/cross-border analysis, risk assessments, CRDs, prevention strategies and projects.<sup>37</sup> RPSs have especially acted as a collaboration ‘bridge’ between entities and levels that does not otherwise exist in the standard UN system. In at least one region, the RPS apparently supported weekly joint discussions between UNDP, DPPA-DPO and DCO regional bureaus/divisions.<sup>38</sup> It will take time to determine whether these nascent strategies/programmes will have eventual value. There were mixed perceptions on the utility of RPS facilitated regional/cross-border analysis because a great deal of open-source analysis by specialised actors is already available in some regions. There were strong suggestions that RPS facilitated regional/cross-border analysis would have greatest utility if is designed for very specific purposes (rather than as an all-purpose analysis), synthesises existing data/analysis into a higher-level and integrated analysis (i.e., bringing pieces together into something new rather than replicating/repeating what already exists), involves ‘foresight’ aspects and directly contributes to the development/implementation of UN strategies, responses and programming.
- **Facilitating innovative and deeper knowledge management processes:** RPSs have actively pushed forward Joint Programme knowledge management. They have facilitated and supported regional PDA retreats and regular regional PDA exchanges, as well as supported regional/thematic ‘communities of practice’. Though some regional PDA networks already informally existed, RPSs have largely regularised and strengthened these as peer-to-peer forums for internal reflection, cross-fertilisation of expertise and sharing of lessons learned. In some regions, RPSs were even facilitating smaller PDA peer-circle meetings for ‘deeper dives’ on key issues. However, without a wider Joint Programme knowledge management strategy or mechanisms, these efforts have not been systematically integrated into wider Joint Programme knowledge management and learning

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<sup>37</sup> Most are about a region/cross-border context in general, though some which are about specific themes/dynamics at play within regional/cross-border context (e.g., the mapping of the HDP situation in a region).

<sup>38</sup> KII HNTT.

practices. RPSs represent a potentially essential knowledge management asset if they can be adequately factored into a more ambitious and capacitated Joint Programme knowledge management approach.

In addition to considering findings and issues raised above, the MTR suggests the Joint programme also consider two key RPS challenges:

- **Standard RPS guidance:** The RPS role is still very much evolving and in different ways based on the needs of stakeholders in different regions. This flexibility has meant RPSs have been able to generally demonstrate relevance and ‘plug in’ cohesively. However, this flexibility has had its drawbacks and RPSs are stretched between expectations. The Joint Programme should do a specific stock-take on RPSs and develop standardised guidance to structure the core work of RPSs in relation to PDAs, to tripartite-managers (UNDP, DPPA-DPO and DCO) and to the Joint programme Secretariat itself.
- **Expectations for RPS ‘surge’ support may be problematic:** There are risks that RPSs’ workstreams would be significantly disrupted if they were to be regularly deployed as surge support to country locations as per their TORs. An RPS’s ‘regular’ work would effectively go on hold because it is not likely they can both work as a fulltime interim PDA and carry on their regional work at the same time. While there were a few examples of very specific and time-bound RPS deployments, frequent and unpredictable surge-support deployments may be very disruptive to an RPSs’ main workstreams.

## 2.2 Relevance and Coherence

58. For the purposes of this MTR, both Relevance and Coherence criteria are being examined together. Both are intrinsically interlinked in the case of the Joint Programme and it would be unwieldy to analyse each criteria separately. The extent of the programme’s coherence is greatly determined by the extent to which its relevance is valued in different country contexts and by different stakeholders.

59. **The Joint Programme was largely perceived as highly relevant to and coherently aligned with a wide range of national and UN stakeholders, both at the country, regional and global levels.** It was frequently described as an essential inter-stakeholder bridge, cross-pillar integrator and direct manifestation of the ways of working and priorities underlying [SDG16](#), the [UN Sustaining Peace Resolutions](#) and the Secretary-General’s recent [“Our Common Agenda.”](#) PDA/PDTs were regularly described as an “indispensable”, “vital”, “phenomenally important”, “mission critical” and “transformational” contribution to UN peace and development capacities and engagement. A good indicator of relevance is that requests for PDAs have increased year on year (13 requests in 2019, 16 requests in 2020 and 18 requests in 2021). The increasing visibility of and reference to the Joint Programme as a ‘flagship’ programme of the UN’s sustaining peace/prevention related agendas<sup>39</sup> is also indicative of the programme’s perceived relevance and coherence.

**“PDAs are an absolute critical capacity for RCs to have. You cannot underestimate the value of a good PDA.”**

KII EEOH

**“The Joint Programme and PDAs are without a doubt the best bit of the UN. They influence change.”**

KII ZGVZ

<sup>39</sup> Such as by the UN Deputy Secretary-General at the Third Joint Programme High-Level Partners Event (9 Feb 2022), “[T]he joint programme is a flagship cross pillar initiative that combines political engagement and sustainable development action.”

60. The most relevant PDA/PDTs were seen to avoid getting “stuck in processes” (i.e., endless meetings, emails, reports, talking points, strategies, etc.) and promoted a “bigger picture mindset” of entry points and strategic issues regarding national and UN capacities for sustaining peace.<sup>40</sup> In the best cases, PDA/PDTs were perceived to offer niche capacities that simply do not exist in the standard in-country UN Development System set-up, but which are essential in complex development contexts. Interviews strongly suggest that PDA/PDT/RPSs are regularly assessing: how can they best add value, how can they make themselves relevant to stakeholders and how do they best ‘fit in’? The programme’s overall perceived high degree of relevance and coherence among UN stakeholders is partly reinforced by a transparent Criticality Assessment exercise that involves inputs from UNDP, DPPA-DPO and RCs to select new and review ongoing PDA locations. While most new requests are not approved, the mechanism generates consensus on where the Joint Programme can be most relevant and its resources most coherently applied.

61. During most interviews, stakeholders were asked to describe the PDA/PDT/RPSs with one word. Though not scientific, the results in the below ‘word cloud’ provide an anecdotal indication of the relevance of PDA/PDT/RPSs (the larger the word-size, the more times it was used):

Graphic 1: “What is one word you would you to describe the PDA/PDT/RPS?”



<sup>40</sup> KII ZKDY.

62. Out of 243 responses, the five most frequently used words were:

- 15 occurrences: **connector**
- 10 occurrences: **indispensable**
- 6 occurrences: **advisor** | **facilitator**
- 5 occurrences: **collaboration** | **enabler** | **political** | **supportive** | **useful**
- 4 occurrences: **analytical** | **innovative** | **nexus** | **relevant**

63. Interestingly, most words relate positively to the relevance and added-value of PDA/PDT/RPSs and ‘how’ they operate, as opposed to their specific outputs or substantive areas of work. Only a very small slice of responses conveyed a negative perspective on PDA/PDT/RPS relevance.

### Joint Programme relevance for and coherence with national stakeholders

64. **Joint Programme relevance to differing national needs is partly evidenced by the diverse range of priorities and methods employed by PDA/PDTs.** While the plurality of PDA/PDT work in multiple contexts challenged efforts to demonstrate programme coherence at the global ‘aggregate’ level, the flexibility of delivery in-country was essential for ensuring programme relevance to and coherence with national contexts and stakeholders—this was necessary in especially challenging, fluid and fragile settings characterised by crises, changing counterparts and unpredictable transition trajectories. The end results were also not always perfect or easy to predict, but the nature and alignment of PDA/PDT work was usually heavily adapted to and continuously informed by collaborative and integrated analysis, feedback from diverse networks of national actors and exploration of feasible entry-points. As a result, PDA/PDTs were usually seen as highly relevant and sometimes indispensable contributors for catalysing, developing and operationalising national plans/strategies, different national ‘peace architectures’ modalities, electoral crisis/violence prevention efforts, safe dialogue spaces and other national capacities relating to sustaining peace/prevention. When necessary, remaining relevant on the ground trumped continuity. Successful PDA/PDTs were observed to be agile ‘opportunists’ and largely adapted to fit changing national dynamics and needs rather than clinging to planned activities at all costs. The most successful PDA/PDTs, however, were not only agile but coherently embedded their changing activities within underlying strategies and longer-term theories of change.

65. Stakeholders underscored different ways in which PDA/PDTs were relevant to the needs and priorities of national stakeholders—PDA/PDTs were perceived as:

- a cross-pillar manifestation of the UN’s offer as a third party impartial in support of sustaining peace/prevention—they were not constrained by the specific mandates, agendas and priorities of any particular agency;
- a less ‘threatening’ and ‘lower-key’ presence than a full-scale UN peace/political mission or other political intervention;
- not just present to resolve specific crises/processes, but to more wholistically support national stakeholders to ‘get ahead of the conflict curve’ and ultimately make more sustainable and effective contributions to medium- and long-term peace building;



- respected sources of technical expertise, advice and accompaniment with no strings attached and not expecting ‘attribution’ (i.e., allowing national stakeholders full ownership);
- gateways, networking hubs and integrators whose principal job was to better connect national, UN and international stakeholders; and
- facilitators, enabling stakeholders at all levels (international, regional, national and sub-national) to ‘connect the dots’ regarding information, analysis and vision, as well as translating these into action.

66. **However, PDA/PDTs may not be relevant to all national stakeholders and all contexts.** Inter-state conflicts and conflicts involving geostrategic political powers are situations where PDA/PDTs were often not perceived as having any immediate relevance by national stakeholders or otherwise were given virtually no space on the ground in which to operate.

### Joint Programme relevance for and coherence with the UN system

67. More generally, stakeholders underscored different ways in which PDA/PDTs were relevant to the needs and priorities of the UN system:

- there is simply no other UN capacity for cross-pillar political, conflict and context analysis and connecting that analysis to cross-pillar strategies and programmes;
- no one entity in UN development pillar is specifically ‘mandated’ for sustaining peace/prevention or structurally linked to the peace/security pillar—the UN needs an ‘integrator’ because no one entity can take responsibility;
- PDA/PDTs enabled the UN system to collect information, establish networks and engage national stakeholders in ways that higher profile UN leadership (i.e., RCs) and programmes are unable to, particularly as a means for preparing, testing and identifying for entry-points;
- PDA/PDTs were more likely to successfully mobilise UN technical, financial (particularly from the PBF and DPPA’s extra-budgetary Multi-Year Appeal funds) and leadership (i.e., good offices, preventative diplomacy, mediation, shuttle diplomacy) resources;
- PDA/PDTs built, facilitated, convened and coordinated collaborative and inclusive processes/networks, often across sectoral, organisational, social, political and other ‘divides’;
- PDA/PDTs performed or supported strategic/catalytic outreach, awareness raising, sensitisation and advocacy;
- PDA/PDTs provided niche and value-added technical advice/assistance, training, accompaniment and practice/experience exchange;
- PDA/PDTs fostered collaborative and integrated information sharing, data collection and information compilation processes and outputs;
- PDA/PDTs fostered collaborative, integrated and applied analytical processes, methodologies and products; and
- PDA/PDTs introduced, trialed, experimented with and adapted innovative technologies and practices.

68. **There are some indications that PDA/PDTs may have relevance in UN peace and political mission settings, which are for the most part excluded from the Joint Programme.** The Joint Programme could be deploying PDA/PDTs even further in advance of mission transitions to not only avoid potential deployment gaps

but to lend more substantive sustaining peace/prevention advisory support to transition processes and UNCTs. Although the MTR did not examine mission contexts, there were occasional anecdotal observations from informed stakeholders that UNCTs in mission settings would likely benefit from PDA/PDT support because mission elements generally do not extend significant analytical and other support capacities for sustaining peace/prevention to UNCTs.

69. **Different understandings and expectations of Joint Programme relevance among different UN stakeholders are testing the limits of the programme’s relevance and ability to maintain coherence.** Diverging expectations among elements of DPPA and UNDP have always introduced certain ‘frictions’ into the programme, which have largely been addressed over the years by cultivating collaborative and transparent governance, management and/or operational arrangements. However, these have been further accentuated with the UN Development System structural reforms. Frictions in general and beyond just the scope of the Joint Programme have emerged between some RCs and UNDP RRs. With the UN Development System structural reforms, DPPA and UNDP engagement with RCs now requires coordination with DCO, increasing the complexity of harmonising different expectations of the programme. PDA/PDT relationships with UNDP RRs and UNDP COs are also less direct now that UNDP RRs are the secondary rather than primary supervisors of PDA/PDTs.

70. More broadly, stakeholders frequently characterised the perceived relevance of the Joint Programme for different UN stakeholders in the following ways:

**Table 4: Joint Programme Relevance expectations among main UN stakeholders**

Stakeholder	Relevance expectation
DPPA	<p><b>Political affairs officers:</b> The predominant perspective of DPPA was that PDA/PDTs are vital on-the-ground sources for context and political information. DPPA-DPO desk officers / regional teams seek accurate and up-to-date picture of what is happening—their principal priority is information and analysis, which is the ‘bedrock’ for DPPA responses and engagement. In the barest terms, the Joint Programme provided DPPA with political affairs reporting/liaison officers for non-mission settings. Seeing the programme’s value and how PDA/PDTs are increasingly an essential element of DPPA engagements, the corporate level of DPPA has demonstrated increasing ownership of and resource mobilisation for the Joint Programme. However, many stakeholders pointed to a frequently one-side ‘extractive’ relationship between DPPA and PDA/PDTs, which led to missed opportunities for relevance.</p> <p><b>Experts and facilitators for effective delivery:</b> PDA/PDT relevance was different from the perspective of the ‘specialised’ divisions of DPPA (i.e., EAD, PBSO, PMD), which have less systematic engagement with PDA/PDTs. For non-regional divisions, PDA/PDTs have still been important inter-entity and cross-pillar bridges, provided the necessary ‘contextualisation’ advice for their technical interventions and often activated or provided essential support to their interventions in different contexts. PDA/PDTs were largely very active in facilitating PBF engagements in non-Peace Building Commission locations, often acting as ‘chief technical advisors’ to provide the necessary peace/conflict technical guidance for funding windows and project applications. PDA/PDT support to the context/conflict analysis pre-requisites for PBF funding have often been essential, because “you can’t get programming without good</p>

analysis.”<sup>41</sup> PDA/PDTs also often oversaw or advised in-country PBF secretariats. There is clearly more room and demand to explore closer PBF and Joint Programme synergies. Many stakeholders in specialised DPPA divisions would like to see more systematic induction opportunities, collaboration and exchange of practice with PDA/PDTs. PDA/PDTs were seen as a potentially deep pool of practical ‘on the ground’ experience that could be used to strengthen DPPA guidance, tools and policy. Closer and more systematic exchange would also enable PDA/PDTs to better access and understand the appropriate application of DPPA technical resources.

## UNDP

**UNDP programme design/implementation advisor:** PDA/PDTs’ relevance to UNDP depended on their ability to provide analytical, technical and process facilitation support to the design, adaptation and implementation of UNDP conflict sensitive development and prevention/peacebuilding programming—i.e., playing the role of a sustaining peace/prevention programme ‘chief technical advisor.’ Reports and analysis were important, but only as far as they concretely aided design and implementation of UNDP programmes.

However, understandings and expectations of the Joint Programme varied across UNDP. This was partly a result of UNDP’s large and decentralised nature. It was also because sustaining peace/prevention is still making something of a ‘come back’ as a core organisational priority. UNDP only reinstated a crisis-focused bureau in 2019 and continues to rebuild its corporate capabilities, offers and ownership for sustaining peace/prevention. In this context, some within UNDP felt the Joint Programme and UNDP’s participation in associated peace/security pillar coordination, policy and decision-making processes has ensured that sustaining peace/prevention remains on UNDP’s agenda. That said, some stakeholders felt that the principal alignment of PDA/PDTs under RCs has been a significant corporate loss for UNDP programming. Different regional bureaus and UNDP COs also assumed varying postures and engagement with the Joint Programme based on their ownership of sustaining peace/prevention and their expectations of what the programme could offer to UNDP programming. Some UNDP COs have developed their own in-house sustaining peace/prevention expertise and do not see PDA/PDTs as providing additional relevant value.

More fundamentally, however, UNDP perspective of the programme’s relevance was pulled in two directions: i.) the corporate perspective that the Joint Programme is principally an asset for the UN system and ii.) the perspectives of regional bureaus and COs that generally felt the Joint Programme should principally be an asset for UNDP programming.

Given the above dynamics, some PDA/PDTs were not getting the necessary relevance ‘traction’ with some hesitant/reluctant UNDP COs. In a few worst-case scenarios, some UNDP CO programme staff even viewed the Joint Programme as a competitor.

## RCs

**PDA/PDTs demonstrated the greatest relevance to and most significant value for RCs—they were regularly referred to as one of the most important and vital RC resources, and as a principal instrument for the ways of working and priorities underlying the new ‘Our Common Agenda’. They were generally preferred to perform an advisory role, rather than operational/programmatic. PDA/PDTs provided multiple essential services to RCs:**

<sup>41</sup> KII XDMG.

- **RC's special 'political' advisor and 'liaison' officer:** PDA/PDTs' relevance depended on their ability to strengthen the RC's political acumen, access to decision-makers/informants and ability to navigate risky contexts. They were most valuable when their analysis/advice goes deep (not just 'news summaries'), contextualises political and conflict risk in development terms and focuses on 'so what does this mean?' for the UN.
- **Strategic process and collaboration facilitators:** Whether for CCAs, UNCT conflict prevention strategies, specialised analysis (e.g., risk, conflict, LNOB, etc.) or sometimes processes/thematics that are not strictly related to sustaining peace/prevention, PDA/PDTs usually facilitated strategic collaboration, broke-down siloes and built new inclusive connections. There was evidence that most PDA/PDTs have played important or essential roles in formulating the latest generation of CCA/UNSDCFs and integrating aspects of sustaining peace/prevention.
- **Coordinators:** PDA/PDTs were usually involved in establishing, maintaining and/or supporting UNCT platforms or international development/political coordination mechanisms related to sustaining peace/prevention.
- **Resource mobilisers:** On a practical level, PDA/PDTs were usually perceived to be excellent mobilisers of PBF and sometimes other resources, which helped incentivise RCs, UNCTs and agencies. In many locations, PDA/PDTs played key roles facilitating and accompanying the design and submission of joint project concepts/documents.

Frequently, beyond their standard TORs, PDA/PDTs have been expected to be a 'jack-of-all-trades' and an extra pair of competent hands supporting the RC and/or RCO in development coordination. Some have observed that RC/RCO workloads are higher than ever and every contribution to RC capacity needs to support this. While this may seem inappropriate on the surface, some PDA/PDTs commented that this had its advantages. It cemented their value and networks across the RCO, UNCT and other development partners. It also allowed PDA/PDTs to 'infiltrate' sustaining peace/prevention across different areas. However, in some cases, it went too far and PDA/PDTs were directed away from their core work. In a few locations, PDAs were effectively being reserved as personal advisors for the RC rather than as an asset that is accessible to the UNCT and UNDP CO.

## UNCTs

**UN system asset for programming and resource mobilisation:** PDA/PDTs' relevance to UNCTs depended on their ability to provide analytical, technical and process facilitation support to the design, adaptation and implementation of UNCT and UN agency conflict sensitive development and prevention/peacebuilding programming. PDA/PDTs' ability to mobilise PBF and other resources was also highly valued by UNCTs. Where these two things were happening, which is many cases, UNCTs saw a high degree of relevance.

That said, relevance to UNCTs also often depended on PDA/PDTs: supporting UNCT situational awareness, scenario planning and risk management; building new UNCT skill sets and changing mindsets through analysis and training; and facilitating UNCT access to national stakeholders.

Certain factors inhibited the Joint Programme from consistently reaching optimal relevance for UNCTs and UN agencies. There were varying levels of UNCT confusion regarding 'what is on offer' from the Joint Programme and misunderstandings of how PDA/PDTs might be relevant to UNCTs. Optimal relevancy has sometimes been undermined by UN agency 'conflict hesitancy' (noted under **Effectiveness-Outcome 2**), as well as occasional agency wariness that PDA/PDTs are simply an extension of an 'interfering' UNDP or RC. Because UN agencies are principally led and incentivised by

their individual corporate agendas, ‘whole-of-system’ and ‘integration’ oriented PDA/PDTs were sometimes undervalued or at best ‘tolerated’ by UN agencies. The UN Development System structural reforms may also have somewhat diminished the value of PDA/PDTs to UNCTs by disrupting the direct relationship between PDA/PDTs and agency programming—as PDA/PDTs have become more involved in high-level UNCT frameworks and strategies, some have become more distant from playing a concrete part in UN agency programming. Lastly, there were still some situations where RCs hindered PDA/PDTs’ relevance to the UNCT and UN agencies. Some RCs demonstrated ‘conflict hesitancy’ or felt the work of the PDA was ‘too sensitive’ to share with the UNCT or wider agency programme teams. As noted under **Effectiveness-Outcome 2**, there were some situations where RCs effectively used PDA/PDTs as personal advisors or coordination officers in the RCO rather than enabling full UNCT access to what should be system assets.

### UN system at the global level

**Vertical and horizontal integrator, potentially:** Overall, the Joint Programme is still seeking to concretely demonstrate its relevance to UN entities at the global level in addition to its core ‘tripartite’ stakeholders (UNDP, DPPA, DCO). While the Joint Platform could theoretically play a cornerstone role for a coherent UN sustaining peace/prevention platform that vertically connects the local with the global while facilitating horizontal cross-pillar integration, such a concept is far ahead of current system thinking and structures.

Joint Programme relevance and coherence with additional UN entities at the global level (such as with OHCHR, UN Women, UN Volunteers, OCHA and UNICEF) varied overtime, but has been less coherent and consistent in recent years. This was partly a function of reduced in-person events due to the pandemic. It was also suggested that the Secretariat and management have been more heavily focused on building strong relations among the new tripartite arrangements between UNDP, DPPA and DCO than other intra-UN relationships.

At the senior UN leadership level, the Joint Programme was frequently cited in the Secretary-General’s annual reports since 2018 on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace. Few stakeholders suggested that senior UN leadership levels in the peace/security and development pillars or in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General had significant awareness of or substantive engagement with the Joint Programme.

## Joint Programme relevance for and coherence with external international partners

71. Different funding partners view the Joint Programme from different perspectives. Some perceived the Joint Programme as a ‘fix’ for systemic sustaining peace/prevention capacity gaps for RCs and UNCTs that Member States have yet to resolve. Despite a very specific Results Framework, some funding partners sought a more ambitious agenda that sees the Joint Programme and PDA/PDTs achieving more direct conflict prevention and peacebuilding impacts. Some funding partners were also advocating the programme integrate additional specific result areas or issues of focus.

72. In-country, there was evidence that PDA/PDTs regularly liaised and shared information/analysis with bilateral and multilateral development/diplomatic missions, as well as frequently facilitated or coordinated international engagement on specific issues and/or processes. This took many forms (formal and informal, at both working and ambassadorial/heads of aid levels) and happened in response to local needs and PDA/PDT

predisposition rather than as a systematic effort driven by specific global Joint Programme guidelines. This also occurred at the regional level where RPSs have increasingly facilitated engagement and coordination among regional and sub-regional organisations, such as on cross-border issues and approaches. Interviews suggested that external bilateral/multilateral stakeholders usually at least perceived these as ‘welcomed’ and ‘useful’, but not always essential. In some circumstances, PDA/PDTs provided indispensable services to catalyse coherent international collaboration and establish/revitalise coordinated international responses at critical moments. PDA/PDTs’ relevance to bilateral/multilateral missions depended on their ability to: freely exchange ‘inside’ information and original impartial analysis; map out and convey ‘who is doing what’ for coordination purposes; facilitate common understandings and translate these into international stakeholder agendas and strategies; network international and national stakeholders, whether formally or informally; etc. Importantly, PDA/PDTs served as a UN one-stop shop on sustaining peace/prevention for bilateral/multilateral missions in-country: “Before there was a PDA, there was no ‘political officer’ at the UN for the embassy to engage with. The arrival of the PDA not only enabled real embassy engagement with the UN on PVE but the PDA also emphasised and enabled more urgent coordination among international actors to address emerging priorities.”<sup>42</sup>

73. The Joint Programme’s relevance and engagement with IFIs is generally less visible and more *ad hoc*. There are no Joint Programme guidelines organising this as a systemic global effort. There were examples when PDA/PDTs supported the development and implementation of joint IFI/UN assessments and action plans/strategies, as did RPSs at the sub-regional/cross-border level. On balance, Joint Programme relevance for and coherence with IFIs has largely been a tertiary priority; it generally occurs when opportunities allow rather than resulting from any systemic approaches by the Joint Programme.

**Most essential and relevant PDA/PDT/RPS skill sets**

Stakeholders identified a wide spectrum of the most essential and relevant skills sets required by PDA/PDT/RPSs (see **Table 5**), though they also recognised that the relevance of skill sets is highly dependent on the particulars of a context and the UN system’s needs in that location. While expertise or grounding in specific ‘thematic areas’ was appreciated, most stakeholders first prioritised key ‘soft’ skills—that the personal attributes of PDA/PDT/RPSs were usually the most essential ingredient for their success. Stakeholders appreciated the diversity of capacities within the PDA cadre, but also suggested that some of these were ‘uneven’—not all PDA/PDT/RPSs come to the table with the same understanding of conflict sensitivity, sustaining peace/prevention, gender/WPS, programming and human rights.

**Table 5: Most essential and relevant PDA/PDT/RPS skill sets**



Typology	Skills Sets
Core ‘soft skills’	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ diplomatic skills and political acumen</li> <li>○ emotional intelligence, social acumen and inter-personal communications</li> <li>○ critical and ‘systems’ thinking</li> </ul>

<sup>42</sup> KII HRWB.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ collaborative leadership</li> <li>○ inter-organisational, cross-pillar and multi-stakeholder networking at international, national and sub-national levels</li> <li>○ ability to build rapport, trust and collaboration in multi-stakeholder contexts</li> <li>○ cultural awareness and sensitivity</li> </ul>
<b>Core technical skills</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ results-based project/programme design and management</li> <li>○ political analysis, including deeper and structured political-economy analysis</li> <li>○ conflict research/analysis, including flexible application of relevant UN methodologies but also new innovative methods (CRD, use of digital/data technologies and visualisation, etc.)</li> <li>○ communication skills, especially coherent written skills and report writing</li> <li>○ adult learning/training methodologies</li> <li>○ deep country/context knowledge, including native or learned language skills</li> </ul>
<b>Core thematic areas</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ conflict sensitivity</li> <li>○ sustaining peace / conflict prevention</li> <li>○ electoral violence prevention</li> <li>○ social cohesion</li> <li>○ PVE</li> <li>○ hate speech</li> <li>○ people-to-people conflict prevention/resolution processes</li> <li>○ negotiation</li> <li>○ mediation</li> <li>○ gender equality, women's empowerment and WPS</li> <li>○ digital technologies in peace building and conflict prevention</li> <li>○ human rights</li> <li>○ media, social media and sentiment monitoring</li> <li>○ climate security</li> </ul>

## 2.3 Efficiency

74. **The Joint Programme does not systematically monitor for efficiency.** It does not maintain internal criteria, data or monitoring systems that assess the efficiency of management process or identify efficiency problems. The MTR was also not specifically equipped to conduct a detailed financial review of the Joint Programme. Therefore, this analysis only highlights aspects of programme efficiency that became most obvious over the course of the MTR process.



75. **In examining Efficiency, it is important to note the rapid expansion of the scale of the Joint Programme.** The programme has seen continuous growth in revenue and expenditure over the last 10-years. The annual expenditure of the Joint Programme has grown more than eight-times its size from 10 years ago (715%). Expenditure has grown 175% in the last 5-years and 76% in the last 3-years. To give some perspective, over 53% of the last decade’s worth of Joint Programme expenditure occurred in the last three years (2019-21). Some comparison with the UN global PBF also gives a sense of scale. For the last three years (2019-21), the Joint Programme operated PDA/PDTs across roughly 64 countries/territories while the PBF has deployed funds to 58 (39 of which had a PDA/PDT present). During the last 3-years, Joint Programme expenditure was roughly 12.6% that of the PBF (or about 1/8<sup>th</sup>).

76. **The Joint Programme does not spend all revenue in order to build and maintain a strategic reserve.** Basic observations indicate that programme resource uptake and delivery are largely satisfactory even though the programme has built-up a very large holdover year-to-year. This is purposeful and is not ‘under-spend’ or a reflection of inefficiency. The programme has built and maintained this reserve as a strategic risk management measure to provide for roughly a 2-year payroll period. This protects UNDP as the contracting entity from personnel contractual obligations in the event that funding for the Joint Programme ceases or is significantly disrupted or decreased.



77. **There were frequent observations from stakeholders that the costs of deploying PDA/PDTs in a preventative mode paled in comparison to larger scale special political missions and peacekeeping operations.** UN peace operations in roughly a dozen countries/territories cost upwards of USD 6.5 billion a year; more than one stakeholder suggested that the relatively minor costs of deploying Joint Programme resources to countries at any risk of crisis or tension was an efficient investment in ‘prevention insurance’. As noted earlier, PDA/PDTs were also frequently observed to play instrumental roles in mobilising additional sustaining peace/preventions resources from the PBF, the DPPA Multi Year Appeal and other sources that were many times the value of the original costs of deploying the PDA/PDT. More in-depth monitoring and tracking by the Joint Programme would likely reveal a PDA/PDT cost/leverage factor that demonstrates how hundreds of thousands of Joint Programme dollars often leverages additional millions of dollars for sustaining peace/prevention.

**Overall efficient use of resources**

78. **The Secretariat and management generally prioritise maximizing use of funds to deploy assets for delivery on Outcomes 1 and 2.** Roughly 87% of total expenditure during the last 3-years went towards ‘deployments’, primarily PDA/PDTs (but also interim PDAs and other short-term deployments) and the six Regional Programme Specialists deployed since 2020. Secretariat operational costs as a proportion of overall expenditure remain low at 8% of total expenditure over the last three years.

**Table 6: Programme expenditure by spending category<sup>43</sup>**

Year	Deployments Expenditure (USD)	Seed Funding Expenditure (USD)	Event & Retreats Expenditure (USD)	Secretariat Expenditure (USD)	Total Expenditure (USD)
2019	11,313,966.38	310,024.24	606,996.12	1,006,922.65	13,237,909.39
2020	14,440,078.35	420,848.36	107,129.58	1,428,723.08	16,396,779.37
2021	17,406,555.54	797,520.88	296,327.19	1,608,791.42	20,109,035.55
<i>As % of Total</i>	<b>87%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>100%</b>

79. **Although a few stakeholders questioned the value for money achieved through retreats and other peer-to-peer learning events, this was largely a small portion of expenditure during the current programme cycle.** Spending on this has dropped considerably during the last two years of the global pandemic where in-person events have largely not been possible and the programme experimented with virtual modalities (which might be further refined for future efficiency savings).

80. **Though not quantified, the Joint programme also regularly leveraged additional in-kind contributions, secondees and complementary programme implementation funding (such as for training) and considers these important efficiency multipliers.** The Secretariat and management have also sought to leverage basic office,

<sup>43</sup> Expenditure data presented is from working figures provided by the Joint Programme Secretariat. These are indicative and not intended as representing an ‘auditable’ financial statement for the Joint Programme.

administrative and travel budget costs of PDA/PDT deployments from partner RCOs, UNDP COs and UNCT agencies. Though the Joint Programme can authorize up to USD 9,000 (and slightly more in exceptional cases) annually to PDAs for such costs, administering these transactions across multiple countries is time consuming. Moreover, cost-sharing by in-country UN entities is seen as demonstrating a genuine partnership and the programme's relevance.

81. **The increasing deployment of national PDAs was mooted as an important efficiency lesson and step by the Joint Programme.** There were circumstances in which national PDAs offered considerable advantages and played indispensable roles while being more cost effective than an international PDA. But national PDAs had their own drawbacks and were not the optimal modality in all circumstances. Most stakeholders saw national and international PDAs as complementary assets rather than as 'substitutional'.

### Programme management tools and systems

82. **As already outlined in Effectiveness-Programme Management, the programme is experiencing challenges in the effective and efficient application of certain management systems and tools.** Some challenges stemmed from Secretariat and management capacity deficits. But the uneven application of some tools/systems indicates that they were not working as intended and need to be adapted. Certain results-based management and M&E tools/systems were particularly perceived as burdensome and there is lack of convergence between planning and monitoring tools. Challenges with programme management tools/systems have had a negative effect in many ways on PDA/PDT/RPs, Secretariat and management workloads and have detracted from optimal efficiency. While most staff have 'pushed through' and 'just worked harder and longer', management tools/systems need to become more efficient; otherwise, the Joint Programme risks decreasing returns on effectiveness and relevance, as well as staff burnout.

### Human resource, recruitment and roster management

83. **As already outlined in Effectiveness-Programme Management, the new PDA Roster has not been conducted in the efficient and timely manner as originally envisioned and has imposed significant strain on the Secretariat and management.** The Roster process was intended to considerably increase the quality and diversity of the PDA talent pipeline and ensure much more efficient recruitment processes that could better match the increasing demands of an expanding programme. However, the overall process began nearly two years ago and still has not been completed. Management and the Secretariat did not adequately foresee the scale of interest by potential applicants and put in place the capacities necessary to efficiently deliver such an ambitious and complex process. For some context, the initial P5 PDA Roster exercise in 2016 received 466 applications and took roughly 7 months; therefore, some stakeholders argued that such an exponentially larger applicant pool this time around (3,621 applicants after pre-screening) could never have been anticipated. Moreover, the workload strain from the delayed Roster process was compounded by the Joint Programme having to then simultaneously conduct a large number of external PDA and short-term PDA recruitments because the roster was not available.

84. **The Joint Programme took measures to course correct on the Roster.** Additional specialised capacities were brought in from UN Volunteers. The Joint Programme was also able to leverage relationships across DPPA-DPO (including the PBSO), UNDP, RCOs and the PDA cadre and other parts of the system to handle the bulky evaluation stages of the applicant evaluation process. However, the overwhelming scale of what was needed to

evaluate several thousand applications was unanticipated and was conducted largely on an ‘all hands-on deck’ exigency basis; this will be difficult to replicate in the future. On the positive side, the Roster process was perceived to have successfully put in place: an extended and inclusive vacancy announcement/media campaign that attracted increased female applicants and applicants from the Global South; processes to involve PDAs, DPPA and UNDP collaboratively in the design and implementation of application evaluations; trainings and coaching for application evaluators to improve their evaluation consistency and lower unintentional exclusionary biases; and necessary quality assurance and discrepancy reviews during evaluation stages to ensure fairness in evaluating female and Global South applications.

85. **The Roster was meant to be a major efficiency gain; instead, it has significantly overwhelmed programme management for an extended period.** Capacities necessary to maintain and update the new Roster as an enhanced human resources/talent management asset need to be anticipated so that the Roster will not again undermine overall programme management effectiveness and efficiency.

## 2.4 Sustainability

86. **The Joint Programme does not monitor or have specific metrics for sustainability.** There have been efforts during this programme cycle to establish a baseline and track progress towards the establishment/strengthening of national capacities for sustaining peace/prevention in programme countries (‘Outcome 1 Matrices’). However, these largely subjective and narrative tools are still nascent. It is too early to determine if they will be effective and efficient means for tracking results over the long-term and gauging the sustainability of Joint Programme interventions in specific countries, as well as at the global aggregate level. Although the Criticality Assessment is useful for prioritising the allocation of Joint Programme deployments to the ‘neediest’ locations, it does not assess whether the programme is achieving sustainable results in target locations and does not determine programme ‘exit’ based on this.

87. **There was little evidence that most PDA/PDTs develop or follow explicit ‘exit strategies.’** While PDA/PDT deployments have largely become medium- to long-term deployments, they generally did not have specific strategies outlining the results and conditions under which their presence would no longer be required. That said, there was wide recognition among stakeholders that PDA/PDTs should ultimately be working to ‘put themselves out of a job’ and that the Joint Programme should continue to assess changing conditions and national/UN capacities to determine when it is time for the Joint Programme to adapt, scale-down and/or ‘exit’. A critique leveled at the Joint Programme was that if it was achieving sustainable results, then why have so few PDA posts been discontinued in the last several years?

88. **Joint Programme management largely recognises that effective, relevant and sustainable PDA/PDT engagements need at least a medium-term outlook** (though there will be some specific short-term interventions that should be exceptions to this). The Joint Programme now largely deploys PDA/PDTs on the basis of multi-year engagements (anywhere from 2-5 years) rather than the previous year-to-year arrangement. For the most part, PDA/PDT postings have become longer in duration. Interviews with stakeholders inside and outside of the programme suggested this may reflect greater realisation that such engagements more sustainably address the deep-rooted nature of many conflicts and promote the necessarily longer-term and non-linear pathways towards sustaining peace/prevention.

89. **The Joint Programme has expanded the deployment of national PDAs as one avenue for sustainably building national capacities.** This is partly justified by experiences where national PDAs' better access to national stakeholders and context awareness frequently enabled the UN to better understand the most relevant, effective and sustainable pathways towards building national capacities. It is also premised on the aspiration that national PDAs—imbued with deeper skills sets, experiential palettes and value systems for sustaining peace gained through the Joint Programme—will eventually 'recycle' through national leadership roles and institutions. Once in these roles, they will be more likely and more capable to positively influence national capacities for sustaining peace/prevention or themselves become influential peacebuilders. This is still a 'theoretical' premise; there was evidence that many national PDAs rather aspire to become international PDAs and senior UN management than remain as 'peace activists' in their home countries.

### 3. MID-TERM REVIEW CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

90. This section outlines conclusions and recommendations made based on the evaluation findings above. These are intended to inform more immediate adjustments during the current programme phase as well as to inform the longer-term design and management of future iterations of the Joint Programme.

#### 3.1 Programme Performance Conclusions

91. **In its totality, the MTR finds that the Joint Programme has demonstrated a positive trajectory of programme implementation that meets standards and expectations. The near universal regard that the Joint Programme provides crucial and sometimes essential value for UN sustaining peace and prevention efforts cannot be over-emphasised. There is strong demand for this strategic capacity to not only continue but for a further evolution that would deepen its effectiveness.** The Joint Programme is meeting and exceeding standards and expectations in some aspects of Outcomes 1 and 2, though it is also experiencing challenges that result in real or perceived sub-optimal performance (as well as risk sub-optimal performance in the future). Overall, the MTR has not discovered anything to suggest that the Joint Programme is failing major components outlined in the Programme Document or suffering any ‘existential’ failings. Stakeholders frequently identified programme challenges during the MTR, but they also cautioned the MTR: “don’t try to fix what’s not broken.”

92. **A minority of programme stakeholders have strong perceptions that the Joint Programme does not provide full value, is duplicating existing capabilities/roles and that resources would alternatively be more effectively used for direct sustaining peace/prevention programming.** Some of this stems from internal ‘turf’ contention among UN entities, but also perhaps misplaced expectations about what the programme is intended to actually achieve. Resources for sustaining peace are also limited, so many stakeholders simply do not prioritise the type of strategic ‘overhead’ the Joint Programme represents and want to ‘just get on with it’. There are indications that a ‘one-UN’ is still a work in progress. In many operational contexts, some UN stakeholders do not have the time or inclination for sustaining peace/prevention agendas or UN system-wide approaches. A few stakeholders suggested that PDA/PDT/RPS functions could be more effectively carried out as an integrated UNDP service line/platform under its corporate ‘integrator mandate’ that is meant to serve as a foundation for a strong and coherent UN development system that advances the SDGs.

**Table 7: MTR Programme Performance Rating**

Evaluation Criteria	Rating				
	Major improvements needed	Some improvements needed	Meets standards and expectations	Often exceeds standards and expectations	Consistently exceeds standards and expectations
Effectiveness— Outcome 1					
Effectiveness— Outcome 2					

Effectiveness— Prog Gov & Mng't					
Relevance & Coherence					
Efficiency					
Sustainability					

93. **In the aggregate, the Joint Programme is meeting standards and expectations for effectiveness.** The Joint Programme is mostly succeeding in doing what it said it would do. At the outcome level, the programme is meeting and often exceeding expectations. While having to navigate significantly challenging operating contexts and expectations, PDA/PDTs are creating space, planting seeds and adding value for national capacities in many ways. Effectiveness is more apparent regarding UN in-country capacities for sustaining peace/prevention, where the programme sometimes exceeds expectations in certain aspects and locations. The Joint Programme is experiencing ‘growing pains’ as it expands and faces effectiveness challenges in programme governance and management. The new tripartite-management of PDA/PDT/RPS is not working well everywhere. The programme also needs to more fundamentally reckon with how it can best deliver value to the UN-system given new UN structural reforms. Significant governance and management improvements and capacities have been put in place during the current programme cycle, but the Secretariat and management are straining at the seams with the scale and complexity of the expanded programme.

94. **The Joint Programme and PDA/PDT/RPSs are nearly universally regarded as offering considerable and sometimes essential relevance to national stakeholders and the UN system.** There is strong evidence that most stakeholders support the Joint Programme’s objectives as relevant and that PDA/PDT/RPSs find flexible and responsive ways in which to coherently ‘fit in’ with the national and UN systems of different contexts. **Feedback to the MTR frequently emphasised that there is simply no other UN capacity currently positioned and capable to do the cross-pillar and integrated analytical, advisory and capacity support necessary for advancing sustaining peace/prevention agendas.** The programme has often exceeded standards and expectations where PDA/PDT/RPSs contributed pioneering approaches and/or went well beyond standard methods to infuse sustaining peace/prevention into UNCT development processes, strategies and programming. For the most part, PDA/PDT/RPSs seek to adapt to the changing needs and priorities of national stakeholders and emerging trends, though this can be exceedingly difficult in ‘closed’, complex and fluid contexts.

95. **The Joint Programme offers ‘good value’ but needs to adapt, strengthen and improve internal management tools/systems in order to better measure and optimise programme efficiency.** From what can be observed of management behaviour and documentation, the Joint Programme actively seeks efficient and economic delivery. At the forefront of planning is how programme funds can be efficiently allocated to maximize PDA/PDT deployments. The Secretariat and management make cost/benefit considerations and seek to get the best value for money in all activities, as well as how to strategically leverage additional external resources through mutually beneficial partnerships. Interviewed stakeholders did not convey compelling arguments that similar results could be achieved through a more economical model. Greater use of national PDAs is often identified as one avenue for more cost effectiveness; however, simply replacing international PDAs with national PDAs will not

be an effective approach in all contexts. As already highlighted under **Effectiveness**, internal management systems and tools are reaching their limits and detracting from optimal programme efficiency.

96. **Programme sustainability mostly meets standards and expectations, though it needs to adapt, strengthen and improve internal management tools/systems in order to better measure and optimise programme sustainability.** Sustainability for in-country interventions has become more likely given the clearer programme TOCs and the at least medium-term durations now considered for PDA/PDT deployments. The expanded deployment of national PDAs is also one important avenue for sustainably building national capacities (though many national PDAs seek to eventually become international PDAs). There are some inherent challenges for sustainability of capacities for sustaining peace/prevention. While the programme may achieve certain effective results for a given period, contexts do not stand still and capacities need revitalizing and adaptation.

### 3.2 Additional Conclusions

97. **While the distribution of activities, outputs and results between Outcome 1 and Outcome 2 vary from context to context, Outcome 2 appears to receive greater engagement and investment in the aggregate.** In the best case situations, PDA/PDTs seek to strike a balance in building national capacities and those of the UN system there is balanced focus at the country-level on both Outcomes. However, PDA/PDTs are confronted in many contexts by dilemmas over which Outcome takes precedence. While the expected results and indicators in the Monitoring Framework appear realistic in the aggregate (though ‘quantitative’ and not reflective of qualitative impact), the MTR suggests stakeholders should be mindful that, “because PDA/PDTs work in such diverse and differing contexts, stakeholders cannot expect every PDA/PDT in every context to work on 100% of all Monitoring Framework outcomes and outputs at once [...] The Joint Programme balances out and delivers on all aspects of the Monitoring Framework, but the precise mix of activities and results are different in each country. These also change over time with changing contexts.”<sup>44</sup>

98. **The Joint Programme clearly operates and delivers results within the outcome domains of UNDP’s and DPPA’s corporate strategic plans<sup>45</sup> and many targets of SDG16, as well as other SDGs.** It was not within the ability of the MTR to quantify and assess the Joint Programme’s overall contribution to corporate results. Moreover, there is the challenge of differentiating attribution between contributions by the Joint Programme proper and those of UNDP and DPPA proper to their corporate results. In many situations, PDA/PDTs closely facilitate, accompany, inform, implement and otherwise support UNDP and DPPA efforts; the work is integrated and the role of PDA/PDTs is often ‘invisible’, so drawing lines of attribution is highly problematic. It is even more problematic to begin to assess the extent of the Joint Programme’s global contribution to SDG16 and the wider 2030 Agenda. However, stakeholders frequently believed that deploying a PDA/PDT significantly improved the chances of elevating the sustaining peace/prevention agendas and SDG16 in-country. In different contexts, the Joint Programme is also believed to be contributing to the operationalisation of other global agendas/strategies, such as UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech.

99. **The Joint Programme is somewhat (unfairly) shouldering the accountability burden for UN system sustaining peace/prevention impacts.** While expectations and accountability are high for a PDA/PDT to mobilise

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<sup>44</sup> KII ZKDY.

<sup>45</sup> Though it is important to note that current UNDP and DPPA Strategic Plans came online after the start of the current Joint Programme cycle.

the UN system towards advancement of the sustain peace/prevention agendas, there are no mechanisms holding UNCTs accountable to advance these. **The Joint Programme only possesses two tools for mobilising RCs and UNCTs: ‘persuasion’ (analysis/advice) and ‘incentivisation’ (through resource mobilisation).** Even when PDA/PDTs are successful in building capacities, establishing strategic frameworks and instigating programme, they cannot be held accountable for what stakeholders do or not do with these. There are real limitations on what greater sustaining peace/prevention impacts that PDA/PDT/RPSs can reasonably achieve. The Joint Programme might explore how the UN Development System ‘Management and Accountability Framework’<sup>46</sup> could be used to appraise UNCT members contribution to sustaining peace/prevention commitments in-country.

100. **There is a need to be realistic about what the Joint Programme can achieve in any given context with a solo PDA or small PDT.** Some stakeholders have ambitious expectations of what the Joint Programme can achieve regarding sustaining peace and prevention on the ground. They are expecting that “Member States are better equipped to mitigate the risks of conflict and fragility”<sup>47</sup> will automatically translate to ‘more peace’. Programme success has likely led to increasingly inflated expectations that the Joint Programme should have direct sustaining peace/prevention impacts; that “there is a total discrepancy between global discussions about the programme and what can be reasonably achieved by a single person”<sup>48</sup> in most countries. Modest expectations are needed for the macro-level ‘peace’ impacts that an individual PDA or small PDT can have: “The Joint Programme is a small contribution. Even with superhero PDAs, people need to be realistic about results.”<sup>49</sup> In addition, others strongly suggested that “PDAs are like petri-dishes, you never know exactly how they will translate into measurable results” and those results are generally incremental, non-linear and often “don’t show a difference until much later.”<sup>50</sup> PDA/PDTs are having impact, but whether these directly contribute to peace in a given country over the long-term is not only untested but also not the direct objective of the programme.

101. **Joint Programme relevance is partly undermined by increasing ‘expectation dissonance’, which is contributing to real and perceived sub-optimal performance in some locations. There are risks that relevance and coherence will suffer if the Joint Programme tries to be ‘all things to everyone’.** As outlined earlier, the spectrum of stakeholders and diversity of their expectations is extremely wide. Expectations have grown and proliferated as the scale and ambition of the Joint Programme have grown: “Everybody sees the value, but now wants more and more.” Expectation dissonance has also increased as a result of UN Development System structural reforms and not just because of unclear tripartite reporting lines. In some locations, there are significantly contending expectations between DCO/RCs, UNDP/RRs and DPPA-DPO about the relevance, role and priorities of PDA/PDT/RPSs under their supervision. As already noted above, dissonance also reflects unrealistic expectations about the Joint Programme’s ‘peace’ impact in any given country. It has become more challenging to maintain coherent expectations about the Joint Programme as stakeholders test the elasticity of the Joint Programme’s relevance and the role/functions of PDA/PDT/RPSs.

102. **Programme effectiveness and efficiency are not only a matter of deploying the maximum number of PDAs per dollar—more needs to be sensibly invested in ‘management overhead’.** As the Joint Programme’s scale

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<sup>46</sup> Which states: “The RC formally appraises UNCT members for their contribution to agreed results as defined in the UN Cooperation Framework and other inter agency agreements, through inputs to their agency’s performance appraisal system as part of the regular assessment.”

<sup>47</sup> From the programme’s Theory of Change section, Joint Programme ProDoc (Dec 2018), p.13.

<sup>48</sup> KII LOHI.

<sup>49</sup> KII GQTZ

<sup>50</sup> KII VWMP.



has expanded, it does not seem to have consistently considered that continuing programme success depends on significantly increased management capabilities to deal with significantly increased demands and expectations. The Joint Programme is already starting to experience efficiency and effectiveness challenges partly because investments in human resource/talent management, quality assurance and results-based management/M&E, knowledge management/learning, strategic partnerships and programme management tools/systems have not kept pace with programme expansion.

103. **The Joint Programme's concept of PDA/PDT 'exit strategy' needs revisiting because it does not reflect the long-term and non-linear nature of building capacities for sustaining peace/prevention in many programme locations.** There were strong reflections that most PDA posts should probably be designed from a starting premise that they will be long-term engagements (i.e., 5-10 years), barring any radical context changes. It was also suggested that agile 'sustainability strategies' would be a more effective and realistic way of guiding PDA/PDT priorities, measuring results/sustainability and determining when conditions are right for scaling-down programme engagement.

104. **Lastly, there is no long-term 'gameplan' for the PDA/PDT capacity: whether it should evolve into a 'core' system capacity, continue via a voluntarily funded programme modality or something in-between.** While PDA/PDTs were frequently considered so essential that the UN Development System ought to consider making them core competencies, there were also clear arguments why this would not be politically acceptable and how this might diminish some of the special value that PDA/PDTs bring as part of a global inter-entity and cross-pillar effort. There were reflections that the Joint Programme was an important node for integrative sustaining peace/prevention approaches within the UN, but that the system was still lacking a globally integrative cross-pillar platform for sustaining peace/prevention. Predicting the future conflict landscape, the UN's place in it and future UN system evolutions (especially as 2030 approaches) is highly speculative; however, the landscape looks more challenging than ever before, which means there will likely be increasing demand for the capacities delivered by the Joint Programme. Stakeholders should begin reflecting now on a long-term possible vision and associated pros, cons and risks for the Joint Programme, not just on how to better design the next ProDoc.

### 3.3 Recommendations

105. **While the Joint Programme is performing well, aspects are under strain and management should consider that the programme has reached an important inflection point in its evolution.** Significant reflection and adjustments are necessary to maintain or improve programme effectiveness, relevance, coherence, efficiency and sustainability. There are strong indications that the Joint Programme cannot continue with 'business as usual' or just simply continue to 'scale-up'. On this basis, the MTR presents the following recommendations for consideration:

#### 1. Instigate an 'expectation reset' with Joint Programme core stakeholders and funding partners.

*This might entail the Joint Programme, DPPA and UNDP:*

- Convening internal and external consultations regarding a long-term vision over what value and capacities are realistically delivered through the Joint Programme and the most appropriate delivery modalities for the future;

- Encouraging and contributing to an examination of how country-level UN engagement on sustaining peace/prevention is effectively joined up with senior UN leadership and global accountability frameworks as a means for making sustaining peace/prevention agendas more fully embraced by the UN system across all pillars and at all levels; and
- Re-examining programme assumptions and TOCs. National sustaining peace/prevention capacities should be considered non-linear and long-term outcomes that can only reasonably be approached from ‘complex-systems’ change models, rather than the programme’s current ‘linear’ and ‘deterministic’ models. They also need to more realistically take into account that Outcome 1 is more significantly a result of Outcome 2 than a result of the generally limited effects achievable by a PDA/PDT. Expectations might be better managed by learning from and modifying TOC concepts from the current DPPA Strategic Plan, which adopted a “risk-reduction” change model that “refuses the binary of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ and instead examines the extent to which DPPA has contributed to a diminishment in the risks of violence across a wide range of settings and timeframes.”<sup>51</sup>

**2. Review inclusivity of participation in programme governance, management and operational arrangements to achieve the greatest possible effectiveness, relevance and coherence.** There is an opportunity to build a stronger and more coherent partnership between UNDP, DPPA and DCO, but also across a wider spectrum of UN stakeholders. This would support greater participation in and ownership of UN ‘doctrines’ for sustaining peace/prevention across the system. This would also enable more coherent integration between the Joint Programme’s strategies and operational contributions and those of other UN entities. For example, decision-making over PDA and surge deployments would benefit from closer synergies with decision-making over the deployment of HRAs, HDP Nexus Advisors and other specialised DCO, DPPA and UNDP technical and/or programming staff in specific contexts. Any adjustments to participation in governance, management and operational arrangements need to be carefully designed and streamlined to avoid creating cumbersome decision-making processes or other barriers to efficient programme management.

*This might involve adaptations, such as:*

- Systematizing and expanding the participation of DCO in the Joint Programme’s Steering Committee, Technical Committee and other working-level arrangements, as well as regularising Secretariat/management liaison with the DCO;
- Systematising and strengthening the engagement of other relevant UN entities with the Joint Programme at different levels to promote greater intra-UN ownership and collaboration on sustaining peace/development and closer operational synergies on the ground;
- Testing the direct participation of ‘representative’ RCs, UNDP RRs and PDAs in strategic programme discussions and practice; and

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<sup>51</sup> DPPA Strategic Plan 2020-22, p.19.

- Ensuring a regular/predictable schedule of programme meetings with funding partners to discuss the programme, share expertise and understand key lessons/achievements.

**3. Adopt a ‘narrow but deep’ programme model that prioritises greater investments in the quality, depth and tailoring of Joint Programme engagements before increasing the number of programme locations.** This may entail some sort of ‘cap’ on the total number of programme locations, though the exact ‘scale of economy’ for what that would be will need to be determined and might also be flexible as demands change. This would enable the Joint Programme to take stock and make deeper investments in its own capacities and the quality of its engagements rather than unquestioningly continue to expand the number of locations and ‘spreading itself thin’. The reality is that there likely cannot be a PDA in every RCO.

*This might involve adaptations and investments, such as:*

- Enhancing the Criticality Assessments by:
  - reviewing Criticality Assessment processes and content with a view to enhance anticipatory elements and the articulation of context/needs ‘typologies’;
  - following post-approvals with a needs analysis and multi-year engagement framework to calibrate PDA profiles and inform PDA selection, deployment and working strategies; and
  - including a sustainability assessment and strategy for PDA/PDT locations;
- Adjusting the current PDA/PDT ‘exit strategy’ concept into a ‘sustainability strategy’ that presumes engagement for at least a medium term duration (e.g., 5-10 years) and is linked to an over-arching multi-year engagement framework that explicitly examines what the effective and sustainable transfer/building of national and UNCT stakeholder capacities could be expected to look like (possibly scenario-based). This would allow PDA/PDTs and the Joint Programme to better understand, adjust and monitor achievement/sustainability of key expected priorities/results in every location. It would also enable the programme to determine if changes in a context might require changing PDAs with different skills, re-skilling existing PDA/PDTs, scaling-up or scaling-down resources and expertise deployed in support of PDA/PDTs and/or ending the programme’s engagement in that context;
- Promoting the adoption of the PDT modality in all locations, which are largely perceived as deepening the Joint Programme’s effectiveness in any given location. PDTs benefit from: the complementary advantages from having both international and national PDAs present; being more able to effectively handle increasing workloads/expectations; and delivering more diversified and/or specialised expertise than a lone PDA;
- Considering developing and deploying a more comprehensive range of support modalities beyond just PDAs, such as needs-specific modular/agile ‘support packages’ that could be deployed alongside PDA/PDTs to ensure capacities are tailored to the context—these could include additional specialised expertise (e.g., data/information management specialists, etc.), in-principle advance allocations of seed funds and pre-established linkages to headquarters technical resources and leadership; and

- Exploring secondment or co-location of programme assets with national stakeholders, such as peace-related commissions or government bodies to increase direct UN access to national decision-makers.

**4. Deepen the Joint Programme’s prioritisation of gender and women, peace and security.** The programme has made considerable advances to prioritise WPS and gender, but more systematic measures would ensure they become more central to implementation.

*This might involve adaptations and investments, such as:*

- Developing more comprehensive and disaggregated gender indicators across all parts of the programme monitoring framework;
- Strengthening gender-informed/focused requirements for PDA analysis/reporting;
- Formalising a Secretariat annual Gender Workplan reviewed by the Steering Committee or otherwise integrating required gender components into the programme’s main Annual Workplan;
- Tracking gender/WPS expertise in the PDA cadre and ‘leveling-up’ expertise through targeted or standardised trainings, orientations or inductions; and
- Taking immediate and more drastic measures to enforce PDA gender parity during recruitments within the next year, as well as revisit the 2015 ‘PDA Gender Disparity Study’ and take stock of measures that could quickly instituted (e.g., strip identification data from applications for ‘blind’ evaluation, etc.).

**5. Provide enhanced support and regularised engagement with PDA tripartite-managers to establish clearer expectations, standards and guidelines, as well as to oblige greater management accountability.**

*This might involve adaptations, such as:*

- Conducting an internal review of current tripartite-management arrangements, including anonymous surveys in order to gain a clearer picture of the extent of challenges and potential solutions;
- Establishing instruments to track tripartite-managers’ fulfillment of management obligations, as well as feedback mechanisms to monitor tripartite-management quality and adjust/intervene as needed;
- Cancelling posts and re-assigning PDAs in situations where tripartite-managers are not fulfilling their management obligations;
- Including greater specificity of tripartite-management obligations in the Tripartite Agreement, such as: frequency of required tripartite-management meetings; reiteration that all tripartite-managers receive monthly PDA reports; and outline of the PDA’s division of labour between managers;

- Annexing to the Tripartite Agreement a detailed outline of essential PDA working relationships beyond tripartite-managers (e.g., UNDP CO programme managers, regional bureau programming contacts, HRAs and other specialised RCO advisors, etc.);
- Requiring either cost-sharing of PDA/PDT/RPS administration, operations and travel equally between all tripartite-managers or cover these directly from the Joint Programme to minimize seemingly trivial but key grievances regarding ‘ownership’ of the PDA/PDT/RPS based on ‘who pays for what’;
- Putting in place more guidance to clarify the tripartite-management set-up, such as: requiring a Joint Programme segment at all RC and RR inductions; creating a Joint Programme tripartite-manager ‘User Guide’ that establishes basic common management denominators; creating a Joint Programme ‘tab’ on RC (DCO) / RR (UNDP) intranet management portals;
- Continue strengthening Joint Programme ‘protocols’ and practices that ensure management and the Secretariat reinforce a culture of tripartite collaboration in all aspects of implementation, especially that all essential conversations with PDA managers are consistently tripartite; and
- Organising standard PDA introductions to tripartite-managers whenever there is a new PDA, RC, UNDP RR or DPPA-DPO onboarding—this would review the Tripartite Agreement, required management obligations and outline other vital PDA relationships in-country and with headquarters.

**6. Review Secretariat and management staffing and capacity needs, bearing in mind the increasing scale and complexity of the programme and associated challenges, the results of consultations regarding the programme’s long-term vision and that a ‘fit for purpose’ Secretariat remains essential for maintaining successful delivery.**

*Such a process might include consideration of:*

- Reviewing the division of labour between and capacity demands upon the UNDP/DPPA Co-Technical Leads and the Programme Manager as per current and emerging needs, potentially making adjustments and/or capacity increases as required;
- Bolstering operational staffing and other capacities to more efficiently and effectively manage the increased quantity and complexity of the financial, procurement, travel, and other operational demands of the programme;
- Bolstering staffing and other capacities to more effectively manage the increased quantity and complexity of the human resources/talent management demands of the programme—including human resources/talent management adaptations, such as:
  - conducting an ‘after-action’ review of the PDA Roster process (once it is completed) to document lessons and adjust Roster approaches/systems;
  - acquiring efficient, integrated and candidate/client-sensitive technology solutions for the full life-cycle of PDA Roster recruitment, human resource and talent management;

- developing a Talent Management and Pipeline Strategy;
  - developing a PDA Rotation/Mobility Policy that supports performance management, efficiently planning recruitment cycles and supporting PDA professional development/advancement;
  - developing a permanent Gender Parity Recruitment Strategy, enshrining metrics and procedures for not only reaching but also maintaining gender balance across the PDA cadre;
  - testing new methods and tools for enhancing inclusive recruitment processes and promotion of applications from an increasingly diverse pool of aspiring PDAs;
  - establishing standing commitments from core Joint Programme partners (e.g., different parts of DPPA, UNDP, DPO and DCO) to regularly participate in high-volume episodes of PDA rostering;
  - training PDA application evaluators on basic gender standards and recognition of personal/systemic biases; and
  - considering the outsourcing of certain aspects of human resource/talent management to external partners in order to create efficiencies and generating additional synergies;
- Bolstering staffing and other capacities for a wholesale re-invention of Joint Programme ‘PMEAL’<sup>52</sup> capacities and systems to more efficiently and effectively manage the increased quantity and complexity of the integrated ‘planning, monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning’ demands of the programme—including PMEAL adaptations, such as:
    - experimenting with novel and emerging PMEAL methodologies and data/digital technologies to set new gold standards in generating an evidence-base for effectiveness in sustaining peace/prevention (i.e., testing what works and what does not, learning from failure, etc.);
    - acquiring PMEAL technology solutions to realise the planning, monitoring and evaluation efficiency gains necessary for the demands of the Joint Programme’s new scale;
    - considering the outsourcing of certain aspects of PMEAL to external partners to create efficiencies, experiment with novel methods and generate additional synergies (e.g., PMEAL does not need to all be ‘in-house’);
    - integrating UNCT feedback on Joint Programme and PDA/PDT performance into annual PMEAL cycles and reporting;
    - reviewing the content of and approaches to Annual Reports, potentially: including progress updates of the Results Framework; organising results in different ways (such as by thematic); and integrating Member States contributions and inputs; and
    - focusing more on qualitative results, ‘most significant change’ and more creative ways to capture and ‘tell the impact story’, such as through testimonials that demonstrate impacts and results through stakeholders’ lived experience and own words;
  - Bolstering knowledge management staffing and other capacities to enable the Joint Programme to make a ‘step-change’ in technical backstopping and professional development for PDA/PDTs, but also to begin systematically contributing high quality inputs into UN organisational learning and policy development—including knowledge management adaptations such as:

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<sup>52</sup> Programme monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning.

- taking stock of and updating PDA Inductions, including how to adapt these as a starting point for PDA/PDT continuous learning and professional development strategies that involve ‘demand-driven’ and customizable learning components, necessary ‘levelling-up’ of core thematic knowledge areas (i.e., conflict sensitivity, gender/WPS, programming, human rights) and re-skilling as changing contexts require;
- taking stock of and updating the PDA and RC global retreat methods to make these more concrete and challenging peer-exchange and learning exercises;
- developing cohesive Joint Programme knowledge management and professional development strategies for exchanging/building expertise in the PDA cadre, but also employing this systematically as a UN system knowledge resource;
- regularising collaborative intra-UN knowledge management and policy partnerships with the: DPPA PMD and Innovation Cell; the soon to be launched UNDP Prevention Academy; UNDP Talent Development Unit; the UNDP-GPN; UNDP Accelerator Labs; DCO Policy Branch; and UNSSC; and
- regularising the development and production of internal practice guidance and other knowledge products—such as: CCA conflict sensitivity ‘checklists’ (first trialed by RPSs); in-house conflict sensitivity resource and training pack providing standard guidance to PDAs, as well as templates/building blocks for PDAs to conduct conflict sensitivity orientations/trainings; and PDA/PDT best practice case studies.

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## 4. ANNEXES

### 4.1 Document Review and Bibliography

#### Internal Joint Programme Documentation Reviewed and Referenced

- Standard Operating Procedures (March 2021)
- Risk Register (Draft Version 5 – 1 Feb 2021)
- Tripartite Agreement Template (2020)
- Guidelines for PDAs & recipients: PDA analytical reporting (2020)
- Terms of Reference for the Steering and Technical Committees (2020)
- Steering Committee Minutes (Draft – 10 Sep 2020)
- Steering Committee Minutes (15 Mar 2018)
- Technical Committee Minutes (Draft – 17 Mar 2021)
- Technical Committee Minutes (30 Apr 2020)
- Strategy Note: Re-opening of the Peace and Development Advisor Roster 2020 (updated Dec 2021)
- Note to the File for the Peace and Development Advisor Roster (P5) (2016)
- Temporary recruitment measures to achieve gender parity in the Peace and Development Advisors cadre (May 2021)
- Examining the Gender Disparity in the PDA Cadre, by Sanam Naraghi Anderlini & Dr. Valerie Begley on behalf of ICAN (2015)
- Terms of Reference: Peace and Development Specialist - Standard Roster P4 (2020)
- Terms of Reference: Peace and Development Advisor - Standard Roster P5 (2020)
- Terms of Reference: National Peace and Development Officer – Sample (2021)
- Terms of Reference: Regional Programme Specialist – P4 (2019)
- Joint Programme Team Annual Work Plan 2021
- Joint Programme Team Annual Work Plan 2020
- Joint Programme Team Gender Work Plan (2020)
- Guidelines for setting PDA Key Results and Annual Workplans (Mar 2020)
- PDA Key Results and Annual Works Plans for 2019, 2020 and 2021 (sampling of PDAs from Africa, Arab States, Asia/Pacific, Europe/Central Asia, Latin America/Caribbean)
- Summaries of Results: PDAs, RCs, UNDP RR/Desks and DPPA-DPO Desks Annual Surveys, 2018-2020 (various)
- PDA Outcome 1 Matrices (sampling of PDAs from Africa, Arab States, Asia/Pacific, Europe/Central Asia, Latin America/Caribbean)
- Joint Programme Monitoring Framework (updated 16 April 2021)
- Criticality Assessment Matrix – Template (2022)
- Criticality Assessment Decision Notes and Tracking Sheets (2019-2021)
- PDA Learning Strategy 2019-2023 (Draft – May 2019)
- PDA Learning Survey: Compiled Summary Results (Draft – May 2019)
- PDA Induction Folders: May 2021, Nov 2020, Mar 2020, Aug 2019.
- PDA Training Calendar (2019-2021)
- PDA Resources Package (2021)
- Summary Report: Montreux VI Workshop for Resident Coordinators Engaged in Complex Political Situations (Draft – Oct 2021)
- Short Note: Virtual Forum for Resident Coordinators, UNDP Resident Representatives and Peace and Development Advisors engaged in complex political settings in the context of COVID-19 Response (9 June 2020)
- PDA Regional Retreats Summary Notes/Reports: Africa (2019, 2021), Arab States (2021), Asia/Pacific (2020), Europe/Central Asia (2021) and Latin America/Caribbean (2020)
- Draft/internal Meeting Minutes: Joint Programme Global PDA Retreat (20-24 May 2019)



- Various confidential/internal PDA/PDT/RPS produced, led or supported: monthly/quarterly reports; conflict, risk and political analysis; situation and early warning reports; contingency plans; draft CCA contributions; internal UN prevention strategies (various regions)

## Core Public Documents Reviewed and Referenced

- High-level United Nations Steering Committee on Women, Peace and Security, "[UN strategic results framework on women, peace and security: 2011–2020](#)," United Nations (2011)
- Joint Programme, "[Joint UNDP-DPPA programme on building national capacities for conflict prevention Programme Document \(1 December 2018 – 31 December 2023\)](#)," United Nations (Dec 2018)
- Joint Programme, "[Joint UNDP-DPPA programme on building national capacities for conflict prevention – Annual Report: 2018](#)," United Nations (2018)
- Joint Programme, "[Joint UNDP-DPPA programme on building national capacities for conflict prevention – Annual Report: 2019](#)," United Nations (2020)
- Joint Programme, "[Joint UNDP-DPPA programme on building national capacities for conflict prevention – Annual Report: 2020](#)," United Nations (2021)
- UNDP, "[United Nations Development Programme Strategic Plan, 2018-2021 \(DP/2017/38\)](#)," UNDP (17 Oct 2017)
- UNDP, "[United Nations Development Programme Strategic Plan, 2022-25](#)," UNDP (2 Sep 2021)
- UN DPA, "[Department of Political Affairs Strategic Plan 2016-2019](#)," United Nations (20 Nov 2015)
- UN DPPA, "[Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Strategic Plan 2020-22](#)," United Nations (2020)
- UN Secretary-General, "[Report of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace \(A/72/707-S/2018/43\)](#)," United Nations (18 Jan 2018)
- UN Secretary-General, "[Report of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace \(A/73/890-S/2019/448\)](#)," United Nations (30 May 2019)
- UN Secretary-General, "[Report of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace \(A/74/976-S/2020/773\)](#)," United Nations (30 Jul 2020)
- UN Secretary-General, "[The Highest Aspiration: A Call To Action For Human Rights](#)," United Nations (2020)
- UN Secretary-General, "[Our Common Agenda](#)," United Nations (2021)
- UN Security Council, "[Resolution 2282 \(2016\): Sustaining Peace \(S/RES/2282 \(2016\)\)](#)," United Nations (2016)
- UN Sustainable Development Group, "[Management And Accountability Framework Of The UN Development and Resident Coordinator System](#)," (15 Sep 2021)
- UN Sustainable Development Group, "[The UN System-Wide Strategic Document to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#)," United Nations (10 Jul 2019)
- UN Sustainable Development Group, "[UNCT Gender Equality Marker Guidance Note](#)," United Nations (Jun 2019)
- UN USG for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, "[Administrative instruction: Temporary special measures for the achievement of gender parity \(ST/AI/2020/5\)](#)," United Nations (6 Aug 2020)

## 4.2 MTR Approaches and Methods

### Purposes and Scope

This MTR was conducted for the purposes of:

- i.) Supporting programme accountability to management, partners and stakeholders by providing independent and objective information regarding programme performance and progress;
- ii.) Identifying potential needs for programme design and/or implementation improvements; and
- iii.) Formulating recommendations for possible adjustments to improve design and/or implementation.

The current programme cycle of the Joint Programme is from Dec 2018 to Dec 2023. Being a mid-term exercise, the MTR covers the period from Dec 2018 to Dec 2021 (three years).

## Criteria and Lines of Enquiry

Guided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee's '[Evaluation criteria](#)', the MTR examined the effectiveness, relevance, coherence, efficiency and sustainability of the Joint Programme at the global, regional and country levels. It assessed performance across the full range of activities/outputs implemented under the programme as outlined in the Programme Document, Results/Monitoring Frameworks, Work Plans and other strategic documents to demonstrate how the Joint Programme has performed in relation to goals, strategic targets and other performance expectations. The MTR undertook a holistic review of overall programme performance and progress to date, including internal management aspects that may impact effective delivery. The MTR did not include summative 'impact evaluation' elements because the programme is at the midpoint of its current cycle, and it is too early to assess for impact.

Based on the MTR TORs, Joint Programme stakeholders sought the MTR to answer numerous lines of enquiry. Synthesising and streamlining these into a workable framework, the MTR combined process/implementation and outcome evaluation approaches to answer two core questions:

1. *To what extent is the Joint Programme effectively achieving its twin objectives to enhance national and UN capacities for preventing conflict and sustaining peace?*
2. *How well is the design and implementation of the Joint Programme responding to the needs and priorities of its diverse stakeholders and contexts?*

## Approach, Methods and Data Analysis

The MTR was conducted in accordance with the UNEG's '[Norms and Standards for Evaluation](#)' and UNDP '[Evaluation Guidelines](#)' by a team of two independent consultants in an impartial and transparent manner with full consideration of gender and human rights norms.

The mixed method approach was employed, using qualitative and quantitative research methods and the triangulation of information from different sources to assess programme progress against set targets to date and overall programme performance. The MTR employed purposive sampling for primary data collection to ensure that all stakeholder groups had the opportunity to participate. The MTR considered gender, regional, language and ethnic/cultural diversity during sampling to allow for as representative a sample as possible. Within the given time, budget and logistical constraints of the exercise, the MTR sought to engage as diverse and inclusive a range of stakeholders as possible and efforts were made to seek information from all perspectives. Interviews used open-framed questions both i.) to reduce external bias and pre-determining responses, but also ii.) to provide participants the opportunity to articulate responses according to their own language, perspective and experience.

## Data Collection

The MTR relied on both primary and secondary data sources, utilizing three data collection methods:

- **Document and literature review.** The MTR Team reviewed relevant and available internal Joint Programme documentation (ProDoc, results/monitoring frameworks, annual reports, M&E and other internal reporting, work plans/key results, Outcome 1 Matrices, etc.), UN policies and guidance documents, analytical/research/lesson-learned reports related to the Joint Programme, to conflict prevention/sustaining peace and to field visit case locations. The document review was used as a means for: developing background for the MTR and targets/expectations for programme results and management measures; bringing clarity to the MTR's questions and methods; supplementing and triangulating primary data collected by the Review; and contextualising the MTR's findings.
- **Semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs) across all key programme stakeholder groups at the global, regional and country levels.** KIIs at the global level included: Joint Programme Co-Chairs, Co-Technical Leads and Secretariat; UNDP, DPPA and DCO headquarters staff interacting with the programme; a sampling of relevant other UN system headquarters staff; and funding partners of the programme. Interviewees at the regional level included: Joint Programme Regional Specialists; and UNDP, DPPA-DPO and DCO regional bureau/division staff interacting with the Joint Programme. Interviewees at the country level included PDA/PDTs, RCs, UNDP RRs in 8 Joint Programme countries. Over the course of the MTR process, additional key informants were deemed relevant and also interviewed.

- **In-person and virtual field visits to select case locations for observation, in-depth semi-structured interviews and elaboration on results and lessons at country level.** MTR Team members visited 7 locations with PDA/PDTs: Côte d'Ivoire; Kenya; Malawi; Jordan; Bangladesh; South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia); and the Caribbean. The duration of field visits to each location was typically 4 days. Locations were selected on the basis of: equitable regional representation roughly in line with current PDA deployments; balanced language representation; equitable PDA gender representation; mix of long established and newly established programme locations; mix of different conflict prevention/peacebuilding contexts; mix of solo PDAs and PDTs; and reasonable accessibility during the global pandemic. The field visits provided another layer of evidence gathering through interviews with: relevant national governmental and civil society stakeholders; PDA/PDTs; RCs; RCO staff; UNDP RRs, DRRs and relevant UNDP CO programme management/staff; UNCT members and UN agency staff; related DPPA offices/staff; bilateral and multilateral diplomatic missions/development agencies and INGOs; and any other projects/initiatives that interface closely with PDAs and/or the Joint Programme.

By the conclusion of data collection, the MTR Team interviewed 302 key informants (49% male and 51% female). Nearly 66% of key informants were based/focused on the country level, while 13% were based/focused at the regional level and 21% were based/focused at the global level. In total, 76% of key informants were UN personnel, 11% were from national civil society, 5% were from bilateral governments, 4% were from host governments, 3% were from other international organisations and 1% were from INGOs. Among UN key informants, 27% were UNDP staff, 21% were PDA/PDT/RPSs and JP Secretariat staff, 20% were RCs/DCO staff, 16% were DPPA/DPO staff, 4% were UNW staff, 3% were EOSG staff and 2% were OHCHR staff. The remaining 7% of UN key informants comprised staff from (in descending order of magnitude) UNICEF, UNFPA, UNSSC, UNHCR, UNDSS, IOM, UNOCT, UNESCO and UNIC.

### Data Analysis and Report Drafting

Data entry, cleaning, and analysis were a continuous process from the development of the inception report and throughout the document review, KIIs and field visits. Interview notes were triangulated through analysis of gathered documentation and information provided by the Joint Programme and stakeholders. Data and analysis were synthesised to maintain focus on the MTR's principal lines of enquiry and to arrive at a coherent and grounded set of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

A draft report was drafted and submitted for internal review by Joint Programme management and core stakeholders. The MTR Team then reviewed, weighed and integrated relevant feedback into this final report.

### Ethical considerations

This study was conducted with the highest standards of integrity and respect. All interviews were conducted in a non-attributional<sup>53</sup> and participatory manner with informed prior consent being requested of all participants. The MTR Team took necessary steps to protect participants from the potential negative consequences of participating in the MTR. Specific statements have not been attributed to specific individuals/entities and no interview reports/summaries were shared outside of the MTR Team. The MTR Team endeavored to create conditions that enabled participants to reflect freely and speak without fear.

### Limitations and caveats

Implementation of the MTR was partly impacted by the global COVID-19 pandemic, which diminished the full scope of field visits and the availability of key informants for interviews. It is also important to note that the MTR is not a catalogue of programme results. Given constraints and purposes, it does not present elaborated case studies or examples. It synthesises findings and recommendations based on evidence acquired from an examination of *overall* programme performance; it recommends that programme management should conduct deeper examination of specific areas in follow-up to the MTR. There are obvious limitations in the nature of this exercise and its methodologies, including: a limited geographical and sampling frame; challenges of remote interviews and collaboration; bias towards UN supported sources and processes; bias

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<sup>53</sup> Specific individuals or organisations are not attributed to specific statements. Random codes have been assigned for all KII quotes.

towards English-language sources and contexts<sup>54</sup>; and other implicit researcher biases. Given the past and present implementation of the Joint Programme in a wide variety of contexts and the limitations inherent in conducting the MTR, it will inadvertently exclude certain voices or not satisfactorily cover all issues of importance to all stakeholders. Therefore, its findings are presented with modesty and humility.

### 4.3 Stakeholders Interviewed

**Note:** Not all interviewed stakeholders are listed here as some requested to remain anonymous. Titles and organisations are denoted as they were known at the time of interview.

#### **Joint Programme Supervision and Management**

ASG Asako Okai	Joint Programme Co-Chair—ASG, Assistant Administrator and Director, Crisis Bureau, UNDP
ASG Miroslav Jenča	Joint Programme Co-Chair—ASG for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, DPPA-DPO
Sam Rizk	Joint Programme Technical Co-Lead—Head, Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding & Responsive Institutions (CPPRI), Crisis Bureau, UNDP
Alexandra (Sascha) Fong	Joint Programme Technical Co-Lead—Chief, Policy and Guidance, Policy and Mediation Division, DPPA

#### **Joint Programme Secretariat and Regional Programme Specialists**

Sanna Tasala	Programme Manager
Ilona Lecerf	Programme Specialist
Risa Fujimura	M&E and Programme Specialist
Julian Hernandez	Roster Specialist
Jeremy Carpenter	Peace and Development Analyst
Florence Danner	Communications and Event Analyst
Mehwish Mirza	Programme Associate
Colleen Bermingham	UNV Seconded (human resources)
Shewit Desta	Regional Programme Specialist, Africa (East/South)
Kwaku Asante-Darko	Regional Programme Specialist, Africa (West)
Fadi Abilmona	Regional Programme Specialist, Arab States
Dilrukshi Fonseka	Regional Programme Specialist, Asia/Pacific
Gizem Sucuglu	former Regional Programme Specialist, Europe/Central Asia
Aycan Akdeniz Bayram	Regional Programme Specialist, Europe/Central Asia
Luqman Patel	Regional Programme Specialist, Latin America/Caribbean

#### **United Nations Development Programme**

Amita Gill	CPPRI, Crisis Bureau
Musa Ibrahim	CPPRI, Crisis Bureau
Monica Rijal	former CPPRI, Crisis Bureau
Nika Saeed	CPPRI, Crisis Bureau
Asa Wallton	CPPRI, Crisis Bureau
Catherine Wong	CPPRI, Crisis Bureau
Corrado Scognamillo	Crisis Risk and Early Warning Unit, Crisis Bureau
Noura Hamladji	Deputy Regional Director, Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA)
Roselyn Akombe	UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, Addis Ababa (RBA)
Susanne Dam-Hansen	Deputy Manager, UNDP Regional Hub in Amman (RBAS)
Giordano Segneri	UNDP Regional Hub in Amman (RBAS)
Rawhi Afaghani	UNDP Regional Hub in Amman (RBAS)
Abdallah Al-Laham	UNDP Regional Hub in Amman (RBAS)

<sup>54</sup> The MTR team was composed of English speakers; while translation was provided in non-English speaking settings, this automatically introduces certain biases and some element of risks for data capture.

Nicholas Booth	UNDP Regional Hub in Bangkok (RBAP)
Bhasker Khafle	UNDP Regional Hub in Bangkok (RBAP)
Ben Slay	Deputy Regional Director a.i., Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS (RBEC)
Robert Bernardo	UNDP Regional Hub in Istanbul (RBEC)
Jonathan Zigrand	UNDP Regional Hub in Istanbul (RBEC)
Linda Maguire	Deputy Regional Director, Regional Bureau for Latin America/Caribbean (RBLAC)
Jairo Acuna-Alfaro	UNDP Regional Hub in Panama (RBLAC)
Juliet Solomon	UNDP Regional Hub in Panama (RBLAC)
Richard Kelly	UNDP Regional Hub in Panama (RBLAC)

#### **Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs**

Teresa Whitfield	Director, Policy and Mediation Division
Sean Kane	Policy and Mediation Division
Thomas Ritzer	Policy and Mediation Division
Maarten Halff	Electoral Assistance Division
Hiroko Miyamura	Electoral Assistance Division
Pascale Roussy	Electoral Assistance Division
Mikyong Kim	Electoral Assistance Division
Jorge Grayeb	Electoral Assistance Division
Gonzalo de Cesare	Electoral Assistance Division
Asma Nassery	Electoral Assistance Division
Min Ji Song	Innovation Cell
Brian Williams	Chief, Financing for Peacebuilding, PBSO
Marcus Lenzen	Senior Adviser & Deputy Chief, Peacebuilding Fund, PBSO
Henk-Jan Brinkman	Chief of Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships, PBSO
Farah Abdessamad	HDPP Facility Programme Manager, PBSO

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Catharina Goldschmidt	Central and Southern Africa Division
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Philip Helmingier	Northern Africa Division
Oystein Nedrebo	Northern Africa Division
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Laura Flores	Americas Division
Marylene Smeets	Americas Division
Guillermo Kendell	Americas Division
Peter Due	Director, Asia Pacific Division
Alma Saliu	Asia Pacific Division
Herve Lecoq	Deputy Director, Europe and Central Asia Division
Erwan Pouchous	Europe and Central Asia Division
Roman Shpak	Europe and Central Asia Division
Darko Mocibob	Director a.i., Middle East Division

#### **Development Coordination Office**

ASG Robert Piper	ASG for Development Coordination
Helena Fraser	Director, Policy and Programme Branch
Alexandra Simpson	former Policy and Programme Branch
Diloro Kadirova	Policy and Programme Branch
Christina Human	Policy and Programme Branch
Joerg Schimmel	Policy and Programme Branch
Patience Lily Alidri	Policy and Programme Branch

Marie France Bourgeois	Policy and Programme Branch
Tolulope Lewis Tamoka	Policy and Programme Branch
Antonio Cisneros De Alencar	Policy and Programme Branch
Brianna Harrison	Policy and Programme Branch
Laila Baker	Regional Director, Arab States
Bradley Foerster	Regional Office for Arab States
Gwi Yop Son	Regional Director, Europe/Central Asia
Neil Buhne	Regional Director, Asia/Pacific
Roberto Valent	Regional Director, Latin America/Caribbean

### **UN System**

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Michèle Griffin	EOSG
Ayaka Suzuki	Director, Strategic Planning and Monitoring Unit, EOSG
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James Coltheart	UN Operations and Crisis Centre
Sarah Douglas	Peace, Security and Humanitarian Affairs, UN Women
Tatyana Jiteneva	Peace, Security and Humanitarian Affairs, UN Women
Eira Fallen	Peace and Security Team, UN System Staff College
Ginevra Cucinotta	Peace and Security Team, UN System Staff College
Lorraine Charbonnier	former Peace and Security Team, UN System Staff College
Jascha Scheele	UN Transitions Project
Lorraine Reuter	UN Transitions Project

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Stefano Berti	Government of Switzerland
Janieke Drent	Government of the Netherlands

### **International Civil Society**

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### **Country Specific**

#### ***Armenia***

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Anna Barfyan	UNFPA Armenia
Lusine Sargsyan	UNFPA Armenia
Anna Carin Ost	UNHCR RR, Armenia
Karine Sujayan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia
Marta Ayvazyan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia
Gulnara Shahinyan	Democracy Today
Laura Baghdasaryan	Director, Region Research Center

Armen Ohanyan	Writers for Peace
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	
Elgun Taghiyev	National PDA, Azerbaijan
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Sudipto Mukarjee	UNDP RR, Bangladesh
Van Nguyen	UNDP DRR, Bangladesh
Michael Van Tangen Page	UNDP Bangladesh
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Noor Wahiduzzaman	Counter-Terrorism & Transnational Crime Unit, Dhaka Metropolitan Police
Amb Farooq Sobhan	Bangladesh Enterprise Institute
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Tanvir Mahmud	British High Commission, Bangladesh
Tom Pope	former USAID, Bangladesh
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Alma Jenkins	UNICEF Trinidad and Tobago
Jewel Ali	Head of Office, IOM Trinidad and Tobago

Rochelle Nakhid	Living Water Community
Nadine Bushell	Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
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Nino Lortkipanidze UNICEF Georgia  
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Rabia Hasan UNDP Jordan  
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Hon. Mohammed Guleid Frontier Counties Development Council  
Dr Skitter Mbugua Commission Secretary/CEO, National Cohesion and Integration Commission  
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### **Malawi**

Raphael Asuliwonnu	PDA, Malawi
Taweni Kalua	National PDA, Malawi
Max Bonnel	Head of Office, RCO Malawi
Shigeki Komatsubara	UNDP RR, Malawi
Challa Getachew	UNDP DPP, Malawi
Busekese Kilembe	UNDP Malawi
Fatuma Silungwe	UNDP Malawi
Atupele Mataula	UNDP Malawi
Julie Vandassen	UNDP Malawi
Victor Kondwani Manlidi	UN Women Malawi
Hon Timothy Mtambo	Minister of Civic Education and National Unity, Government of Malawi
Amb Agnes Mary Chimbiri	Permanent Representative of Malawi to the UN
Elizabeth Gomani Chindebvu	Principal Secretary, Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity, Malawi
Dyton Kangoma	Deputy Director, National Unity
Kizito Tenthani	Center for Multiparty Democracy
Master Mfunne	Center for Multiparty Democracy
Theodora Thundwa	Lecturer, Mzuzu University
Sophia Nthenda	Deputy Executive Director, Public Affairs Committee Women
Stella Chikombole	Programme Officer, Youth, Public Affairs Committee Women
Ivo Hoefkens	Head of Cooperation, EU Delegation to Malawi
Mark Diarmuid	Deputy Head of Mission, Irish Aid

### **Maldives**

Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen	PDA, Maldives
Catherine Haswell	UN RC, Maldives
Enrico Gaveglia	UNDP RR, Maldives

### **Philippines**

Melina Nathan	PDA, Philippines
Gustavo Gonzales	UN RC, Philippines
Selva Ramachandran	UNDP RR, Philippines

### **Tunisia**

Fabio Oliva	PDA, Tunisia
Walid Said	National PDA, Tunisia
Arnaud Peral	UN RC, Tunisia
Steve Utterwulge	former UNDP RR, Tunisia (now Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy, UNDP)
Martine There	former UNDP RR a.i., Tunisia (now UNDP RR, Morocco)

**Venezuela**

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