



*Empowered lives.  
Resilient nations.*

## THE ELECTORAL INTEGRITY PROJECT

WHY ELECTIONS FAIL AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT

# Secure and Fair Elections (SAFE) Workshop

Model Curriculum

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December 2015



## Electoral Processes

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International IDEA  
Strömsborg  
SE-103 34 Stockholm  
Sweden  
[info@idea.int](mailto:info@idea.int)  
[www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int)

United Nations  
Development Programme  
One United Nations Plaza  
New York, NY 10017  
United States of America  
[publications.queries@undp.org](mailto:publications.queries@undp.org)  
[www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org)

Electoral Integrity Project  
John F. Kennedy  
School of Government, Harvard University  
79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138  
United States of America  
[electoralintegrity@gmail.com](mailto:electoralintegrity@gmail.com)  
[www.electoralintegrityproject.com](http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com)

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# Table of Contents

Introduction .....	6
Overview .....	8
Acknowledgements .....	9
Acronyms .....	10
<b>Theoretical Modules</b> .....	11
<b>Module 1:</b> Electoral security within the electoral process .....	12
<b>Module 2:</b> Global integrity of EMBs .....	17
<b>Module 3:</b> Security considerations in the different electoral phases .....	21
<b>Module 4:</b> The role of security forces (core) .....	24
<b>Module 5:</b> Electoral security in peace processes and transitions (non-core) .....	32
<b>Module 6:</b> Stakeholder analysis (core) .....	37

<b>Module 7:</b>	Media and electoral security (core) .....	42
<b>Module 8:</b>	Electoral justice and security (core) .....	46
<b>Module 9:</b>	Mapping risk to an electoral process (core) .....	50
<b>Module 10:</b>	Using new technology to map risk (core) .....	54
<b>Module 11:</b>	Mapping, preventing and mitigating election-related violence with focus on International IDEA's Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMTTool) (core) ...	61
<b>Module 12:</b>	Identifying electoral security interventions (non-core) .....	64
<b>Module 13:</b>	Security, violence and new technologies (core) .....	69
<b>Module 14:</b>	Lessons learned globally: What can national and international actors do to ensure secure and inclusive electoral processes (core) .....	74
<b>Practical Sessions</b>	.....	79
<b>Practical session 1:</b>	Country and stakeholder presentations .....	80
<b>Practical session 2:</b>	Mapping simulation (ERMTTool) .....	81
<b>Practical session 3:</b>	Crowdsourcing .....	82
<b>Practical session 4:</b>	Introducing election security .....	83
<b>Practical session 5:</b>	Roles and responsibilities of security forces .....	84
<b>Practical session 6:</b>	Relationship between EMBs and security forces .....	85

<b>Practical session 7:</b>	Joint Elections Operation Centre (JEOC) .....	86
<b>Practical session 8:</b>	Conduct and election-related training of security forces .....	87
<b>Practical session 9:</b>	Summary of the learning objectives .....	88
About the Partners .....		89

## Introduction

The Secure and Fair Elections (SAFE) workshop bridges theory and practice on a fundamental element of the electoral process: electoral security. Security is an essential part of the electoral process; at best, it supports the credibility and overall success of an election, and at worst it can discredit elections and make them meaningless.

The basic definition of “security” is the state of being free from danger or threat. Security is more than the absence of physical threat or an armed conflict; it is an environment where individuals can thrive and exercise their rights freely. It requires access to education and health care, democracy and human rights, and economic development. It is a state where citizens’ rights are enforced and citizens are treated fairly by state institutions.<sup>1</sup>

Security means different things to different people and institutions. Governments often focus on what makes the state secure—strong borders, a powerful military—but most people focus on day-to-day security for themselves and their families.<sup>2</sup> In practical terms, election security can be defined as the process of protecting electoral stakeholders, information, facilities, and events.<sup>3</sup> Security is a crucial condition in the context of elections; it assists in establishing an enabling environment that is conducive to holding a democratic poll.

This workshop intends to contribute to a holistic understanding of electoral security. The workshop material presents international experience and lessons

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1 Bastick, Megan and Tobie Whitman. *A Women’s Guide to Security Sector Reform*. Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Inclusive Security and DCAF, 2013.

2 Idem.

3 Fischer, Jeff. 2002. ‘Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention’, IFES White Paper 2002-01. Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

learned, along with phenomena such as social media, two-way communications, technology mapping, and the latest academic methodologies to analyse the integrity of (and threats to) electoral processes.

The materials have been developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP),<sup>4</sup> with contributions from highly experienced field experts on elections, security, media and technology. The content of the workshop is designed to benefit electoral practitioners, electoral management bodies' (EMBs) personnel, members of security forces as well as civil society, the media and other stakeholders in the electoral process.

SAFE is intended to be a living resource in which the modules can be combined for various workshops based on thematic needs. It can be implemented in either a regional or national setting.

SAFE at the regional level intends to bring together electoral administrators, security personnel, and other stakeholders to raise awareness about electoral security and bring together international experiences, comparative models from around the world, best practices, the latest information and communications technology (ICT) developments and cutting-edge technology trends.

The national-level workshop is designed to gather members of electoral administrations, security personnel, civil society, political parties, and the media to share knowledge and raise awareness of electoral security and international experience. An additional element is familiarizing participants with using risk assessment tools, building an electoral security plan and the interaction between security forces, media and civil society. The workshop introduces national stakeholders to international experiences and comparative models from around the world.

Since every election has different priorities and needs, each implementation of the workshop can tailor the modules and training sessions to the local context. The SAFE curriculum is flexible enough to adapt to different national and regional scenarios.

UNDP Asia Pacific and International IDEA welcome any questions or feedback on the content of the SAFE curriculum.

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<sup>4</sup> The EIP is an independent research project based at the University of Sydney and Harvard University, under the direction of Professor Pippa Norris.

# Overview

The SAFE curriculum is composed of fourteen theoretical modules and nine practical sessions:

- *Theoretical modules* introduce the concepts and foster debate in the audience.
- *Practical sessions* combine exercises and group work based on the theoretical modules. They also include group presentations of challenges faced in previous elections in order to encourage discussion about concrete and applicable solutions.

The information provided for each module includes learning objectives, suggested length, key issues to cover and a detailed outline with recommended resources.

The implementation of SAFE starts with a thorough assessment to determine the profile of the participants, the area's electoral and security challenges, needs, and the role of other stakeholders such as civil society and the media in order to design the workshop in a way that addresses the main issues facing the upcoming electoral cycle in each country or region.

It does not try to be the last word on electoral security, but rather to present the latest developments in key areas.



## Acknowledgements

The SAFE workshop was envisioned and its syllabus developed by Simon Finley (UNDP regional electoral adviser Asia Pacific), Annette Fath-Lihic (International IDEA's senior programme manager), Richard Frank (research associate and project manager, EIP) and Michael Maley (senior independent consultant). Martin Landi coordinated the modules' development, the implementation of the pilot workshop at the University of Sydney and the creation of this model curriculum.

The UNDP, International IDEA and EIP would like to express special gratitude to the senior experts who contributed to the development of the SAFE workshop modules: Adrian Morrice (independent consultant), Catinca Slavu (independent consultant), Haissam Riad Minkara (independent consultant), Mark Stevens (independent consultant), Max Grömping (EIP), Peter Wolf (International IDEA electoral team), Sead Alihodžić (International IDEA electoral team) and Seema Shah (International IDEA electoral team).

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It is likewise important to highlight the experts who participated with presentations and feedback during the pilot project at the University of Sydney on September 2014: Joanne Cheah (UNDP) and the members of the Australian Civil Military Centre (ACMC), Greg Elliot (deputy executive director) and Martin Hess (federal agent and ACMC liaison).

## Acronyms

<b>CSO</b>	civil society organization
<b>EDR</b>	electoral dispute resolution
<b>EIP</b>	Electoral Integrity Project
<b>EMB</b>	electoral management body
<b>ERMTool</b>	electoral risk management tool
<b>International IDEA</b>	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
<b>IIMARCH</b>	Information, Intention, Method, Administration, Risk Assessment, Communications, Human Rights and other Legal Issues
<b>IGO</b>	inter-governmental organization
<b>ICT</b>	information and communications technology
<b>JEOC</b>	Joint Election Operations Centre
<b>JOC</b>	Joint Operations Centre
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>MoFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MoHA</b>	Ministry of Home Affairs
<b>Mol</b>	Ministry of the Interior
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>NHRI</b>	national human rights institution
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>SAFE</b>	Secure and Fair Elections
<b>SSA</b>	security sector agency
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme

# Theoretical Modules

<b>Module 1: Electoral security within the electoral process</b>	
<b>Learning objectives</b>	This module functions as an introduction to the workshop. It introduces the broader political context of what electoral processes are, what they are trying to achieve and how they can be manipulated for political ends.
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Foundations: four key human rights instruments</li> <li>• Security conceived as condition/state of affairs or as a form of action/intervention</li> <li>• Role and purpose of the electoral process</li> <li>• Defining electoral efficacy</li> <li>• Forms of manipulation</li> <li>• Context in which elections are conducted               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Classification by position of an election in a country's democratic development</li> <li>– Classification by what is being voted for</li> <li>– Classification according to the broader political/constitutional environment in which electoral processes are embedded</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Fundamental characteristics of typically insecure elections</li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Namibia's independence election of 1989</li> <li>• East Timor's popular consultation of 1999</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

## Methodological remarks

The session introduces the participants to the broader political context of elections. It involves interactive discussions with participants to understand their views and illustrate EMBs' limitations when working in insecure environments.

It examines issues of electoral integrity alongside EMB and political legitimacy in order to provide participants with a lens outside their normal institutional frame with which to understand the role of elections in a country's democratic and political cycles.

## Module outline

The module presents **four of the key post-WWII human rights instruments** that bear critically on the role of elections, and on the political rights associated with them:

- Articles 2 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- Articles 2(1) and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

- Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and
- Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.

Examine electoral security as having two fundamental (but distinct) dimensions:

1. **Personal security:** ensuring the physical safety, and the safety of the property, of all stakeholders in the process, including voters, candidates, political party activists and officials, members of civil society involved in campaigning and electoral officials; and
2. Ensuring the **security and integrity of the electoral process**, for example by taking steps to prevent interference with ballot materials, or with the polling, counting and results compilation.

Present the **role and purpose of electoral processes**. Discuss that if an election is to be secured, there should be a clear understanding of the purpose it is expected to serve in a particular country context, and of the standards that need to be met in order for that purpose to be fulfilled. These will vary according to the nature of the operation under consideration, for example a referendum or recall.

From a democratic perspective, elections may have a range of different objectives, including:

- consolidating a transition from conflict to peace;
- empowering citizens by enabling them to exercise a peaceful democratic choice (rather than change achieved through revolution or violence in a non-democratic context);
- conferring power and legitimacy on elected institutions, regimes, political parties, leaders and representatives;
- enforcing the accountability of those who have occupied positions of power;
- identifying members of a representative body or legislature;
- indicating the extent of public support for various political players, often as a prelude to elite-level negotiations on government formation;
- providing a focal point for the periodic contestation of political ideas, and for activism in support of social change; and
- building a sense of civic ritual, especially by exemplifying mechanisms for peaceful political action and change.

Present the concept of **electoral efficacy**. Planning for a safe and secure electoral process can be grounded on particular qualities and ideals, which are most commonly expressed through the widely used concept of 'free and fair' elections with the following requirements:

- The election is administered impartially, and there are opportunities for complaints about the process to be lodged and dealt with in an even-handed and transparent way.
- People qualified to vote, and only people so qualified, are able to do so.
- They can vote in an open and neutral political environment in which contending views can be safely expressed in an election campaign.

- Votes are not bought and sold.
- Voters can cast a secret ballot without fear of any adverse consequences.
- Everyone votes only once.
- Voters understand the nature and significance of the act of voting.
- Votes are counted and tabulated accurately, without any fraudulent interference.

Present how these requirements seek to express—in an operational form—a number of transcendent norms, such as universality and equality. They represent a minimal statement of conditions that need to be in place to guarantee a genuine election.

Emphasize that ‘spoilers’, or election losers, will sometimes want to actively seek a pretext to reject election results.

Flag **forms of manipulation** and electoral fraud that provide a taxonomy for a useful framework for understanding and anticipating forms of manipulation. The module presents four main categories: voter manipulation, franchise manipulation, results manipulation and manipulation of political sphere.

Discuss **the context in which elections are conducted** and the vast scope for variation in the challenges of each unique electoral process, and how this can be illuminated by attempting to classify electoral processes from a number of different perspectives. Two underlying factors in all of these classifications are:

1. The amount of power and influence that will accrue to winners (and of which losers will be deprived) and the consequent incentives to manipulate.
2. The extent to which historical, institutional and cultural factors may lead political players and the populace to prioritize supporting the process, rather than a particular outcome.

Discuss the **classification by position of an election in a country’s democratic development** and how the different types of electoral process give rise to distinctive challenges:

- independence referendums;
- first or ‘founding’ elections;
- second and subsequent elections;
- elections reverting to multiparty contestation after a period of national unity government; and
- equilibrium elections.

Present a **classification by what is being voted for** and how voting for the following offices may give rise to substantially different challenges:

- executive president;
- non-executive/ceremonial president;
- national parliament
- subnational/local elections; and
- referendums/recall.

Present a **classification according to the broader political/constitutional environment in which electoral processes are embedded**. Highlight the following factors that can significantly influence the security challenges:

- presence of spoilers who are opposed to the entire electoral process;
- post-conflict;
- weak governmental institutions;
- international presence, interest and engagement, or absence;
- divided societies;
- lack of congruence between electoral and societal values; and
- out-of-country voting.

Discuss the **fundamental characteristics of typically insecure elections**, in which security may be a significant issue, especially in post-conflict or developing country situations:

- Elections may determine the long-term political evolution, rather than the short-term government, of a country.
- Political players may have only a shallow commitment to democratic processes.
- There may be a risk that well-armed groups will reject a result.
- Political parties may be based on individuals, tribes or groups of combatants, rather than shared philosophies.
- There may be no credible and independent law enforcement organization and/or judiciary to deal with election-related transgressions and disputes.
- State resources, and especially state-controlled media, may be deployed for the benefit of incumbents.
- There may be no established or credible EMB.
- Concepts of citizenship, nationality or residence may be ill defined.
- There may be a significant refugee/expatriate population in neighbouring countries demanding the opportunity to vote.
- The broad structures of the state may be in decay.
- There may be only a rudimentary infrastructure for transport, procurement, communications, banking, etc.
- Women and members of minority groups may face particular obstacles in the exercise of their electoral rights.
- The electorate may be poorly educated and/or illiterate.
- Political campaigning is likely to take place face to face.
- There may be a tradition of electoral fraud.
- Resources to run the election are likely to be either over-abundant (if the international community is heavily engaged) or scarce (if it is not).

Suggest that threats to security can be analysed by looking at the context, identifying stakeholders, and seeking to understand their motives, means and opportunities. Consider that sustainable security ultimately requires not just force but a workable justice system within which their activities can be embedded.

## Recommended resources

1. Christensen, Skye S., 'Mapping Manipulation: Digital Observation of Electoral Fraud', Master in Politics and International Studies Thesis (University of Uppsala, 2011)
2. Elklit, Jørgen, 'Free and Fair Elections', in Richard Rose (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Elections* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000)
3. Elklit, Jørgen and Svensson, Palle, 'What Makes Elections Free and Fair?', *Journal of Democracy*, 8 (1997), pp. 32–46
4. Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., *Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice* (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2006), <<http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/free&fair06-e.pdf>>, accessed 12 September 2014
5. Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections* (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1994), <<http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm>>, accessed 12 September 2014
6. Maley, Michael, 'Transplanting Election Regulation', *Election Law Journal*, 2 (2003), pp. 479–97



<b>Module 2: Global integrity of EMBs</b>	
<b>Learning objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To outline the state of the art research in the study of EMB effectiveness, democracy and electoral integrity</li> <li>• To provide an overview of the major sources of information that domestic and international actors reach for when evaluating elections within and across countries</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sources of information               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Media coverage</li> <li>– Public opinion surveys</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Domestic level               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– EMB</li> <li>– Domestic media</li> <li>– Non-governmental organizations</li> </ul> </li> <li>• International level               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– International media</li> <li>– International organizations</li> <li>– Electoral forensics</li> <li>– Academic data collection efforts</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Empirical trends               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Individual level</li> <li>– Domestic level</li> <li>– International level</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Case study</b>	Russia's 2011 legislative election
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

## Methodological remarks

After the normative and theoretical motivations for national elections outlined in the first module, this session will turn to the means by which elections can be and are examined by domestic and international actors. It will illustrate the different ways an EMB can build its integrity to ensure that its performance is not used as a trigger to destabilize the electoral process. It presents new research on attitudes toward EMBs and their integrity, and discusses how results management systems, electronic voting machines, and other measures can either enhance or distract from a EMBs performance.

This module begins to answer these questions by presenting the various means by which elections are evaluated, and categorizes evaluation methods according to the three levels of information they rely on. It outlines the myriad ways of how electoral processes can be judged, including voters' perceptions, experts' judgments, media coverage and international monitors' reports.

## Module outline

Discuss the existence of a large number of sources of information with which to evaluate electoral processes' quality and EMB effectiveness. They can be grouped into three general levels:

- 1. Individual level:** present how individual voters' opinions sit at the centre of **individual-level** measures of electoral integrity. These can be aggregated to other levels and can be measured using different sources, including non-systematic media coverage and public opinion surveys using a nationally or locally representative sample of citizens. Discuss how opinions that appear in **media coverage** can be biased and unrepresentative in a number of ways, but have the benefit of being timely and can sometimes provide concise and memorable summaries of the problems or opportunities during the electoral process. Present how **public opinion surveys** take a more systematic approach and can be conducted by both domestic and international actors.
- 2. Domestic level:** flag how this level of information can come from three general areas—the **EMB** itself, the media, and domestic observers and other interested organizations. EMBs vary widely in their efforts at transparency regarding their activities. Stress how the **domestic media** also provide information about election quality and EMB performance. They might also be systematically targeted for repression by autocratic governments. Point out that the third type of domestic information comes from domestic **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs), some of which provide crowd-sourced information and monitoring that overlaps with another module.
- 3. International level:** exhibit four general types of information regarding EMB performance and electoral integrity—the international media, international monitoring organizations and their reports, research that uses statistical tools of forensics to determine whether vote counts are manipulated, and expert surveys and other academic research and data collection efforts. Discuss **the international media's** characteristics and point out that **international organizations** also gather and disseminate relevant information including election-monitoring organizations.

Discuss the field of **electoral forensics**, which involves mathematically determining whether the votes candidates or parties receive are distributed as if by chance or by human interference—i.e., whether certain numbers are systematically overrepresented.

Debate the **academic data collection efforts** that include indices of democracy and autocracy and provide a heuristic snapshot of where countries or elections sit relative to how they did in the past or compared to other countries.

Present **expert surveys** that deal with the difficulties of measurement and observational equivalence by asking academics, policymakers or businesspersons with demonstrated experience in a particular area to make judgments about specific, hard-to-measure de facto observance of laws or practices.

Analyse **empirical trends** in electoral practice, mispractice and malpractice across countries:

- **Electoral practice** constitutes a process that follows international and domestic norms (as described in the previous module).
- **Electoral mispractice** signifies events and actions that are attributable mainly to institutional shortcomings, lack of capacity and mistakes.
- **Electoral malpractice** denotes the active manipulation or exploitation of electoral institutions and processes with the intent to influence the result.

Briefly overview several indicative studies and reports related to different forms of information:

- **Individual level:** survey data has been used to gauge a wide variety of details regarding the electoral process using overall measures of election integrity.
- **Domestic level:** there are an increasing number of sources available with which to assess electoral processes.
- **International level:** observer mission final reports represent the traditional source of international information about election results.

## Recommended resources

1. Alvarez, R. Michael, Atkeson, Lonna Rae, and Hall, Thad E., *Evaluating Elections: A Handbook of Methods and Standard* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
2. Birch, Sarah, *Electoral Malpractice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)
3. Blais, André and Gélinau, François, 'Winning, Losing and Satisfaction with Democracy', *Political Studies*, 55 (2007), pp. 425–41
4. Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., *The American Voter, Unabridged Edition* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1960)
5. Ellis, Erin, 'A Vote of Confidence: Retrospective Voting in Africa', Working paper No. 147 (Afrobarometer, 2014)
6. Entmann, Robert M., 'Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power', *Journal of Communication*, 57/1 (2007), pp. 163–73

7. European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, *Public Opinion in the European Union: Standard Eurobarometer 81* (Brussels: European Commission, 2014)
8. Frank, Richard W., 'The Strategy Behind Election Violence', Paper presented at the pre-APSA Workshop on Electoral Integrity, Chicago, IL, 28 August 2013
9. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2014* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2014)
10. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Hyde, Susan D. and Jablonski, Ryan S., 'When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?' *British Journal of Political Science*, 44/1 (2014), pp. 149–79
11. Mebane, Walter and Kalinin, Kirill, 'Comparative Election Fraud Detection', Paper presented at the APSA conference, Toronto, Canada, 2009
12. Myagkov, Mikhail, Ordeshook, Peter C. and Shakin, Dimitri, *The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
13. Norris, Pippa, Frank, Richard W. and Martínez i Coma, Ferran, *The Year in Elections, 2013* (Sydney: Electoral Integrity Project, 2014)
14. Norris, Pippa, *Why Electoral Integrity Matters* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014)
15. Norris, Pippa, Frank, Richard W. and Martínez i Coma, Ferran, *Advancing Electoral Integrity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014)
16. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Final Report, 2012 Russian Presidential Election* (Warsaw: OSCE, 2012)
17. Rundlett, Ashlea and Svulik, Milan W., 'Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud', Working paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014
18. Whitten-Woodring, Jenifer, 'Watchdog or Lapdog? Media Freedom, Regime Type, and Government Respect for Human Rights', *International Studies Quarterly*, 53/3 (2009), pp. 595–625
19. World Values Survey Association, *World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014, v.20140429*, <<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>>

## Module 3: Security considerations in the different electoral phases

<b>Learning objectives</b>	To distinguish between the main security threats and possible prevention and mitigation options during different electoral phases.
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electoral security considerations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Electoral phases</li> <li>– Electoral actors</li> <li>– Motives</li> <li>– Type of violence (harm)</li> <li>– Electoral risk factors</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Electoral security throughout the electoral cycle <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Prevention and mitigation of electoral violence</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Legal and institutional electoral framework</li> <li>• Planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities</li> <li>• Training and education</li> <li>• Registration of voters, political parties and election observers</li> <li>• Electoral campaigning</li> <li>• Voting operations</li> <li>• Election results announcement</li> <li>• The post-election phase</li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	Nepal 2007, Indonesia 1999, Colombia 2009/2011, Mexico 2009/2012, India 2011, Guinea Bissau 2005, Bhutan 2008, Kenya 2013, Guyana 2001, Nepal 2008, Nicaragua 2008, Azerbaijan 2003, DRC 2006, Cambodia 2008, Guatemala 2011, Côte d'Ivoire 2010, Haiti 2010/11
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

### Methodological remarks

This module will highlight the main conceptual approaches to electoral security, including security concerns that need to be addressed during different phases of the electoral cycle.

Security is broadly defined as the state of being protected or safe from harm. By analogy, the electoral security concept relates to keeping electoral processes safe and protected from harm. Due to the dynamism and complexity of electoral processes and election-related violence, electoral security efforts need

to be tailored to address concerns relating to the specific electoral phases, the multiplicity of actors, and the motives and manifestations of threats.

## Module outline

Discuss the different **electoral phases** and introducing the concept of the electoral cycle as the most common concept used to operationalize, analyse or visualize electoral processes: before, during and after elections. These periods can be further broken down into eight electoral phases:

1. legal and institutional electoral framework;
2. planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities;
3. training and education;
4. registration of voters, political parties and election observers;
5. electoral campaigning;
6. voting operations;
7. election results announcement; and
8. the post-election phase.

Present the **electoral actors**: citizens (in the capacity of registrants, voters, candidates and participants in campaigns); political parties; journalists and media; and electoral officials and bodies. Discuss the interplay between these actors, which takes different forms across the electoral cycle, might lead to violent conflicts.

Present **motives** of election-related violence may occur spontaneously and that separate cases of election-related violence can be organized to influence electoral outcomes. The perpetrators' position in, or towards, elections may help understand their incentives for resorting to violent tactics including: seeking electoral advantages, disrupting elections, and manipulating elections.

Discuss **types of violence (harm)** directed against electoral actors; events, materials and facilities constitute election-related violence, which is a sub-category of political violence. This violence can take the form of physical violence (killing, causing physical injuries, etc.) or psychological violence (threats, blackmail, coercion).

Present the **electoral risk factors** that could be internal: some aspects of electoral processes are challenged, poorly implemented or spoiled, this may create tensions, conflict, or the deterioration of the security situation through violence. Or external: are less dynamic and could be present throughout the whole electoral cycle, hence represent a latent threat to electoral processes.

Utilize the conceptual framework to discuss **electoral security throughout the electoral cycle** along with the **prevention and mitigation measures** in each of its phases:

- legal and institutional electoral framework
- planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities:
  - training and education;
  - registration of voters, political parties and election observers;
  - electoral campaigning;
  - voting operations;
  - election results announcement; and
  - the post-election phase.

## Recommended resources

1. International IDEA, *The Guide on Factors of Election-related Violence Internal to Electoral Processes* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2013)
2. International IDEA, *The Guide on Action Points for the Prevention and Mitigation of Election-related Violence* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2013)
3. US Agency for International Development [USAID], *Best Practices in Electoral Security, A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Programming* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2013)
4. US Agency for International Development [USAID], *Electoral Security Framework, Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2010)
5. Alihodžić, Sead, 'Elections, Violence and Peace', in Andrea Iff (ed.), *Ballots or Bullets, Potentials and Limitations of Elections in Conflict Contexts* (Berne: Swisspeace, 2011)
6. Alihodžić, Sead, 'Building Resilience to Electoral Risks (Risks during the Campaign Phase and Electoral Risk Management)', ACE Electoral Network Newsletter, May 2014
7. Höglund, Kristine, 'Electoral Violence: Causes, Concepts and Consequences', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21/3 (2009), pp. 412–27
8. UN Development Programme [UNDP], *Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming* (New York: UNDP, 2010)
9. Fischer, Jeff, *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2002)

## Module 4: The role of security forces

### Learning objectives

- To understand the role of security forces during the electoral cycle, including how security forces operate and coordinate with each other, EMBs and other stakeholders
- To inform stakeholders about the roles, responsibilities and conduct of security personnel during the electoral cycle

### Key subtopics

Key subtopics of this module are:

- Defining electoral security
- Security forces and election security stakeholders
- Electoral security: a safeguard for human rights
- Security forces, power and democracy: the controversy
- EMBs and security forces
- The conduct of security forces
- Roles and responsibilities of security forces throughout the electoral cycle
- Pre-election period
  - Legal framework
  - Planning and implementation
  - Training and education
  - Voter registration
  - Candidate registration
  - Electoral campaign
  - Electoral period
  - Voting operations and election day
  - Verification of results
  - Post-election period
- Planning command and control
  - Security plan
  - Planning best practices
    - Planning in partnership
    - Planning for possible scenarios
    - Training staff
    - Exercise the plans and processes
- Planning at all levels
- Command, control and communications
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC)
- Command, control and deployment of multiple security actors
- Major incidents



<b>Key subtopics [cont.]</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk assessment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Contextual analysis</li> <li>– Operational and logistical information</li> <li>– Electoral security/violence related information</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Historical conflict</li> <li>• Stakeholders analysis</li> <li>• Monitoring of incidents of violence</li> <li>• Code of conduct and training security forces</li> <li>• Coordination and cooperation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– International electoral assistance</li> <li>– International observation missions</li> <li>– Domestic civil society <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Domestic observation</li> <li>- Opinion polls</li> <li>- Civic and voter education</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>• Media</li> <li>• Political parties</li> <li>• Paramilitary groups</li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Costa Rica: the relationship between the EMB and security forces during elections</li> <li>• Egypt: the role of security in election operations and the influence of public perception on the choice of security deployment</li> <li>• Kyrgyzstan: the use of Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Project</li> <li>• Lebanon: the adoption of Lebanon Electoral Violence Risk Assessment (LEVRA) by the Ministry of Interior (Mol) and the deployment of multiple security agencies on election day</li> <li>• Yemen: the role of security in logistics, political controversies about the role of the army and cascade training challenges</li> <li>• Kenya: challenges in security management</li> <li>• Nigeria: manipulation of security forces by incumbent government</li> <li>• United Kingdom: additional deployment of police in areas identified as risky</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	120 min.

## Methodological remarks

This module is designed to inform the wide spectrum of election stakeholders about the roles, responsibilities and conduct of security personnel during the electoral cycle. It tackles key aspects of election security, including how security forces operate and coordinate with each other, EMBs and other stakeholders (e.g., civil society, observers and media) during the electoral cycle.

Establish a clear, shared understanding of the division of responsibilities between election staff and security personnel, and the reporting lines and chain of command that coincide with those assigned responsibilities. Most importantly, point out the importance of ensuring that the presence, conduct and perception of security personnel is seen as a contributing factor to democratic, safe and fair elections.

Highlight security considerations that go beyond the direct responsibility of security forces and their operations. This holistic approach to election security includes legal, political and outreach activities that are performed by other actors including political parties, the media and legislative and civil society organizations (CSOs).

## Module outline

Present the basic **definition of ‘electoral security’** as the state of being free from danger or threat. Consider security as more than the absence of a physical threat or an armed conflict; it is an environment in which individuals can thrive and exercise their rights freely.

Provide different perspectives of security from governments, civil society and ordinary citizens.

Present modern definitions of the security sector relating to **security forces and election security stakeholders** such as the armed forces, security forces, state oversight and management bodies, CSOs, and justice and rule of law institutions.

Discuss how an election requires complex operations and the involvement of a wide pool of actors. Note that ‘security forces’ is used in this curriculum to refer to all statutory bodies with a capacity to use force, including the military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence services, border, coast and penitentiary guards, and other public security services. Define election security stakeholders as the wider constituents of the security sector and parties that contribute to mitigating a potential conflict including political leaders, traditional and religious leaders and paramilitary groups.

Present the **relationship between elections, security and human rights**. Elections are a mechanism that reflects the political voice and will of the people involved as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Security is also a right with international and regional treaties protecting the right to security of the person, which includes protection from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile.

Flag how the engagement of **security forces in the electoral process entails the controversies of power**, neutrality and civil control relating to the broader debate of democratic control of the armed forces. Discuss these as key themes in the civil-military relationship and the public perception of security forces. Present aspects of the misuse of power that might lead to: (1) a self-serving security actor pursuing its own interests and objectives or (2) a situation in which security forces are an apparatus of the incumbent government or elements thereof.

Present the notion of ‘democratic control of the armed forces’, which establishes the norms and standards governing the relationship between the armed forces and society. Discuss parameters with which to examine the security sector in general, particularly in the context of electoral operations that have civilian control of the security sector, respect for democratic governance, non-interference in domestic politics and an effective chain of command as crucial principles of election security.

Discuss the **relationship between EMBs and security forces** as a key element in the electoral process. Discuss how EMBs are usually charged with the task of making effective planning and arrangements to facilitate the electoral operations, and how security planning and the deployment of security forces are integral aspects of these operations. Flag the responsibility for election security and the control of security forces as an ambiguous area of electoral management. Include the debate of the three EMB models (independent, governmental, mixed) and their relationships with security forces. Relate this to the three models of coordination and communications for security operations (EMB led, security force led, mixed).

Note how security forces should conduct themselves:

- maintain **neutrality and non-interference** in domestic politics;
- assure **equal treatment and non-discrimination** to all citizens;
- respect and obey the **rule of law**;
- employ **non-violent means** first, and use force only when strictly necessary; and
- remain accountable to the **civilian government** and the people.

Present the ‘right-based approach’ as a comprehensive human-focused approach to election security that requires the broad engagement of security personnel (i.e., not limited to election day or the electoral sites).

Discuss the **roles and responsibilities of security forces during the various stages of the electoral cycle**, paying particular attention to the period between the call for elections and the announcement of results. This is outlined at the national and local levels, with a particular focus on electoral sites. Briefly present the characteristics and role of the security forces in the following phases of the electoral cycle:

- pre-election period;
- voter registration;
- candidate registration;
- electoral campaign;
- election period;
- voting operations and election day; and
- post-election period.

Present the basic functions of **planning, command and control**. Highlight that the production of a **security plan** for an electoral event is the joint responsibility of the statutory election security stakeholders defined earlier in this module. Present the difference between an election security plan and its key elements.

Discuss how during the electoral cycle it is particularly important to plan for interoperability between stakeholders. Consider planning **best practices**, including planning in partnership, planning for possible scenarios, training staff, and exercising plans and processes.

While it is critical to plan at the level of the central EMB, **planning needs to take place at all levels**. Flag commanders' requirements to carefully assess the information available, make judgments about and respond to risks, make suitable administrative arrangements for deployment, and coordinate with other units and agencies. Present the IIMARCH framework as a useful memory tool to consider various factors:

- **I**nformation;
- **I**ntention;
- **M**ethod;
- **A**dministration;
- **R**isk assessment;
- **C**ommunications; and
- **H**uman rights.

Discuss the relationship between **command, control and communication** as the system and structures that enables the knowledgeable exercise of authority and direction by the designated commanders over assigned and attached forces.

Link previous discussions on the context of elections and the **chain of command** structure to: supporting and guiding the election and security officials; receiving and sifting the daily reports from security officials at all levels in the chain with intelligence on how the operation is running in their area of responsibility; and responding in a coordinated fashion to any developing security situations.

Highlight the importance of establishing a **Joint Election Operations Centre (JEOC)**. Emphasize that, although responsibility for broader internal security usually lies with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defence (MoD), there is a clear need for close liaison between the EMB and representatives of various security agencies or ministries such as the MoI, MoD and civil defence representatives, among others. The JEOC is ideally established during the pre-election period as an integral step in planning and preparation for implementation.

Explain the functioning and structure of the JEOC in practical terms, comprising an operations room, a meeting room and (ideally) a briefing room.

Explain how the **command and control structure**, which involves the presence of multiple security stakeholders, is a delicate subject. Debate the following challenges that emerge as a result of this situation:

- differences in training and conduct;
- differences in equipment;
- parallel chains of command; and
- integration of different intelligence findings.

Explain how the existence of a JEOC does not necessarily eliminate the conventional operation centres of the individual security actors (e.g., MoI and MoD). Discuss how command, control and communications during the election period can be provided. Present key models for preventing challenges such as parallel chains of command and multiple security agencies.

Present examples of **major incidents, and the corresponding actions required by the JEOC** that require the implementation of special arrangements by the emergency services and include the involvement, directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people.

Explain how effective security planning must be built on thorough **risk assessments** and followed by regular monitoring of the changing dynamics including trends in violent incidents. Present generic frameworks to identify factors for election security risk assessment, including contextual analysis, historical conflict and stakeholder analysis. A systemic risk assessment is developed by analysing trends and patterns in a given context, and identifying standardized risk factors and indicators. Present the different components of risk assessments, such as **contextual analysis, operations and logistics, electoral security and violence-related information**.

Explain that security agencies use intelligence and local resources to develop risk analyses and inform security planning. Indicate that risk assessment and mapping tools are advanced methods of information management and presentation rather than ground-breaking methods of assessing risks. Highlight the importance of risk assessment tools that are owned by security forces and incorporate security intelligence. Discuss the sensitivity of security information and the potential debate regarding its management. Link this to the JEOC, which can form a space for coordination and establishing trust among different actors.

Discuss how monitoring violent incidents is an integral part of risk assessments and the overall monitoring of context. Explain that incidents are a risk indicator that influences risk assessments and therefore informs planning.

Emphasize that the professionalism of the security forces is a key element of delivering credible elections. Discuss how a lack of sufficient training for security forces could be seen as contributing to violence during electoral events.

Explain how capacity challenges are addressed through special trainings developed ahead of the electoral event that includes up-to-date information based on the legal framework, international best practices and the political context. Professional training promotes public trust that the process is ‘in good hands’.

Explain that EMBs and security forces need to ensure that security personnel are well trained. Highlight that the delivery of effective training depends on five factors: conducting an adequate needs assessment, addressing the relevant subjects, employing an adequate method, developing user-friendly material and adhering to the appropriate time frame. Discuss how these factors are crucial to ensuring the proper delivery of the intended knowledge.

Discuss different approaches to capacity needs assessment. Discuss the different subjects that could be provided to security forces in their respective capacities—link the role of security forces to the different stages of the electoral cycle.

Present the four main methods of delivering conventional training courses: **cascade training, mobile teams, simultaneous training** and the **use of international experience**.

Present the different types of training materials: manuals, instructions, memory tools, video and code of conduct. Explain how security forces can combine different methods and materials to increase effectiveness and ensure consistency. Discuss how the timing of training can be useful to ensure the ‘freshness of knowledge’ and therefore maximize performance.

Discuss how election security stakeholders work with non-state actors including **political parties, NGOs, paramilitary groups, media**, international organizations and special guests. Link these themes to Module 12: Identifying electoral security interventions.

Explain the two levels of engaging security forces with other actors: (1) the support provided by these actors in aid of election security; and (2) how security forces can perform their duties to ensure they exercise their roles without impediments.

Present the different activities/actors with which security forces have to coordinate. Discuss: (1) coordination with the international community in the context of international electoral assistance and international election observation missions; and (2) coordination with local civil society in the context of domestic election observation, opinion polls, civic and voter education, and the media.

Discuss the relationship between security forces and paramilitary groups, and link to Module 3.

Explain how women, men and children experience insecurity differently in any given context and interact with security institutions and processes in different ways. Present the notion of gender and how it can be considered at three different levels: institutional composition and recognition of diversity, planning and decision-making, and operations.

## Recommended resources

1. College of Policing, ‘Core Planning Principles’, 2013, <<https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/operational-planning/core-principles/>>, accessed 12 June 2015
2. Fischer, Jeff, *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2002)

3. Bastick, Megan and Whitman, Tobie, *A Women's Guide to Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Inclusive Security and DCAF, 2013)
4. Carter Center, *Election Obligations and Standards: A Carter Center Assessment Manual* (Atlanta, Ga.: Carter Center, 2014)
5. UN Development Programme [UNDP], *Elections and Conflict Prevention: a Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming* (New York: UNDP, 2009)
6. UK Inspectorate of Constabulary, *Without Fear or Favour: A Review of Police Relationships* (London: HMIC, 2011), <<http://www.justiceinspectrates.gov.uk/hmic/media/a-review-of-police-relationships-20111213.pdf>>, accessed 1 July 2015
7. International IDEA, *Electoral Management Design: Revised edition* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014), <<http://www.idea.int/publications/emd/>>
8. Bastick, Megan, *Integrating Gender into Internal Police Oversight* (Geneva: DCAF, OSCE and OSCE/ODIHR, 2014)
9. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNHCR], *Human Rights Standards and Practice for the Police* (Geneva: UNHCHR, 2004)
10. US Agency for International Development [USAID], *Electoral Security Framework: Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2010)
11. UN Development Programme [UNDP], *Elections, Violence and Conflict Prevention, Summary Report* (Barcelona: European Commission and UNDP, 2010)
12. Alihodžić, Sead and Kaiser, Shana, *Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election-related Conflict and Violence* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2010)
13. US Agency for International Development [USAID], *Best Practices in Electoral Security: A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Programming* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2013)

<b>Module 5: Electoral security in peace processes and transitions</b>	
<b>Learning objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To discuss electoral processes in countries in (or emerging from) armed conflict</li> <li>• To understand election-related violence within the broader framework of political violence</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elections as a primary vehicle to exit war</li> <li>• Why are security challenges different in post-conflict countries?</li> <li>• Other threats to security in conflict-affected states</li> <li>• Elections as a benchmark</li> <li>• How long for transitional arrangements and elections?</li> <li>• Timeline for one step forward in institutional performance</li> <li>• Security actors in transition: who to partner with?</li> <li>• Logistics and the (re)militarization of political space</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

## Methodological remarks

This module covers the challenge of elections in countries in, or emerging from, armed conflict. Over the last five years, increasing research has been directed toward understanding and preventing electoral violence. One motivation for addressing this type of violence is the experience that systemic violence threatens economic development and transitions to democracy.

While there is no universal definition of electoral violence, a recent UN report on election-related violence and killings quotes working definitions from five authors. The *2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development* classifies electoral violence as one of several forms of organized violence. It notes that the remaining forms of 21<sup>st</sup> century conflict and violence ‘do not fit neatly into “war” and “peace” or into “criminal violence” or “political violence”’. This situates electoral violence in a broader frame, within which researchers are recognizing that the world is increasingly violent.

## Module outline

Discuss how elections are an integral part of any political transition and serve as a **primary vehicle to exit war**, and how balancing an open and inclusive national or local election with safety and security is particularly challenging in a country in (or emerging from) armed conflict. Present how elections are counted as the single-most common provision in peace agreements.



Discuss how elections, one of the most widely used tools for ending violent conflict, seek to convert politics by violence into politics by ballot, redistribute power, and legitimately re-establish the executive and legislative arms of the state.

Flag how political transitions are closely associated with changes in social, ethnic, religious and historical identity. Elections in these contexts work when political actors seek to use populations rather than armies to attain their goals. Electoral security challenges are related to these broader transitional issues, as well as to political leaders, transitional justice and the opportunity for transformation at the local level.

Discuss **why security challenges are different in post-conflict countries**. Present that there are often numerous readily identifiable threats to security in conflict-affected states. For example, while police and armed forces are often charged with logistics and providing security for elections, they may enjoy little civilian trust, and indeed may be the source of the main threats to electoral security.

Note that beyond the implementation of political agreements, the challenge of organizing and securing these electoral processes stands out. Post-conflict electoral processes since the end of the Cold War have perhaps been the largest-scale, most complex and highly visible exercises involving the largest number of national and international actors.

Highlight that although elections are the most common provision in peace agreements, there are other threats to security in conflict-affected states. Security issues taken together have the greatest number of provisions overall, which does not necessarily translate into remedies or the creation of a safe society.

Discuss how challenges confronting and involving these security actors and societies embarking on an electoral contest can include spikes in civil disorder, domestic violence, transnational threats, more organized and capable criminal groups, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which create significant security and disarmament challenges in the years following the cessation of armed conflict.

Present how another burden in conflict-affected states is **elections as a benchmark** of progress, or its reverse. For some, they have also been a key measure of 'the exit strategy', signalling sufficient stability to warrant the downsizing and exit of armed UN and other Security Council-mandated military and police. But the pressure to find positive results in these elections can hide negative longer-term legacies.

Discuss how emerging political settlements make the timing and sequencing of different events crucial. Exemplify with how, during the 1990s, negotiators for many peace processes pushed for the shortest possible time to conduct the first national elections, and the shortest time for transitional political arrangements to be in place. Discuss the **ideal timings of transitional arrangements and elections**. Present recent research that has attempted to quantify lessons learned

on how long processes of institution building and political recovery can take in conflict-affected states. Present the examples of a similar trend of short transitions of power that has been observed in recent cases of coups or departures from constitutional order that led to elections in less than two years.

Discuss how short transition periods provide little space to consider ambitious plans to fundamentally alter the political and security environment before an election. This has implications for all subsequent elections, since these key political questions likely remain unresolved. Many civil wars in the last decade have also had much longer initial transition periods, which has implications for the security of the first and subsequent elections.

Discuss the role of the different **security actors in transition: who to partner with**. Providing a secure environment for peaceful electoral competition is made more difficult when primary security providers are under political, public or logistical pressure. Present recent analysis of power-sharing vs. power-dividing arrangements has found that incorporating former enemies into security institutions can produce positive outcomes. In countries affected by civil war, electoral security may require the armed forces and police to secure the political space for their former enemies. The neutrality of the security sector is therefore a key concern.

Discuss the common perception that security issues trump technical issues in post-conflict electoral settings, when keeping the peace is prioritized, which can result in the ‘militarization’ of the space for political competition. Present how particular challenges can arise in the arrangements for first national elections where the neutrality of the security sector is a key concern. The extraordinary resources required for electoral administration can overwhelm small temporary EMB institutions with minimal subnational structures, which can often prompt security providers to step in and take control of security and operational matters, thus militarizing a recently demilitarized landscape.

## Recommended resources

1. Democracy and Election Alliance Nepal [DEAN], *Political/Election Violence Education and Resolution (P/EVER) Project: Final Report* (Kathmandu: DEAN, 2008)
2. Pokharel, Bhojraj, Malla-Dhakal, Rajju and Morrice, Adrian, *Electoral Violence and Mitigation Report – Nepal* (Kathmandu: Electoral Commission, Nepal and UNDP, 2012)
3. Gillies, David (ed.), *Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peacebuilding* (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2011)
4. United Nations [UN], *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Election-related Violence and Killings* (New York and Geneva: UN, 2012), pp. 4–6

5. World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, Overview* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011), pp. 2–4, 7, 39
6. Kadima, Denis, Leonard, David K. and Schmidt, Anna, ‘Elections and Democratisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, *Journal of African Elections*, 8/1, (2009), pp 14-48
7. Suhrke, Astri, Wimpelmann, Torunn and Dawes, Marcia, *Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements* (Washington, D.C. and New York: World Bank and UNDP, 2007), p. 27, Figure 3
8. Reilly, B., ‘Understanding Elections in Conflict Situations’, in David Gillies (ed.), *Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peacebuilding* (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2011)
9. Mayer-Rieckh, Alexander and de Greiff, Pablo (eds), *Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies* (Brooklyn, NY: Social Science Research Council, 2007)
10. International Center for Transitional Justice [ICTJ], *Factsheet: Pursuing Peace, Justice* (New York: ICTJ, 2012)
11. Lindberg, S. I., *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins Press, 2006)
12. Smith, S. S., *Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition* (Boulder, Colo.: First Forum Press, 2011)
13. Culbertson, Roberta and Pouligny, Batrice, ‘Re-imagining Peace After Mass Crime: A Dialogical Exchange Between Insider and Outsider Knowledge’, in Beatrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities* (New York: UN University Press, 2007), pp. 271–87
14. Jones, Bruce and Elgin-Cossart, Molly, *Development in the Shadow of Violence: A Knowledge Agenda for Policy* (New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2011), p. 12
15. Hutchful, Eboe, *Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements* (London: UK Department for International Development and African Security Sector Network, 2009)
16. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, *Global Burden of Armed Violence* (Geneva: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2011)
17. Collier, P., *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), p. 83

18. Martin, Harriet, *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), p. 24
19. Lyons, Terrence, *Voting for Peace: Post-Conflict Elections in Liberia* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1998)
20. Papagianni, Katia, 'Participation and State Legitimation', in Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth, *Building States to Build Peace* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2008)
21. Marinov, Nikolay and Goemans, Hein, 'Coups and Democracy', *British Journal of Political Science*, 44 (2013), pp. 799–825
22. Call, Charles T., *UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition After Constitutional Crises* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2012), Table 1
23. Powell, Jonathan and Thyne, Clayton L., 'Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 48/2 (2011), pp. 249–59
24. Morrice, Adrian, Australian Civil Military Centre, Background Paper, Security Sector Reform Trends (unpublished)
25. Morrice, Adrian, Cobos Flores, Francisco and O'Shea, Mary, *Lessons Learned: Integrated Electoral Assistance in UN Mission Settings* (New York and Geneva: UNDP, UNDPA and UNDPKO, 2013)
26. Collier, P., *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 177
27. Call, Charles T., *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p. 215
28. Laporte-Oshiro, Alison, *From Militants to Policemen: Three Lessons from US Experience with DDR and SSR* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 2011), p. 1

## Module 6: Stakeholder analysis

<b>Learning objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To analyse stakeholders in the context of their role as guardians or contributors to electoral security, as potential perpetrators of electoral conflict, or as potential targets/victims of such conflict</li> <li>To discuss the contribution of all stakeholders to the security environment during the electoral cycle</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Context</li> <li>Stakeholders and responsibility</li> <li>Legislature</li> <li>Political Parties</li> <li>EMB</li> <li>Security Forces</li> <li>Other government institutions</li> <li>Electoral dispute resolution (EDR) bodies</li> <li>Civil society</li> <li>Media (introduction)</li> <li>National human rights institutions (NHRI)</li> <li>International community</li> </ul>
<b>Case study</b>	Nepal: 2008 Constituent Assembly election
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

### Methodological remarks

Stakeholders include both state and non-state actors that may be perpetrators and/or victims of electoral conflict; in some cases, they are also responsible for enforcing electoral security.

More often than not in the course of transitioning to democracy, conflict has become an integral feature of electoral processes. Such conflict takes various forms, from physical violence to the mere threat of violence, perpetrated by a variety of stakeholders against various stakeholders and assets, too often with the collusion of the very state institutions mandated to prevent it. Nevertheless, this has not precluded elections from taking place in unsettled circumstances, making conflict a somewhat regular feature of many transitional elections. This paradigm has brought with it an increasing number of technical security measures to deter from violence, reduce its occurrence and mitigate its consequences.

## Module outline

Discuss the **context** of an electoral process and how electoral violence should not be considered in isolation from the overall political or social context in which it takes place. While the timing place and type of electoral violence will vary from one country to another, it is always framed within the political and social historical context in which that process is organized. Existing social cleavages, identity-politics, social stratification, ethnicity, demographics and political settlements are all examples of factors that will interact to set the context through which political and electoral violence will occur.

Highlight how political violence perpetrated for electoral purposes may have historic roots, particularly when elections are held after prolonged periods of conflict. In these cases, electoral violence may be a chronic, albeit partial, extension of a military conflict, with modified dynamics. The existence of arms and an acquired ‘culture’ of violence as the sole means of resolving a dispute are two other factors that contribute to the conflict being brought into the electoral process

Discuss how **stakeholders and their responsibilities** fit into this overall context. Discuss how stakeholders can be analysed in the context of their potential as perpetrators of electoral violence or as contributors to electoral security. Stakeholders include state and non-state actors and in some circumstances international actors:

- **State actors:** military, police, gendarmerie, intelligence agencies auxiliary forces, national and local legislatures, EMBs, statutory bodies such as media, land and boundary, anti-corruption and human rights commissions, courts, government ministries such as Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior.
- **Non-state actors:** civil society organization, political parties, the media, domestic observer groups, traditional leaders, religious groups private security companies, insurgents and rebels and criminal groups
- **International stakeholders:** such as multilateral organizations invited or mandated to assist or observe (UN, EU, OSCE, NATO), bilateral assistance providers (donors and implementing I/NGOs).

Present the role of the **legislature** responsible for the laws governing the conduct of the elections and the roles and responsibilities of the EMB, security forces, and other relevant processes (dispute resolution) and stakeholders (political parties, CSOs, media, etc.), in accordance with the constitution and international (and regional) obligations and standards.

Introduce the role of **political actors** (political parties, independent candidates, candidate/party agents). Political parties have some of the highest stakes in the process and thus, alongside the government, have the greatest, most direct interest in either protecting or abusing it.

Ask participants to develop a mapping of all stakeholders in their particular country context, and to highlight their potential as victims or perpetrators of

violence. When determining which stakeholders might be the perpetrators of violence lead participants through a discussion on the motives for potential perpetrators. Are the motives long-standing or more recent, are they geographically specific, who do they seek to target and why? Participants should also identify at what stage of the electoral cycle, the pre-electoral, electoral or post-electoral period are most likely to be targeted by potential perpetrators. Discuss how there might be many potential spoilers with different motives targeting different parts of the electoral period, or in other instances targets and timing might be the similar.

Once a mapping of stakeholders has been conducted including outlining motives, timing and targets of potential perpetrators, discuss what mechanisms can be utilized to mitigate electoral violence and promote a secure electoral environment by working through an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the key stakeholders, with some examples provided below.

Discuss the role of **the EMB**, what its mandate is in relation to electoral security and what its responsibilities are for creating a secure electoral environment. Highlight how no one institution is responsible for electoral security, and link the role of **security forces** as outlined in module 4 to the electoral security architecture. Introduce the legal mandate of security forces within an election period including what their roles and responsibilities are.

Broaden the discussion and present the role of **other government institutions** such as the various line ministries (MoI, MoD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) etc.) and the prime minister's office to the particular context. Increasingly, the MoFA and its embassies have a role in facilitating a secure election abroad, by negotiating security arrangements with the host country governments, establishing adequate internal measures when elections take place in embassies, inviting international observers, or entering assistance agreements with bilateral and multilateral donors or implementing agencies.

Highlight **electoral dispute resolution (EDR) bodies** as important stakeholders in the electoral security framework. These include the court system, from the Constitutional or Supreme Court (for rulings and interpretations of the constitution), to regular courts (which have jurisdiction over electoral or criminal matters). Discuss how cooperation between law enforcement and EDR bodies' makes for more effective handling of electoral complains and breaches of the electoral security framework, thus contributing to further prevention.

Ask participants to identify the memorandums of understandings and official arrangements that exist between state bodies to ensure electoral security, and to identify any gaps and/or improvements that could be made in terms of collaboration between state agencies.

Introduce the role of **civil society** (observer and voter education NGOs, human rights NGOs, voters, public at large), and how it plays an important role in the security of an electoral process by creating and supporting an enabling environment. The presence of observers may help deter violence on Election Day but people on the ground might treat domestic and international observer's

presence differently. Voter education (through either state or non-state channels) is also critical to creating this enabling environment for safe elections.

Discuss the role of the **media** (reference module 7 on media), identifying the different types of media outlets that exist including state, private, traditional online and social media. Debate how the media can be both a mitigator and promoter of electoral violence. Discuss how providing accurate, neutral and conflict sensitive information can promote a peaceful electoral process. The media's role is commonly governed by the electoral legislation, specific codes of conduct, media legislation, and self- or state-regulatory mechanisms—although regulating online and social media still lags behind.

Present the role of **NHRIs** in helping the EMB and the security forces understand conflict dynamics, and identify policies and courses of action that are sensitive to the context and promote further socio-political transformation, among other activities.

Discuss the role of the **international community** in numerous post-conflict or transitional environments in which it has direct involvement through multilateral and bilateral assistance/observer missions and programmes. The international community potentially can have different roles with electoral security depending on the local context. Some roles have included advice, implementation or even remit for the conduct of the election, including in relation to security but also in relation to policies and activities that may have a bearing on security. Another critical type of international engagement is through international and regional observation to supplement the domestic organizations' role in protecting the integrity and security of the electoral process.

Finally, discuss how the state actors mandated with implementing an election and the secure around it can work with non-state actors (and if appropriate international actors) to promote a secure electoral environment. Introduce the concept of regular stakeholder consultative forums with political parties, CSOs, women empowerment organizations, the media, etc. to build a shared understanding of what is needed to deliver secure elections and everyone's role in it. Also introduce the concept of these forums and exchanges building trust in the electoral process and state bodies mandated to deliver it.

## Recommended resources

1. International IDEA, *Electoral Management Design: Revised edition, Chapter 8*, (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014)
2. International IDEA, *The Guide on Action Points for the Prevention and Mitigation of Election-related Violence* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2013)
3. US Agency for International Development [USAID], *Best Practices in Electoral Security, A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Programming* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2013)



4. US Agency for International Development [USAID], *Electoral Security Framework, Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2010)
5. Darnolf, Staffan and Cyllah, Almami, 'EMBs and Electoral Violence', in Almami Cyllah (ed.), *Elections Worth Dying for? A Selection of Case Studies from Africa* (Washington D.C.: IFES, 2014)
6. UN Development Programme [UNDP], *Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming* (New York: UNDP, 2010)
7. Fischer, Jeff, *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2002)
8. United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], *Understanding Election Violence in Asia* (Bangkok: UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Centre, 2011)
9. Abdullahi, Abubakar, 'Promoting credible elections in developing countries: International development partners and civil society organizations in Nigeria', *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol.9(5), May 2015, pp. 190-9

<b>Module 7: Media and electoral security</b>	
<b>Learning objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To present the role of the media (and social media) in elections, and the potential problems with media in divided societies and interventions to mitigate conflict</li> <li>• To explore how the media are intimately tied to the entire electoral cycle</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The role of media in elections</li> <li>• Media and security               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Free speech vs. hate speech</li> <li>– Lack of journalist training</li> <li>– Unequal access to the media</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Media violence and gender</li> <li>• EMBs and media</li> <li>• The growing importance of social media</li> <li>• EMBs, elections and social media</li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Zambia (2001): how inter-ethnic rivalries are used for political purposes</li> <li>• Russia: OCSE report of the 2012 election about the media favouring a specific candidate</li> <li>• Kenya (2008): hate speech and violence</li> <li>• United States: campaign and social media</li> <li>• New Zealand: campaign and social media</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

## Methodological remarks

This module presents the role of the media and social media in elections. It discusses how the media are intimately tied to the entire electoral cycle, serving as a critical source of information on everything from pre-election debates, to official results, to post-election analysis. While the media's primary role is to provide objective election-related reporting to promote a well-informed electorate, it also serves to reflect the public's concerns and interests and can undertake a negative role in fuelling conflicts or social strife.

Present the rise of social media as a new dimension of the media landscape, which provides important new pathways to disseminate information and facilitate interaction between citizens. While such interaction has, in many cases, promoted increased transparency and higher levels of public engagement, it has also spawned dangerous new avenues for the spread of hate speech, especially around elections.

## Module outline

Discuss **the role of the media in elections** to provide objective election-related reporting in order to promote a well-informed electorate throughout the electoral cycle. Present the following primary media functions during an electoral process:

1. watchdogs responsible for promoting transparency throughout the electoral cycle to ensure public access to the necessary information to make educated and informed choices;
2. vehicles for disseminating the party platforms of candidates and political parties to use a variety of means to reach out to, inform and connect with their constituents;
3. fora for public discussion and debate beyond traditional media, which is becoming increasingly interactive with the rise of social media; and
4. work as public educators in all the above roles, which can serve as vehicles for the dissemination of voter information.

Point out how each of these roles can be carried out during different stages of the electoral cycle.

Understand the connection between **media and security** through the discussion of key issues such as:

- **Free speech vs. hate speech:** how the media can have a positive or negative impact on security, either by providing relevant and accurate information to the public (which promotes security) or airing divisive hate speech (which can indirectly have a negative impact on security).
- **The lack of journalist training:** journalists in conflict areas or post-conflict contexts often have low skill levels. Without skills development related to research, fact-checking, story framing, story development and writing, there is a risk of inaccurate and unfair coverage of the electoral process, the proliferation of hate speech and the incitement of violence.
- **Unequal media access:** unfair and unbalanced coverage of parties and candidates can also threaten electoral security. Skewed media access can result in public frustration, the spread of misinformation and low levels of public confidence.

Discuss the relationship between the **media, violence and gender**. Present for discussion how women are especially vulnerable to violence both physically and psychologically during elections; although they experience one-third as many direct physical attacks as men, they are three times as likely to experience psychological violence, increasingly through social media.

Flag the potential **media interventions** that can be taken to integrate the idea of electoral security into the media's understanding of elections, and to incorporate the media into a proactive campaign to promote peaceful elections.

**EMB-media relations:** there should be a strong working relationship characterized by regular contact and frequent updates. Stress two suggestions:

1. The need to establish a media centre to facilitate communication with the media and provide a trusted space for the media to gather, ask questions and witness the administration of the election first-hand.
2. The EMBs and media houses should work together to discuss aspects of the election and clarify their respective roles throughout the electoral cycle, for example:
  - development of a media code of conduct;
  - joint development of a social media strategy;
  - training sessions on the electoral law and how the election will work;
  - discussions of what kinds of materials each institution will produce and who will disseminate them, etc.; and
  - agreement on the reporting of results, when results will be released, who will have access to them and who will report them.

Present the **growing importance of social media** and how the internet has dramatically altered the media landscape, mainly by facilitating many-to-many communication.<sup>5</sup> Unlike traditional media, social media allows for the simultaneous delivery of individualized messages to vast numbers of people.

To open the debate on new media, emphasize how it is much more difficult to distinguish between producers and consumers, and ordinary people are now empowered to be ‘citizen journalists’ by breaking news stories and disseminating information.

Present the importance of the connection between **EMBs, elections and social media** and how it can potentially facilitate the work of the EMB.

## Recommended resources

1. Allen, Tim and Stremlau, Nicole, *Media Policy, Peace and State Reconstruction* (London: Crisis States Research Centre, 2005), <<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28347/1/dp08.pdf>>
2. Ndhlovu, Gershon, ‘As Elections Approach, Zambia Sees Rising Social Media Hate Speech, Ethnic Tension’, *Global Voices*, 31 December 2014, <<http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/12/31/as-elections-approach-zambia-sees-rising-social-media-hate-speech-ethnic-tension/>>
3. Adamu, Peter, ‘A Bemba is a “Devil” – Tonga Campaign Song’, *Zambia Reports*, 26 December 2014, <<http://zambiareports.com/2014/12/26/bemba-devil-tonga-campaign-song/>>

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<sup>5</sup> Many-to-many communication is one of three major internet computing paradigms, characterized by multiple users contributing and receiving information, with the information elements often interlinked across different websites.

4. Armao, Rosemary, *Covering Elections: The Challenges of Training the Watchdogs* (Center for International Media Assistance, 2012), <<http://www.cima.ned.org/resource/covering-elections-the-challenges-of-training-the-watchdogs/>>
5. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma 3 December 2011 Final Report* (Vienna: OSCE, 2011), <<http://www.osce.org/odihr/86959?download=true>>, p. 13
6. Bardall, Gabrielle, *Breaking the Mold: Understanding Gender and Election Violence* (Washington, D.C.: IFES, 2011), <[http://www.ifes.org/-/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/Gender\\_and\\_Electoral\\_Violence\\_2011.pdf](http://www.ifes.org/-/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/Gender_and_Electoral_Violence_2011.pdf)>
7. Bardall, Gabrielle, 'Gender-Specific Election Violence: The Role of Information and Communication Technologies', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 2/3 (2013), pp. 60, 2
8. Davies, Lizzy, 'Laura Boldrini: The Italian Politician Rising above the Rape Threats', *The Guardian*, 9 February 2014, <<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/09/laura-boldrini-italian-politician-rape-threats>>
9. Gebeily, Maya, 'A New Idea out of Turkey: Using Twitter to Verify Election Results', *Global Post*, 8 April 2014, <<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/turkey/140408/meet-140journos-twitter-group-trying-prove-election-fraud-turkey>>
10. Shah, Seema and Brown, Rachel, *Programming for Peace: Sisi ni Amani Kenya and the 2013 Election* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Center for Global Communication Studies, University of Pennsylvania, 2014), pp. 7–9, <<http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/publications/programming-for-peace-sisi-ni-amani-kenya-and-the-2013-election/>>

## Module 8: Electoral justice and security

<b>Learning objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To analyse the link between security and electoral justice across the electoral cycle, as well as its mechanisms and procedures</li> <li>• To discuss how electoral justice creates public and political confidence in an electoral process</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is electoral justice and why does it matter?</li> <li>• International electoral standards and principles on electoral justice</li> <li>• Security and electoral justice</li> <li>• Approaches to electoral justice</li> <li>• Types of electoral disputes and mechanisms for managing electoral complaints</li> <li>• Key concepts for managing dispute and ensuring electoral justice</li> <li>• Establishing an effective and transparent legal framework             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Awareness</li> <li>– Accessibility</li> <li>– Timing</li> <li>– Coherence</li> <li>– Transparency</li> <li>– Stakeholder relations</li> <li>– Point of final instance</li> <li>– Enforcement and proportionality of punishment</li> <li>– EMB capacity</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Electoral integrity, the electoral process and key principles of electoral justice</li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kenya: importance of impartiality, trust and electoral justice during the post-election violence of 2007–08</li> <li>• Cambodia: use of informal mechanisms during the Cambodia Commune during the 2001 elections</li> <li>• Malawi: timely resolution of election disputes during its 2009 elections</li> <li>• Kenya: need for coherent dispute resolution processes as part of the candidate nomination process for the 2013 elections</li> <li>• Mozambique: need for transparency of EDR to register as a candidate for the 2009 parliamentary elections</li> <li>• Sri Lanka: creating institutions to ensure enforcement and compliance for the October 2001 elections</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

## Methodological remarks

This module presents the links between electoral justice and security, and promotes the discussion of electoral justice as a critical element of providing for the integrity of elections for both individuals and the broader interests of society.

## Module outline

Initiate a discussion of **electoral justice and why it matters**, presenting the **International Election Standards and Principles on Electoral Justice**, which cover regional and international conventions and commitments and list key principles for the conduct of a credible electoral process. The standards cover the importance of the different stakeholders' faith in impartial, independent courts and the security forces.

Note the different **approaches to electoral justice** provided through a number of means, including an election framework that provides the conditions for fair, competitive and credible elections; the impartial and effective management of the entire electoral process by an EMB; and an effective and responsive EDR process. Discuss the four **types of election disputes and challenges**:

1. fundamental rights;
2. administrative;
3. criminal; and
4. legislative.

Discuss the system of managing electoral complaints, and note the primary responsibilities: EMBs handle administrative matters, while the courts are responsible for criminal matters. Each country develops its own election adjudication system that reflects its unique political and cultural heritage, and responds to its own particular set of challenges. However, there are some common characteristics of systems as well as good practices.

Explore the potential **informal mechanisms** to be utilized. In some countries, informal mechanisms for resolving disputes may be used even though they require careful consideration. Show how these mechanisms can take a number of different forms, one of which is local coordination groups that comprise representatives of the EMB and political parties and even sometimes CSOs, traditional leaders and the police. They aim to address concerns and resolve disputes at the local level before they become a serious issue.

Present for discussion **key concepts of managing disputes and ensuring electoral justice**:

- Establishing an effective and transparent legal framework that:
  - articulates electoral rights and responsibilities, and the procedures for dealing with complaints; and
  - is in place throughout the electoral cycle.
- Awareness
  - engage parties and other stakeholders to distribute information;
  - use websites and social media to broadly distribute all information related to complaints and appeals; and
  - ‘protection through information’ from the EMB’s perspective.
- Accessibility
  - providing access to information and procedures in multiple languages;
  - tailor information to visually impaired persons;
  - avoid overly arduous and paper-heavy procedures;
  - use the internet as appropriate;
  - avoid centralizing complaints and appeals procedures in the capital; and
  - consider any cultural issues that may affect women’s access to the process.
- Additional concepts
  - election complaints adjudication must produce timely and efficient results;
  - the process for handling and adjudicating disputes needs to be coherent and consistent;
  - management and resolution of complaints and appeals must be transparent to create confidence and trust;
  - stakeholder relationships rely on close cooperation, trust and confidence to create the conditions for (and the feeling of) electoral justice;
  - need to have a coherent and understandable model and avoid the possibility of ‘decision shopping’; a clear and accepted point of final instance is needed to ensure clarity and further reinforce awareness and transparency;
  - need an adequate enforcement mechanism and a fair but transparent, meaningful and proportional set of related punishments for infringements; and
  - EMB needs adequate institutional powers and the capacity to manage the process and the stakeholders and related institutions.

Discuss **electoral integrity, the electoral process and key principles of electoral justice**. Highlight good practices of ensuring electoral justice throughout the electoral process.

## Recommended resources

1. International IDEA, *Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2010), <[http://www.idea.int/en/publications/electoral\\_justice/](http://www.idea.int/en/publications/electoral_justice/)>
2. International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES], *Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Elections* (Washington, D.C.: IFES, 2011), <<https://www.ifes.org/publications/guidelines-understanding-adjudicating-and-resolving-disputes-elections-guarde>>



3. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, <<http://aceproject.org>>
4. UN Development Programme [UNDP], *Elections and Conflict Prevention* (New York: UNDP, 2009), <[http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral\\_systemsandprocesses/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide.html](http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/electoral_systemsandprocesses/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide.html)>
5. OSCE/ODIHR, *Resolving Election Disputes in the OSCE Area: Towards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring System* (Vienna, OSCE, 2009), <<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/17567?>>
6. Electoral Integrity Group, *Towards an International Statement of the Principles of Electoral Justice: The Accra Guiding Principles (2011)*, <<http://www.integrityaction.org/dg/documents/towards-international-statement-principles-electoral-justice-accra-guiding-principles>>
7. The Electoral Integrity Project, <<https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/home>>

<b>Module 9: Mapping risk to an electoral process</b>	
<b>Learning objectives</b>	To examine the motives behind the use of two generators of electoral risk: protest and violence in different phases of the electoral cycle.
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global empirical trends</li> <li>• Actors, methods and location</li> <li>• Motives (causal mechanisms) for electoral security risks               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Motives during the pre-election phase                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election dynamics</li> <li>- Pre-election triggers</li> </ul> </li> <li>– Motives during the campaign and election day                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election dynamics</li> </ul> </li> <li>– Post-election motives                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election dynamics</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>• Connecting casual mechanisms to effective anti-violence response</li> </ul>
<b>Case study</b>	Thailand’s 2014 general election
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

## Methodological remarks

Previous sessions have presented a clear structure for mapping the **who** (relevant stakeholders), the **what** (why have elections, sources of information on electoral integrity, nature of risks to elections and transformations to peace) and the **when** (electoral cycles) of electoral security. This session focuses on the **why**—understanding the motivations for the types of actions that jeopardize electoral security.

This session revolves around an empirical **puzzle**: as elections are becoming a more common and accepted means of determining who governs a country, and states become more experienced in conducting them, the number of election protests and the probability of election violence has not declined.

This module examines the **motives** (also known as causal mechanisms) behind the use of two generators of electoral risk—protest and violence—according to where they fall in the three phases of the electoral cycle: pre-election, campaign (up to and including election day) and post-election. Each phase discussion includes a brief overview of the relevant actors, methods and location (who, how, and where) for each form of action. Each also groups causal mechanisms according to whether they can be considered to operate on one of **three levels**

**of analysis:** the country's **structural environment**, its **electoral rules and dynamics**, and specific **triggering events**.

## Module outline

Present the **global empirical trends** in which most elections are held in relative peace and security, and election violence and insecurity are much broader phenomena that affect all regions; roughly 80 per cent of elections do not lead to violence. Note that there has been a simultaneous growth in the number of elections held over time and as well as the levels of pre-election and post-election violence. The evidence also suggests that more elections are susceptible to pre-election than post-election violence, countering the conventional wisdom that post-election violence is more frequent.

Present the **actors, methods and location**. An earlier module highlighted the various relevant stakeholders in an electoral process, but a few additional types of **actors** (and ways of grouping them), specific to this sort of electoral risk, are relevant. This session presents the assumption that actors have (1) reasons (whether conscious or unconscious) for their actions and (2) preferences regarding the range of actions available to them, and (3) the time they have to make decisions is finite, as is (4) their available information about their options and environment.

Discuss the **methods** (myriad, as diverse as the interests involved) and **locations** that include those with a history of violence, where weapons or armed gangs are available, or where the election results are likely to be close, and those where security forces might have a harder time controlling an escalation in violence.

Discuss the **motives (causal mechanisms) for electoral security risks**.

Present structural factors during the **pre-election phase**. In addition to election dynamics and triggering events, this module focuses on structural considerations across the electoral cycle: economic, political, legal, social and geographic characteristics of a state that are relatively fixed in the short term and change slowly over the long term. More generally, a state's overall social, ethnic, economic and political structure is often what puts it at high or low risk. These structural factors are not limited to the pre-election period, but are a crucial element of understanding security risks throughout the electoral cycle.

Note that another structural issue affecting a country's overall probability of conflict is gender inequality across a range of political and economic areas. Such issues affect understanding of electoral security risks at all levels, but they are barely studied and not clearly understood.

Examine **election dynamics** such as the motives for incumbent or opposition repression/violence in order to skew the playing field or intimidate those they see as opposing their side. Also note the prevalence of intimidating lawmakers, media or individuals.

Present how security actions that happen during the **campaign and on election day** are almost always political. Particular **structural** reasons of interest here include no checks and balances, the high stakes and rewards of office, competition for resources, and weak policing or the selective provision of security in different areas.

Flag different types of **election dynamics** that include preventing opposition voters from heading to the polls or preventing specific candidates from running for office. Also note institutional problems on election day such as lost ballots, closed booths, and fraud or mismanagement.

Present the **post-election motives**, as after election day there is a rush of activity by both government and opposition forces. **Structural** considerations are not significantly different when looking at the motivations for protest or violence, although an understanding of how the democratic constraints on the executive operate in practice is critical.

Explain the importance of the **speed and efficiency with which the results are announced**. Note that the announcement of electoral results is an obvious **trigger**. Both incumbents and challengers often wait until they get a sense of the likely outcome (and whether it meets expectations) before responding with electoral security threats.

The dispute resolution mechanisms involving the EMB or the judicial system can also either encourage or discourage instability.

Explain that the final phase of the electoral cycle—which still includes security risks related to election outcomes—is actual political representation.

Present the **connection of causal mechanisms to effective anti-violence responses**.

Present how this module has outlined a number of different motivations for electoral risk and explored several empirical examples. Unlike a number of other types of destabilizing political violence (from interstate or civil war to government repression and human rights violations), there is little research on which of these many causal mechanisms are factors (or likely factors) in specific cases and/or regions.

## Recommended resources

1. Bardall, Gabrielle, *Breaking the Mold: Understanding Gender and Electoral Violence* (Washington, D.C.: IFES, 2011)
2. Bekoe, Dorina (ed.), *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2012)
3. Cyllah, Almami (ed.), *Elections Worth Dying For? A Selection of Case Studies from Africa* (Washington, D.C.: IFES, 2014)

4. Fischer, Jeff, *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention* (Washington, D.C.: IFES, 2002)
5. Hyde, Susan D. and Marinov, Nikolay, 'Which Elections Can Be Lost?', *Political Analysis*, 20 (2011), pp. 191–210
6. National Democratic Institute [NDI], *Monitoring and Mitigating Electoral Violence Through Nonpartisan Citizen Election Observation* (Washington, D.C.: NDI, 2014)
7. Reilly, Benjamin, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
8. Sisk, Timothy, 'Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence', paper presented at a conference of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, 2008
9. Snyder, Jack, *From Voting to Violence* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000)
10. Taylor, Charles, Pevehouse, Jon and Straus, Scott, 'Perils of Pluralism: Electoral Violence and Competitive Authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa', paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1, 2013, New Orleans
11. United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], *Understanding Election Violence in Asia* (Bangkok: UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Centre, 2011)
12. United States Agency for International Development [USAID], *Best Practices in Electoral Security: A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Programming* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2013)
13. Urdal, Henrik, 'A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence', *International Studies Quarterly*, 50 (2006), pp. 607–29
14. Wilkinson, Steven I., *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

<b>Module 10: Using new technology to map risk</b>	
<b>Learning objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To present the concept of crowdsourcing and outline three types of technologically enhanced conflict mapping that EMBs can use to enhance their information base on electoral security risks</li> <li>• To draw attention to a number of ways in which technologies can assist EMBs to speed up information gathering on risks, and how to tap into the monitoring potential of the citizenry at large</li> <li>• To analyse EMBs' expanding informational capabilities, and their engagement with civil society and the public to build societal trust in them as institutions</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How new technologies have transformed information flows during elections               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Crowdsourcing</li> </ul> </li> <li>• How EMBs can respond to the new information environment               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– 'Bounded' crowdsourcing: reporting by EMB staff</li> <li>– 'Open' crowdsourcing: reporting by citizens</li> <li>– 'Passive' crowdsourcing: listening to social media</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Some best practices               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Avoiding redundancies</li> <li>– Engaging with civil society and the public</li> <li>– Choosing appropriate technologies</li> <li>– Verifying information                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Manual verification</li> <li>- Crowdsourced verification</li> </ul> </li> <li>– Making information actionable</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indonesia: presidential election 2014</li> <li>• Malaysia 2013</li> <li>• Kenya 2007</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

### Methodological remarks

This session complements the political and historical analysis illustrated in previous sessions by introducing participants to new forms of gathering information on electoral risks and conflict. It uses the concept of **crowdsourcing** to outline three types of technologically enhanced conflict mapping that EMBs can use to enhance their information base on electoral security risks. Draw attention to a number of ways in which technologies can assist EMBs to speed

up their **gathering of information** on risks, and how to tap into the monitoring potential of the citizenry at large. In that sense, it is somewhat similar to developing early warning capabilities.

This is not a programmatic response to mitigate electoral conflict, but provides EMBs with alternative and complementary tools to conduct research and analysis to inform decision making. The use of online mapping, citizen reporting and social media monitoring is aimed at generating additional and timely information on trending developments, as they occur.

## Module outline

Discuss **how new technologies have transformed information flows during elections**. Although not on par with traditional mass communication (TV, radio or newspaper), the internet and mobile phones are reaching more and more people every day—including in low- and middle-income countries. Despite a persisting digital divide, 40 per cent of the global population is online and the number of mobile phone subscriptions exceeds the world population (ITU 2014). Governments, political parties, advocacy organizations, and citizens alike make use of these technological advances to enhance their communication strategies or aid in the gathering of information.

Flag how EMBs also face a changed information environment, in which the speed and volume of information flows have increased exponentially. From online campaigning, to internet voting, voter registration by SMS, voting advice applications (VVA), campaign finance monitoring, to the tracking of candidates' popularity via online social networking sites, new communication technologies have rapidly transformed the conduct of elections. In addition, political parties, civil society organizations, news media and citizens are able to share observations, comment on the conduct of election officials, or accuse each other of fraud at a much faster pace.

Part of this trend is the use of mobile technology and social media for the rapid reporting of local events, and online maps for the visualization of these events in near real-time. Unlike TV, radio or newspaper, mobile and social media are many-to-many communication channels (Stevens 1981), meaning that information is generated, received, edited and shared by audiences-turned-producers consisting of professional media outlets and ordinary citizens alike.

Present how '**crowdsourcing**' has the potential to provide EMBs with alternative and complementary tools to conduct research and analysis to inform decision-making.

Crowdsourcing is not in itself a programmatic response to mitigate electoral conflict. However, since risks to the electoral process may occur rapidly with the potential to turn into violence or security challenges, the use of online mapping, citizen reporting and social media monitoring has the potential to generate additional and timely information to inform appropriate mitigation measures. In a number of ways, technologies can help EMBs speed up their information gathering on risks, at best providing early warning capability.

Discuss the criticism about the inaccuracies (or even dangers) of crowdsourcing and its potential negative effects. In the context of elections, this could happen in the form of false reports or attempts by political parties to discredit their opponents.

Present **how EMBs can respond to the new information environment**. EMBs seem largely reluctant to immerse themselves in the new information environment. Yet without knowledge of how these processes work, problems might arise if EMBs are expected to incorporate crowdsourced information into their workflow, and react to thousands (or perhaps tens of thousands) of new pieces of information.

Outline the three ways in which EMBs can respond proactively and constructively to the challenges posed by the new environment of information abundance through crowdsourcing. These are relevant throughout the **electoral cycle**, yet their usefulness might be most pronounced during the phases of campaign, polling and counting:

1. **‘bounded’ crowdsourcing**: reporting by EMB staff (or its trained and trusted observers) by SMS, app, hotline, email, etc.;
2. **‘open’ crowdsourcing**: reporting by citizens (in response to an open call to all citizens, who submit through SMS, app, hotline, email); and
3. **‘passive’ crowdsourcing**: listening to social media.

**Present** best practices and the **pros and cons** of crowdsourcing and discuss several strategies that EMBs can consider if planned well in advance:

- minimize redundancies with the infrastructure already in place;
- **engage early with civil society and the public** to generate synergies in information gathering;
- **choose appropriate technologies** for different situations, such as phone hotline, interactive voice response and SMS messaging;
- **verify information** to avoid spreading false information and rumours; and
- **decide which information to make public and make it actionable**; an online map—as in many of the examples cited above in the text—can be a valuable tool for focusing public interest.

## Recommended resources

1. Bailard, Catie Snow and Steven Livingston, ‘Crowdsourcing Accountability in a Nigerian Election’, *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, 11/4 (2014), pp. 349–67
2. Bardall, Gabrielle, ‘Election Violence Monitoring and the Use of New Communication Technologies’, *Democracy & Society*, 7/2 (2010), pp. 1–8
3. Fung, Archon, ‘Popular Election Monitoring. How Technology Can Enable Citizen Participation in Election Administration’, in Guy-Uriel E.



- Charles, Heather K. Gerken and Michael S. Kang (eds), *Race, Reform, and Regulation of the Electoral Process: Recurring Puzzles in American Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 192–208
4. Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors [GNDEM], *Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations and Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors* (GNDEM, 2012)
  5. Grömping, Max, 'Echo Chambers. Partisan Facebook Groups during the 2014 Thai Election', *Asia Pacific Media Educator*, 24/1 (2014), pp. 1–21
  6. Howe, Jeff, 'The Rise of Crowdsourcing', *Wired*, 14/6 (June 2006)
  7. Iacucci, Anahi Ayala, 'Monitoring and Verifying During the Ukrainian Parliamentary Election', in Craig Silverman (ed.), *Verification Handbook. An Ultimate Guideline to Digital Age Sourcing for Emergency Coverage* (Maastricht: The European Journalism Centre, 2014), pp. 31–3
  8. Ilo, Udo Jude, *Making Elections Count: A Guide to Setting up a Civil Society Election Situation Room* (Abuja: Open Society Institute for West Africa, 2012)
  9. International IDEA, *Social Media: A Practical Guide for Electoral Management Bodies* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014)
  10. International Telecommunications Union [ITU], *World Communication/ ICT Indicators Database 2014, (18th edition)* (Geneva: International Telecommunications Union, 2014)
  11. Lederach, John Paul, 'Crowdsourcing during Post-election Violence in Kenya', in Joseph G. Bock (ed.), *The Technology of Nonviolence: Social Media and Violence Prevention* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2013)
  12. Lorenz, J. Rauhut, H. Schweitzer, F. and Helbing, D. 'How Social Influence Can Undermine the Wisdom of Crowd Effect', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 108/22 (2011), pp. 1–6
  13. Metzger, M. J., Flanagin, A. J., Eyal, K., Lemus, D. and McCann, R., 'Credibility for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Integrating Perspectives on Source, Message, and Media Credibility in the Contemporary Media Environment', in Pamela J. Kalbfleisch (ed.), *Communication Yearbook 27* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2003), pp. 293–335
  14. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], *Humanitarianism in the Network Age* (New York: OCHA, 2013)
  15. Omenya, Rhoda, *Uchaguzi Kenya 2013. Monitoring & Evaluation* (Nairobi: iHub Research, 2013)

16. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], *Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation* (Vienna: OSCE, 2005)
17. Schuler, Ian, 'SMS as a Tool in Election Observation', *Innovations*, 3/2 (2008), pp. 143–57
18. Sharma, Ankit, 'Crowdsourcing Critical Success Factor Model: Strategies to Harness the Collective Intelligence of the Crowd', Working Paper, London School of Economics, 2010
19. Silverman, Craig (ed.), *Verification Handbook. An Ultimate Guideline to Digital Age Sourcing for Emergency Coverage* (Maastricht: European Journalism Centre, 2014)
20. Stevens, Chandler Harrison, *Many-to-many Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Information Systems Research, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, 1981)
21. Sunstein, Cass R., 'The Law of Group Polarization', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 10/2 (2002), pp. 175–95
22. Tuccinardi, Domenico and Balme, Franck, 'Citizen Election Observation Towards a New Era', *Election Law Journal*, 12/1 (2013), pp. 94–9
23. Zaller, John R., *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
24. Bader, Max, 'Crowdsourcing Election Monitoring in the 2011–2012 Russian Elections', *East European Politics*, 29/4 (2013), pp. 521–35
25. Berman, Eli, Callen, Michael J., Gibson, Clark and Long, James D., 'Election Fairness and Government Legitimacy in Afghanistan', NBER Working Paper No. 19949, 2014
26. Grömping, Max, 'Many Eyes of Any Kind? Comparing Traditional and Crowd-sourced Monitoring and their Contribution to Democracy', paper presented at the Second International Conference on International Relations and Development, 26–27 July 2012, Chiang Mai, Thailand
27. Grömping, Max, 'Citizen Reporting as Norm Entrepreneurship? The Case of Crowdsourced Election Monitoring in Southeast Asia', paper prepared for presentation at the ICIRD 2013 conference, 22–23 August 2013, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
28. Heinzelman, Jessica and Meier, Patrick, 'Crowdsourcing for Human Rights Monitoring: Challenges and Opportunities for Verification', in John Lannon (ed.), *Human Rights and Information Communication Technologies: Trends and Consequences of Use* (IGI Global, 2012)

29. Hellström, Johan and Karefelt, Anna, 'Mobile Participation? Crowdsourcing during the 2011 Uganda General Elections', in *Proceedings of M4D 2012*, 28–29 February 2012, New Delhi, India, p. 411
30. Herron, Erik, 'The Effect of Passive Observation Methods on Azerbaijan's 2008 Presidential Election and 2009 Referendum', *Electoral Studies*, 29/3 (2010), p. 17
31. Sjöberg, Fredrik, 'Autocratic Adaptation: The Strategic Use of Transparency and the Persistence of Election Fraud', *Electoral Studies*, 34/4 (2014), pp. 233–45
32. Smyth, Thomas N. and Best, Michael L., 'Tweet to Trust: Social Media and Elections in West Africa', paper presented at the Sixth International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development (ICTD2013), Cape Town, South Africa 2013
33. International IDEA's Electoral Risk Management Tool, <<http://www.idea.int/elections/ermtool/>>, and Module 9 of this workshop
34. Aitamurto, Tanja, *Crowdsourcing for Democracy. A New Era in Policy-Making* (Helsinki: Parliament of Finland, 2012)
35. EC-UNDP Joint Taskforce on Electoral Assistance, *Thematic Workshop: Information Technology and Election Management* (Brussels: European Commission/UNDP, 2012)
36. iHub Research, *3Vs Crowdsourcing Framework for Elections* (Nairobi: iHub Research, 2013)
37. International IDEA, *Social Media: A Practical Guide for Electoral Management Bodies* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014)
38. Internews Center for Innovation and Learning, *Mapping the Maps: A Meta-level Analysis of Ushahidi and Crowdmap* (Washington, D.C.: Internews, 2012)
39. Stein, Michael, *Using Mobile Phones in Electoral and Voter Registration Campaigns* (Mobile Active, 2007)
40. National Democratic Institute [NDI], *Citizen Participation and Technology* (Washington, D.C.: NDI, 2014)
41. National Democratic Institute [NDI], *Monitoring and Mitigating Electoral Violence Through Nonpartisan Citizen Election Observation* (Washington, D.C.: NDI, 2014)
42. UN Development Programme [UNDP], *Mobile Technologies and Empowerment: Enhancing Human Development through Participation and Innovation* (New York: UNDP, 2014)

43. The World Bank, *Closing the Feedback Loop: Can Technology Bridge the Accountability Gap?* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2014)
44. Global Voices: Technology for Transparency Network, <<http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/>>
45. ICT4D Collective, <<http://www.gg.rhul.ac.uk/ict4d/Collective.html>>
46. iHub Research, <<http://www.ihub.co.ke/research>>
47. iRevolution, <<http://irevolution.net/>>
48. NDItech Democracy Works, <<https://www.demworks.org/>>
49. Ushahidi Election Monitoring Guide, <<https://wiki.usahidi.com/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=8358642>>

## Module 11: Mapping, preventing and mitigating election-related violence with focus on International IDEA's Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMTool)

<b>Learning objectives</b>	<p>To familiarize participants with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different approaches to prevention and mitigation of election-related violence</li> <li>• Different ICT-based tools</li> <li>• International IDEA's ERMTool</li> <li>• Challenges to institutionalization of digital tools</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mapping, prevention and mitigation of election-related violence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Prevention by non-state actors</li> <li>– Prevention by state actors</li> </ul> </li> <li>• ICT-based risk mapping methodologies and tools</li> <li>• Advantages, disadvantages and synergies of data analysis</li> <li>• Institutionalization of digital tools in elections</li> <li>• Challenges of adoption and implementation of digital tools by EMBs</li> <li>• International IDEA's ERMTool <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Three-layered approach</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mexico: Instituto Nacional Electoral</li> <li>• Sri Lanka: Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence</li> <li>• Ushahidi</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

### Methodological remarks

This module presents how several national and international governmental organizations and NGOs mandated to organize, support or monitor the credibility of elections have developed specialized tools and methodologies to warn about, prevent and mitigate election-related violence.

Discuss the main approaches, ICT tools and challenges in utilizing digital tools to prevent and mitigate election-related violence. Show that the ways in which they combine early warning and prevention strategies vary, and are contingent on the mandates and contexts in which these organizations operate. This module is complemented by a practical session in which participants will be able to practice using the ERMTool software.

## Module outline

Current approaches to mapping, preventing and mitigating election-related violence are contingent on the organizational mandate and capacity to engage. Distinguish between actions implemented and tools developed by non-state actors and EMBs, which have a specific mandate to ensure that elections are held peacefully.

Discuss how **non-state actors** (domestic and international CSOs) are implementing programmes that aim to address conflicts during the brewing stage. Flag their main strategies for monitoring and reporting on electoral violence, organizing community-based prevention and mitigation actions, and supporting the EMBs.

Debate how **state actors** (EMBs) are utilizing early warning data to make better-informed and conflict-sensitive electoral decisions. As state actors, they are well positioned to coordinate the efforts of other governmental agencies during elections, for instance in designing electoral security arrangements and prosecuting perpetrators of electoral crimes.

Examine how several organizations have **developed ICT-based risk mapping methodologies and tools** to assess, prevent and mitigate electoral risks. Discuss ICT-based risks by presenting the relevant cases of the Instituto Nacional Electoral in Mexico and the Sri Lanka Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence and USHAHIDI platform.

Present the **advantages, disadvantages and synergies of data analysis** features such as geographical colour coding, trend charting and aggregated figures.

Flag how digital tools are being increasingly **institutionalized in elections** to implement complex projects. Through the increasing use of digital tools, EMBs are able to collect and analyse the various data needed to plan and monitor electoral operations, and take actions to prevent and mitigate negative occurrences.

Present the **challenges of adopting and implementing digital tools by EMBs**. These could be related to limited internal capacities as well as the quality of the collaboration with external partners such as security sector agencies (SSAs), given that the effective utilization of digital tools is often contingent on data provided by external organizations.

Present good practices of how the utilization of digital tools helped improve collaboration and cooperation between EMBs and SSAs.

Present **International IDEA's Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMTool)**, which is designed to empower those who have immediate responsibility for (or a specific interest in) ensuring that elections are peaceful and credible. Intended users are EMBs, SSAs, civil society, and other state and non-state actors. It aims to enhance users' capacities to understand, analyse, prevent and mitigate

electoral risks, in particular those that can trigger or contribute to election-related violence.

Discuss the tool's **three-layered approach** for preventing and mitigating election-related violence: **improved electoral management, improved electoral security and improved infrastructure for peace**. These three layers reinforce each other.

## Recommended resources

1. International IDEA, *Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election-related Conflict and Violence* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2010)
2. Alihodžić, Sead, 'Electoral Violence Early Warning and Infrastructures for Peace', *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 7/3 (2013), pp. 54–69
3. Alihodžić, Sead, 'A Three-layered Approach to the Prevention of Electoral Violence, New Routes', *Journal of Peace Research and Action*, 17/1 (2012), pp. 10–14
4. International IDEA's Electoral Risk Management Tool, <<http://www.idea.int/elections/ermtool>>
5. ERMTTool, users' experiences, <<http://www.idea.int/elections/the-idea-electoral-risk-management-tool-pilots.cfm?1>>

<b>Module 12: Identifying electoral security interventions</b>	
<b>Learning objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Based on a proper analysis of the risks to the electoral process, an appropriate intervention should be developed to address that risk</li> <li>• To outline some thinking on responses to electoral violence</li> </ul>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principles of electoral security and forms of violence</li> <li>• Matching risk assessment with mitigation</li> <li>• Prevention, mitigation and response</li> <li>• Integration: what are the conditions for partnering with MoHA/Mol</li> <li>• Co-location—a precondition?</li> <li>• Joint Operation Centers (JoCs)</li> <li>• Tools to monitor, map and respond</li> <li>• Technology</li> <li>• Cost effectiveness</li> <li>• Annexes               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The cost of securing elections in UN mission settings</li> <li>– Nepal Electoral Violence Mitigation Assessment</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Case studies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nepal 2012</li> <li>• Mexico 2009</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

## Methodological remarks

There are as many possible measures to address the threat or occurrence of electoral violence as there are potential types of threats, perpetrators and peace builders. Identifying the risk, threat or occurrence of the violence comes first; designing and adapting the response to it comes second.

There can therefore be no ‘list’ of different interventions that can apply to all cases. One case can inform or learn lessons from another, for example comparing countries or comparing elections in the same country over time.

## Module outline

Present the electoral security topic that outlines the possible principles underpinning approaches to electoral security. The examples are based on the BRIDGE electoral security module. The key principles are:



- equitable and rights based;
- national ownership;
- strategic;
- non-partisan and impartial;
- flexible and efficient; and
- transparent and accountable.

Present where different people working in different elections would build different lists of forms of electoral violence:

- criminal;
- theft;
- fire;
- insult;
- demonstrations;
- fraud;
- landmines;
- hostage incident;
- threats to women;
- bomb threats;
- belligerents;
- explosives; and
- direct fire.

Present that in terms of **prevention, mitigation and response**, the benefits of integrated strategies or a ‘holistic and comprehensive approach’ have been recognized.

Discuss the specific role of EMBs in electoral security and the **conditions to partner with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)/MoI**. Given that EMBs lack the subnational structures, mandate and agreement from electoral stakeholders to lead efforts to track, categorize, and follow the status of acts of physical or threatened violence related to an electoral process, the MoI or MoHA and other constitutionally mandated judicial and security institutions are likely to retain (and unlikely to give up) accountability for these processes.

Flag that co-location of international, EMB and security actors is very important for maximizing coordination efforts for electoral security. Examine the alternative to co-location, which is parallel office structures with their own parallel chains of command and reporting lines. This is counterproductive and confusing to institutions that are interdependent and meant to be collaborating.

Note that utilized best practice is to integrate national (and international, where applicable) electoral security management through **JOCs**.

Discuss the new **tools** that have emerged to **monitor and map**, prevent and mitigate electoral violence. Also, new technologies such as social media have emerged that allow individuals and organizations to report and respond to electoral violence.

Discuss that no direct evidence has been found of the relative **cost effectiveness** of one security measure versus another, due to (1) the difficulties associated with measuring the prevention of conflict and (2) the absence of electoral costs in general, let alone for electoral security in particular.

The organization and conduct of credible elections require adherence to principles and rights, including:

- transparency;
- compliance with national laws;
- freedom of speech and association;
- impartial institutions; and
- inclusiveness.

Present practical issues that may need to be assessed when contemplating an intervention:

- past triggers;
- emerging triggers;
- the extent to which the constitutional structure provides incentives for potential spoilers to participate in the electoral process rather than boycott it;
- the legal system;
- the broad credibility of the election in question;
- any realignment of political parties;
- criminal domination;
- sources of political financing;
- the nature of electoral management;
- the role of the state machinery during the election (in particular, whether it is politically neutral, and whether there is a caretaker government in place);
- the role of women in politics; and
- the role of observers, CSOs and the media (including whether such bodies and organizations are neutral and capable).

## Recommended resources

1. Paris, R., *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 189
2. Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections [BRIDGE], <<http://www.bridge-project.org>> and Module 3 of this workshop
3. Martin, Harriet, *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War* (Bloomsbury, 2006), p. 24
4. Fomunyoh, Chris, *Mediating election-related conflicts* (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2009), p. 6
5. Call, C.T., 'Political Missions and Departures from Constitutional Orders', in R. Gowan, *Review of Political Missions* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011)

6. *The Hindu*, 'Editorial: The Model Code Ain't Broke', 23 February 2012
7. Kumar, Dhurba, *Electoral Violence and Volatility in Nepal* (Kathmandu: Vajira Publications, 2010)
8. Von Einsiedel, Sebastian, Malone, David M. and Pradhan, Suman, *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
9. United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston. Addendum: Election-related violence and killings*, UN documents A/HRC/14/24/Add.7, 21 May 2010
10. Norris, Pippa, 'Why Electoral Malpractices Heighten Risks of Electoral Violence', paper presented at the APSA 2012 Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2012
11. Pokharel, Bhojraj, Malla-Dhakal, Rajju and Morrice, Adrian, *Electoral Violence and Mitigation Assessment: Final Report* (Kathmandu: Election Commission, Nepal and UNDP, 2012)
12. Morrice, Adrian, Cobos Flores, Francisco and O'Shea, Mary, *Lessons Learned: Integrated Electoral Assistance in UN Mission Settings* (New York and Geneva: UNDP, UNDPA and UNDPKO, 2013)
13. International IDEA's ERMTool, <<http://www.idea.int/elections/elections-in-nepal-remain-vulnerable-to-violence.cfm>>
14. Letouzé, Emmanuel, 'Can Big Data From Cell Phones Help Prevent Conflict?' International Peace Institute, 8 November 2012, <<http://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/11/can-big-data-from-cellphones-help-prevent-conflict/>>, accessed 19 November 2015
15. Carrillo, Manuel, 'Instituto Federal Electoral, Mexico,' in International IDEA, *Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election related Conflict and Violence* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2009)
16. United Nations, 'Election-related Violence', in *Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results*, S/2011/552 (New York and Geneva: UN, 2011), p. 17
17. 'Peace Operations and Electoral Violence', in *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2012), Box 2.2, p. 40
18. UN Development Programme [UNDP], Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy, *Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming* (New York; UNDP, 2009)

19. United Nations, *Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization*, UN resolution A/RES/66/163, 10 April 2012
20. López-Pintor, R. and Fischer, J., *Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project* (Washington, D.C.: IFES, 2005)
21. Morrice, Adrian, Cobos Flores, Francisco and O’Shea, Mary, *Lessons Learned: Integrated Electoral Assistance in UN Mission Settings* (New York and Geneva: UNDP, UNDPA and UNDPKO, 2013), Annex 4
22. ACE Project, ‘Elections and Security’, <<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/elections-and-security/principles-of-elections-and-security>>

## Module 13: Security, violence and new technologies

<b>Learning objectives</b>	<p>To acquire general background information about ICT systems, including their risks, advantages and relationship with security by the EMB throughout the electoral cycle. The module presents the potential impact of the introduction and usage of new technologies on the security and integrity of the electoral process.</p>
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Usage of ICT throughout the electoral cycle</li> <li>• Risks related to the introduction of technology in the electoral process <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Stakeholder concerns</li> <li>– Technology significantly changing previously established procedures</li> <li>– The risk of introducing immature systems</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Risks related to the usage of technology <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– EMB reputation</li> <li>– Inadequate performance</li> <li>– Claims of manipulation</li> <li>– Valuable equipment attracting crime</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Cyber security, tampering and hacking <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Manipulation of election results, endangering the secrecy of the vote</li> <li>– Data protection, data leaks</li> <li>– Sabotage</li> <li>– Election ICT systems as ‘collateral damage’ in cyber conflicts</li> <li>– Physical attacks and breaches in connection with cyber attacks</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Mitigating technology risks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Needs assessment and appropriate technology</li> <li>– Resources, funding and sustainability</li> <li>– Stakeholder relations, transparency and communication strategy</li> <li>– Avoiding rushed introduction of new technology</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Case studies and examples (to be provided by the facilitator)</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	<p>90 min.</p>

### Methodological remarks

This module presents the potential impact of the introduction and usage of new technologies on the security and integrity of the electoral process. It focuses on EMBs’ ICT usage throughout the electoral cycle.

The module broadly defines security and violence that encompasses all threats and attacks against persons, physical material and property, and technical infrastructure that can challenge the integrity of the electoral process.

This module can be used on its own or in connection with other modules, particularly the ‘Media’, ‘Risk Mapping’ and ‘Risk Tools’ modules. It encompasses technologies such as community radio, social media and two-way communication, citizen journalism, crowd sourcing and specialized risk mapping applications in more detail.

## Module outline

Present how, as the utilization of technology throughout the electoral cycle increases, most parts of the electoral process depend on flawlessly deployed and operated ICT systems. Cases are provided throughout this module to demonstrate that the impact of technology risks on electoral integrity is not limited to conflict countries, but also needs to be considered in stable democracies.

Introduce how the usage of ICT poses new challenges and risks that can jeopardize election security and trigger violence. While ICT in itself is rarely the root cause of electoral violence, it can play an important role in both mitigating and aggravating triggers of violence. This is especially true in fragile and security sensitive environments. Explain how electoral technology has the closest link to triggers of violence where it relates to the establishment of election results. Also describe how technology can create new channels for undermining the integrity of elections through non-violent cyber-attacks.

Discuss technology’s positive side, and how ICT usage in electoral processes can improve the credibility of electoral conduct and alleviate some problems that can trigger violence. For example, ICT can contribute to:

- more accurate and comprehensive voter registers;
- better voter eligibility checks and prevention of multiple voting;
- elimination of some avenues of fraud through the reduction of human intervention in counting and tabulation;
- faster availability of results, shortening the period of uncertainty related to the electoral outcome;
- more accurate results through eliminating human error in the tabulation process;
- better and timelier ability to comprehensively inform the electorate;
- improved planning of the electoral process, including detection, prevention and mitigation of electoral violence; and
- increased financial transparency.

Review how EMBs **use ICT systems throughout the electoral cycle**. Overview the different types of technology, the examples of its potential security impact, patterns of escalation and possible mitigation strategies.

To discuss where and how technology can be disputed and become a potential source of violence, the module categorizes ICT risks into three groups:

- 1. Risks related to introducing technology into the electoral process.** Electoral technology in elections has specific risks during its initial introduction. All stakeholders, including the EMB, are potentially unfamiliar with the new technology and its potential impact on the overall process. The module presents the potential **stakeholder concerns** and reactions to the introduction of new technologies. Discuss the potential side effects of **technology significantly changing previously established procedures** that might eliminate, for example, existing problems such as inaccurate voter lists, delayed availability of results and certain types of fraud. Highlight the need for the electoral justice system to be prepared and qualified to handle new disputes that arise with new voting technologies and changing voting procedures. Cover the issue of the **risk of introducing immature systems** in elections where the implementation project fails technically and yields an unusable or unreliable solution.
- 2. Risks related to the ongoing usage of election technology.** Present how any flaw in election technology carries a reputational risk for the EMB. Additionally, a perception that the complexity of technology overwhelms the EMB can call into question its **reputation and credibility**. Introduce a discussion of how **inadequate performance** of election technology has the highest risk of undermining integrity and triggering violence where it becomes most visible to stakeholders. Discuss how in a tense political environment, even vague and unproven **claims of ICT manipulation** or flaws can become a major point of contention. Note how ICT **equipment value can attract crime**. To enrich the discussion, present a series of concrete contemporary cases of such situations.
- 3. The challenge of cyber-attacks against electoral ICT infrastructure.** Emphasize the debate about how the integrity and credibility of the electoral process can be undermined by hacking and cyber-attacks to ICT systems. Cyber-attacks are usually non-violent, anonymous and not attributable, which reduces the personal and political risk for attackers. Note that absolute protection against such attacks is impossible, and that in practice protection levels are limited by a lack of available resources for countermeasures. Cyber-attacks can become an issue in the electoral process through technical vulnerabilities that allow for the **manipulation of election results**, endangering the secrecy of the vote. Present how technical vulnerabilities can endanger electoral integrity: even a widely shared perception of threat is already a problem; vulnerabilities that can be proven in laboratory environments are more serious, and security issues that can be exploited in actual elections are the most critical. Review the importance of **data protection and leaks**, given that EMBs handle substantial personal data such as voters' biometric details. Stress the importance of safeguarding the ICT infrastructure, since EMBs can be discredited by an act of **sabotage**.

Present best practices in strategies to **mitigate technology risks** in order to facilitate the successful introduction and use of electoral technology and thus avoid related risks. For this purpose, **needs assessments and adopting appropriate technologies** are important. Consider **resources, funding and sustainability**. Note the importance of reinforcing **stakeholder relations, transparency and communication strategies**. Finally, discuss the need to **avoid rushed introductions of new technologies**.

List and discuss contemporary ICT **cases studies and examples** from four continents to demonstrate how various electoral technologies affected security, levels of violence and electoral integrity.

## Recommended resources

1. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 'Results Management Topic Area', 2013, <<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/vc>>
2. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 'Voter Registration Topic Area', 2012, <<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/vr>>
3. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 'Focus on E-voting', 2014, <<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/e-voting>>
4. Council of Europe, *E-voting Handbook - Key Steps in the Implementation of e-enabled Elections* (Strasbourg: CoE, 2010), <[http://www.coe.int/t/DEMOCRACY/ELECTORAL-ASSISTANCE/themes/evoting/CoEvotingHandbook\\_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/DEMOCRACY/ELECTORAL-ASSISTANCE/themes/evoting/CoEvotingHandbook_en.pdf)>
5. Evrensel, Astrid, *Voter Registration in Africa: A Comparative Analysis* (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, 2006), <<http://www.content.eisa.org.za/pdf/vrafrica.pdf>>
6. Rid, Thomas, 'Cyber War and Peace', *Foreign Affairs*, November/December (2013), <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140160/thomas-rid/cyberwar-and-peace>>
7. International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES], *Direct Democracy: Progress and Pitfalls of Election Technologies* (Washington, D.C.: IFES, 2011), <[http://ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/Books/2011/20111026\\_Direct\\_Democracy\\_Progress\\_and\\_Pitfalls\\_Election\\_Technology\\_Yard.pdf](http://ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/Books/2011/20111026_Direct_Democracy_Progress_and_Pitfalls_Election_Technology_Yard.pdf)>
8. International IDEA, *Electoral Management Design: Revised edition* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014), <<http://www.idea.int/publications/emd/>>
9. International IDEA, *Introducing Electronic Voting: Essential Considerations* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2011), <<http://www.idea.int/publications/introducing-electronic-voting/index.cfm>>
10. International IDEA, *Observing E-enabled Elections: How to Implement Regional Electoral Standards* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2012), <<http://www.idea.int/democracydialog/upload/Observing-e-enabled-elections-how-to-implement-regional-electoral-standards.pdf>>
11. International IDEA, *The Use of Open Source Technology in Elections* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014), <<http://www.idea.int/publications/open-source-technology-in-elections>>



12. International IDEA, *Certification of ICTs in Elections* (Stockholm, International IDEA, 2015)
13. *Information Week*, 'Why Do Big IT Projects Fail so Often?', 28 October 2013, <<http://www.informationweek.com/strategic-cio/executive-insights-and-innovation/why-do-big-it-projects-fail-so-often/d/d-id/1112087>>
14. National Democratic Institute [NDI] and International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES], *Implementing and Overseeing Electronic Voting and Counting Technologies* (Washington, D.C.: NDI and IFES, 2013), <[http://www.ifes.org/-/media/Files/Publications/ManualHandbook/2013/Implementing\\_and\\_Overseeing\\_Electronic\\_Voting\\_and\\_Counting\\_Technologies.pdf](http://www.ifes.org/-/media/Files/Publications/ManualHandbook/2013/Implementing_and_Overseeing_Electronic_Voting_and_Counting_Technologies.pdf)>
15. Organization of American States [OAS], *Observing the Use of Electoral Technologies* (Washington, D.C.: OAS, 2010), <<https://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/Technology%20English-FINAL-4-27-10.pdf>>
16. OSCE/ODIHR, *Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies* (Vienna: OSCE/ODIHR, 2013), <<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/104939>>
17. European Commission [EC] and UN Development Programme [UNDP], Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance, *Thematic Workshop 'Information Technology and Elections Management', Summary Report* (Brussels and New York: EC and UNDP, 2012), <<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/brussels/docs/Other/EC%20UNDP%20Joint%20Task%20Force%20Thematic%20Workshop%20on%20ICT%20and%20Elections%20Management,%205%20to%209%20March,%202012.pdf>>
18. The Carter Center, *Handbook on Observing Electronic Voting* (Atlanta, Ga.: Carter Center, 2012), <[http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/Carter-Center-E\\_voting-Handbook.pdf](http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/Carter-Center-E_voting-Handbook.pdf)>
19. Khazan, Olga, 'What Causes Some Elections to Go Violent?', *The Atlantic*, 5 March 2013, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/what-causes-some-elections-to-go-violent/273728/>>

## Module 14: Lessons learned globally: What can national and international actors do to ensure secure and inclusive electoral processes

<b>Learning objectives</b>	This module functions as the epilogue of the workshop. It takes stock of contemporary perspectives on electoral security and the current state of knowledge about it, identifying historical developments, highlighting the rapidly changing nature of the field and flagging several emerging challenges.
<b>Key subtopics</b>	<p>Key subtopics of this module are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Historical trends</li> <li>• The rapidly changing nature of the field</li> <li>• Modern challenges <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Centralization vs. decentralization</li> <li>- The electoral cycle</li> <li>- International engagement</li> <li>- Knowledge management</li> <li>- Social media</li> <li>- Risks of technology</li> <li>- Out-of-country voting</li> <li>- Remote internet voting</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	90 min.

### Methodological remarks

As election security is mainly a matter of concrete experience and practice rather than abstract theory and analysis, the entire workshop constitutes a compendium of lessons learned.

Earlier chapters have addressed and summarized specific elements of the context of, planning for and implementation of election security. This epilogue takes stock of contemporary perspectives on the subject and the current state of knowledge about it, identifying historical developments, highlighting the rapidly changing nature of the field and flagging several emerging challenges

### Module content

Note that specialized thinking at the global level about election security is a **comparatively recent phenomenon**. The end of the Cold War constituted a

clear break with the past. Many countries that had one-party political systems and little or no established culture of democratic elections sought to make a transition to multiparty democracy. Also, the opportunity to bring an end to civil wars in a number of developing countries—which had been a feature of the Cold War—gave rise to the new phenomenon of elections conducted as an integral part of UN peacekeeping operations, with attendant military and civilian police involvement. Present the case of the Namibian independence election of 1989 as a break from the past.

Indicate that since 1989, there has been a growing trend that EMBs are expected to conduct elections in increasingly insecure environments, and in situations where spoilers have been opposed to the overall political and constitutional framework.

Explain the **rapidly changing nature of the field**, in which lessons are still being learned. This dynamic state of affairs can be expected to continue for the foreseeable future, and stands in stark contrast to some other prominent areas of electoral study (such as electoral systems).

Emphasize that the overall picture of election security remains complex. The earlier modules identified many factors that have the potential to influence the nature of security threats, which have required security responses in past elections. A full understanding of these factors would require an analysis of the motives, means and opportunities of a potentially large number of actors; in many cases, these will be subject to considerable uncertainty in the minds of the relevant authorities and planners.

Indicate **some modern challenges**, and a number of questions and issues, which in the short to medium term are likely to require the close attention of election security planners.

### ***Centralization vs. decentralization***

By nature, an election is a decentralized operation. This implies that the decentralization of functions needs to be accompanied by a decentralization of decision-making and responsibility.

Complexities can arise when a security operation or intervention has to be overlaid on this model of election administration, because the overall command and control architecture for security and/or police forces may well be different. The most powerful interventions might even require decision-making at the national level. This highlights the need for early contact and communication between EMBs and security actors; a clear understanding of each other's command and control systems; and, where possible, the integration of such systems through mechanisms such as joint operations centres at all administrative levels.

Present how technological tools (real-time reporting, mapping of security incidents, etc.) are increasingly available to EMBs and their security partners, which shapes decision-making in ways that require careful consideration.

### *The electoral cycle*

Debate how the concept has developed for the last 10 years, and how it has highlighted the need for election preparation activities to be sequenced in a timely, systematic and structured way. Explain why timely planning is just as important for election security activities as for activities relating to other aspects of the electoral process. The point in the electoral cycle at which election security preparations need to come to the fore will, however, vary from case to case. Security must be an integral element of all stages of the electoral cycle.

Present how the existence of perceived major threats to the security of an election implies a considerable power on the part of miscreants to cause trouble and disruption. Such a power can be exercised in a range of different ways, making the overall security environment harder to predict.

Finally, it needs to be borne in mind that the electoral cycle rarely takes place in isolation. In even the simplest cases in established democracies, it is likely to proceed in parallel with a cycle of legal reform and parliamentary activity.

### *International engagement*

Present how insecure elections often correlate with threats to international peace and security, and thus are marked by international engagement. Thus the resources available for responses to security problems can vary dramatically over time. Where international military and police are present, they may be able to deploy large numbers of well-equipped, experienced and trained officers, who are supported by technically skilled planners and proven standard operating procedures. Such an operation can create expectations in the community that are hard to maintain when the international force has withdrawn.

### *Knowledge management*

Present the problem of knowledge management within an EMB and its partner organizations. As emphasized above, the body of knowledge associated with election security is built up not from abstract analysis, but from direct experience of problems that have arisen and 'solutions' that have either worked or failed. Such experience, however, needs to be accessible, either in the form of staff memories or well-maintained records. Yet EMBs face the problem of substantial staff turnover and the challenge of passing on institutional knowledge.

### *Social media*

Note that the rise of social media is expected to continue, but that its future landscape will be difficult to predict. Social media present EMBs with several major challenges. Social media users place great priority on receiving rapid responses from bureaucratic organizations, but these are not always well placed

to provide such responses. The sheer volume of questions and issues may well make it impossible to maintain traditional processes of high-level clearance of information prior to publication.

Explain how social media also provide an opportunity for EMBs to access large volumes of ‘crowdsourced’ information in near real time. For this to be of practical value, however, the EMBs must have systems in place to receive and analyse the information in question, and to respond rapidly to issues that the information highlights.

### *Risks with technology*

Present how technology in the running of elections is becoming ever more prominent. Tools such as biometric voter registration, real-time election result compilation, geographic information systems or corporate websites are becoming the norm. Yet assumptions that sophisticated systems will contribute to the security of an election, improve the underlying quality of the process, and/or enhance trust and credibility are problematic. Explain the risks of implementing new technologies (i.e., the risk that technology may be directed toward solving the wrong problem, high costs, task of setting up systems could be overwhelming, etc.).

Note that while sound implementation has the potential to meet intended targets, and hopefully to build confidence and trust in the effectiveness of elections and the EMB, failed implementation can have the opposite effect.

### *Out-of-country voting*

Discuss how the increasing mobility of populations worldwide poses an ongoing challenge for EMBs. The nature of the security problems involved in enfranchising populations such as refugees or guest workers is immensely variable, but a common factor in all cases is that the EMB will have to deal not only with its own domestic security apparatus, but also with the governments (and potentially the security apparatuses) of other countries.

### *Remote internet voting*

Note the pressures on EMBs, from political players and vendors, to consider the use of such systems. Internet voting raises a wide range of distinctive questions, especially relating to secure networking and data encryption, and crystallizes some fundamental questions about the basic character of elections, such as the meaning of a secret ballot.



# Practical Sessions

## Practical session 1: Country and stakeholder presentations

<b>Type of workshop</b>	Regional and national levels (on the first day)
<b>Session's objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional workshop: for workshop participants to present the challenges and experiences from previous electoral processes</li> <li>• National workshop: workshop participants to present their conclusions about the security challenges of previous elections</li> </ul>
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p>Key activities of this practical session are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To prepare participants for the workshop (presentations should be prepared in advance)</li> <li>• To allow participants from different institutions to present their problems and failures from previous electoral processes</li> <li>• To enable discussions during pre-workshop assessment</li> <li>• To inform trainers and presenters in advance of topics to cover in the theoretical and practical sessions</li> </ul>
<b>Support on theoretical modules</b>	Presentations are to be developed before the workshop starts based on the participants' experience
<b>Suggested length</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional workshop: provide EMB and security forces with 20 minutes for each presentation.</li> <li>• National workshop: provide each stakeholder with 15 minutes for his or her presentation.</li> </ul>



## Practical session 2: Mapping simulation (ERMTool)

<b>Type of workshop</b>	National and regional
<b>Session's objectives</b>	To experience a digital mapping tool through a practical exercise
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p>Key activities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customization (relevant risk factors in a given country context)</li> <li>• Create analytical model (including selected factors)</li> <li>• Assign risk levels to respective administrative regions (within a sample country)</li> <li>• Create colour-coded risk map</li> <li>• Discuss and identify prevention and mitigation strategies</li> <li>• Create risk alert including details on risks and recommended actions</li> </ul>
<b>Requirements</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hardware (PCs): one per five participants (approx.)</li> <li>• ERMTool software licenses</li> <li>• ERMTool software and guides</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	120–180 min.

## Practical session 3: Crowdsourcing

<b>Type of workshop</b>	Regional and national levels
<b>Session's objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To understand the phenomena and reach associated with social and mobile media, and their risks and implications on issues such as monitoring, security, transborder communication and specific electoral-related activities (e.g., voter education)</li> <li>• To obtain basic analysis, planning, and implementation skills to develop an appropriate and effective social media plan</li> </ul>
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p>Key activities of this practical session are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To discuss the increasing overlap of internet functionality and mobile telephony</li> <li>• To discuss basic elements of a social media strategy (EMBs, CSOs, observers, etc.)</li> <li>• To split into two groups to allow expert moderators to develop strategy on specific topics</li> <li>• To present examples and discuss ways to engage the public, media, and civil society in constructive ways for information sharing and gathering via social and mobile media. Highlight concrete options (for EMB audiences) using case studies from an African context, where situation rooms have worked well. Present different digital platforms such as SMS, Ushahidi</li> <li>• To conduct exercises on innovative ways to ensure the veracity and integrity of communications via social and mobile media, including how to verify and curate information</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	100 min.

## Practical session 4: Introducing election security

<b>Type of workshop</b>	Regional and national levels
<b>Session's objectives</b>	To understand the broad definition of election security
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p>Plenary discussion of the definition of election security and election security stakeholders.</p> <p>Facilitator will lead a plenary brainstorming session that asks the following questions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>What does security mean to you?</i> (5 min.) Definition of security to be projected or written on whiteboard</li> <li><i>What does election security mean?</i> (5 min.) Definition of election security to be projected or written on whiteboard</li> <li><i>How can we ensure elections are conducted in a secure and safe environment?</i> (7 min.) Define election security stakeholders</li> <li><i>Who provides election security services?</i> (7 min.) Define statutory security agencies/forces</li> </ol> <p>Summary of the session (5 min.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defining security</li> <li>Defining election security</li> <li>Differentiate between election security stakeholder and statutory security agencies</li> </ul>
<b>Relationship with modules and theoretical resources</b>	<p>Module 1: Electoral security within the electoral process</p> <p>Module 3: Security considerations in the different electoral phases</p> <p>Module 4: Role of security forces</p> <p>Module 5: Electoral security in peace processes and transitions</p> <p>Module 6: Stakeholder analysis</p> <p>Module 12: Identifying electoral security interventions</p>
<b>Suggested length</b>	30 min.

## Practical session 5: Roles and responsibilities of security forces

<b>Type of workshop</b>	National level
<b>Session's objectives</b>	To understand the role of security forces throughout the electoral cycle
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p>Participants will be briefed about the context of the exercise and the electoral cycle (handouts will be distributed). Remind participants about the wider pool of election stakeholders (media, political parties, etc.)</p> <p>Practical exercise</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Divide participants into five groups</li> <li>• Each group will focus on one of the five most operational phases of the electoral cycle (1. Planning and Implementation; 2. Training and Education; 3. Voter Registration; 4. Electoral Campaign; 5. Voting Operations and Election Day)</li> <li>• Starting point is the definition of election security as the ultimate objective of security operations</li> <li>• Participants will prepare a presentation for 10 min</li> <li>• Ask the participants in each group to:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Draft an outline of the key roles and responsibilities of security forces engaged in providing election security in each of the assigned phases</li> <li>– Brainstorm how security forces can cooperate with/engage civilian entities (media, political parties, local leadership, CSOs, EMBs) in order to achieve their assigned role</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	<p>Total: 1 h 30 min.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 min. introducing the session and the exercise</li> <li>• 30 min. group work</li> <li>• 45 min. presentations (8–9 min per group)</li> <li>• 5 min. wrap-up</li> </ul>

## Practical session 6: Relationship between EMBs and security forces

<b>Type of workshop</b>	Regional level
<b>Session's objectives</b>	To identify potential challenges of civil-military/security relations
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p>Divide the participants into 4–5 groups (participants from the same country will preferably be in the same group). Each group will prepare a 5-minute presentation about the challenges of the relationship with the security forces, covering the following themes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Role of the EMB in security planning</li> <li>• Conduct of the security forces deployed on election day</li> <li>• Information sharing between security forces and EMBs, the different security forces involved</li> </ul> <p>Plenary discussion with Q&amp;A after each presentation—facilitator to capture key themes from the discussion</p>
<b>Suggested length</b>	<p>Total: 1h 30 min.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 min. presenting the exercise</li> <li>• 30 min. group work</li> <li>• 50 min. presentations</li> <li>• 5 min. wrap-up by facilitator</li> </ul>

## Practical session 7: Joint Elections Operation Centre (JEOC)

<b>Type of workshop</b>	National level
<b>Session's objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To understand the structure and function of a JEOC</li> <li>To understand the relationship between civil and security stakeholders within the JEOC</li> </ul>
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p>Plenary discussion about the JEOC—brainstorming: what is the JEOC?</p> <p>Explaining the exercise: remind the participants that election security cannot be achieved without engaging the stakeholders in the process</p> <p>Divide the participants into 4–5 groups. Each group designs a JEOC, specifying its members, roles and responsibilities and each of the members in relation to the other stakeholders (security ministries, police, civil defence, media, CSO, logistics, etc.) during the electoral cycle</p>
<b>Relationship with modules and theoretical resources</b>	<p>Module 1: Electoral security within the electoral process</p> <p>Module 3: Security considerations in the different electoral phases</p> <p>Module 4: Role of security forces</p> <p>Module 5: Electoral security in peace processes and transitions</p> <p>Module 6: Stakeholders analysis</p> <p>Module 12: Identifying electoral security interventions</p>
<b>Suggested length</b>	<p>Total: 1h 15 min.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>15 min. presenting the exercise</li> <li>30 min. group work</li> <li>20 min. presentations</li> <li>10 min. wrap-up</li> </ul>

## Practical session 8: Conduct and election-related training of security forces

<b>Type of workshop</b>	Regional level
<b>Session's objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To understand the human rights principles governing the performance of security forces</li> <li>• To understand best practices in training security personnel deployed in electoral events</li> </ul>
<b>Learning activities</b>	<p><b>Presentation:</b> Election security, human rights law and domestic legal framework. Establish the link between human rights, legal framework and the performance of security forces. Key challenge: are security forces aware of this link?</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> Divide participants into groups (if there are enough participants from each country, country groups are preferred). Ask each group to prepare a 5-minute presentation with three flip-chart papers covering:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Challenges related to the performance of security forces on election day</li> <li>• Current election-related training and capacity building provided to security personnel</li> <li>• Changes needed to enhance the conduct/performance of security personnel involved in election security</li> </ul> <p>Facilitator to wrap up identifying key lessons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Challenges of performance</li> <li>• Modalities of training</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested length</b>	<p>Total: 1h 15 min.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 min. presentation on election security and human rights</li> <li>• 5 min. introducing the exercise</li> <li>• 30 min. group work</li> <li>• 20 min. presentations</li> <li>• 10 min. wrap-up by facilitator</li> </ul>

## Practical session 9: Summary of the learning objectives

<b>Type of workshop</b>	Regional and national levels
<b>Session's objectives</b>	To summarize the workshop's learning objectives and exercises
<b>Learning activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plenary: ask participants to volunteer to summarize the day's key learning activities</li> <li>• Facilitator to deliver a pre-designed presentation with the key learning/take away lessons of the day</li> </ul>
<b>Relationship with modules and theoretical resources</b>	<p>Module 1: Electoral security within the electoral process</p> <p>Module 3: Security considerations in the different electoral phases</p> <p>Module 4: Role of security forces</p> <p>Module 5: Electoral security in peace processes and transitions</p> <p>Module 6: Stakeholder analysis</p> <p>Module 12: Identifying electoral security interventions</p>
<b>Suggested length</b>	30 min.



## About the Partners

### What is International IDEA?

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with a mission to support sustainable democracy worldwide.

The objectives of the Institute are to support stronger democratic institutions and processes, and more sustainable, effective and legitimate democracy.

### What does International IDEA do?

The Institute's work is organized at global, regional and country level, focusing on the citizen as the driver of change.

International IDEA produces comparative knowledge in its key areas of expertise: electoral processes, constitution building, political participation and representation, and democracy and development, as well as on democracy as it relates to gender, diversity, and conflict and security.

IDEA brings this knowledge to national and local actors who are working for democratic reform, and facilitates dialogue in support of democratic change.

In its work, IDEA aims for:

- Increased capacity, legitimacy and credibility of democracy
- More inclusive participation and accountable representation
- More effective and legitimate democracy cooperation

### Where does International IDEA work?

International IDEA works worldwide. Based in Stockholm, Sweden, the Institute has offices in the Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and West Asia and North Africa regions.

## The Electoral Integrity Project

The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) is a non-profit scholarly research project directed by Professor Pippa Norris, with a research team based at the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The project studies three main questions:

- When do elections meet international standards of electoral integrity?
- What happens when elections fail to do so?
- And what can be done to mitigate these problems?

The research design uses multiple methods, both quantitative and qualitative, and multilevel analysis. Since 2014, EIP has yearly produced the *Year in Elections Report* which provides an overall assessment of the elections held in the world each year. The reports are based on the project's expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, which provides a comprehensive, impartial, and independent source of information derived from experts evaluations about whether national elections meet internationally-recognized principles and standards. The project is an independent academic body and the evaluations presented in the report are the assessments of the project alone. The results have been featured, among others, in the New York Times and the Washington Post. The EIP has also focused on projects studying election violence, political finance, election monitoring and election management. EIP has presented its work in different academic and policy venues such as the American Political Science Association (APSA), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), the Australian Political Studies Association (AUSPSA), on the former and the UN, International IDEA, the OSCE, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) and IFES, on the latter.

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## United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

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